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FOREWORD
The euro crisis has calmed down somewhat, but the real problem, the
southern euro area countries’ lack of competitiveness, has not been
resolved. Some euro countries simply became too expensive in the years
before the crisis, as a result of the availability of cheap credit from abroad.
They now need to depreciate in real terms by cutting their wages and prices
relative to their euro area competitors. Whether and to what extent this
process is underway is one of the topics discussed in this year's report, the
twelfth in the series. The report also provides a more general assessment of
the crisis, expanding on topics that were discussed in previous issues. It
places a particular focus on the quickly deteriorating labour market situa-
tion and it tries to draw lessons for the European unification process from
the United States, and particularly from its problematic early years, during
which most of its states went bankrupt. 
As always, the report starts with an assessment of  the current economic
situation, providing a set of  forecasts prepared by the Ifo Institute and
complemented by the report’s authors, the European Economic Advisory
Group at CESifo (EEAG). Chapter 2 focuses on the intra-euro area imbal-
ances, emphasising the need for fiscal consolidation and a realignment of
prices. It suggests cutting expenditures rather than raising taxes, and it
advocates a fiscal devaluation by shifting the tax burden towards indirect
taxes. Chapter 3 looks at long-term unemployment and the development
of dual labour markets in some southern countries. At the heart of  the
analysis is the question of  the optimal degree of  labour market flexibility,
in terms of  trading off  efficiency and social justice. The chapter opposes
automatic, legally binding sector-level bargaining, and emphasises the
need for improved vocational education, training and apprenticeships, as
well as active labour market policies and employment protection legisla-
tion. Chapter 4 compares the European unification process with the his-
tory of  the United States. It argues that the establishment of  a common
state is a necessary prerequisite for fiscal transfer schemes and warns
against government debt mutualisation schemes. Furthermore, it calls for
a US-like settlement mechanism for the Target balances that the EEAG
analysed in its 2012 report. 
The EEAG, which is collectively responsible for each chapter in its yearly
report, consists of  a team of six economists from five countries. This year,
the Group is chaired by Jan-Egbert Sturm (KOF Swiss Economic
Institute, ETH Zurich) and includes Giuseppe Bertola (EDHEC Business
School), John Driffill (Birkbeck College), Harold James (Princeton
University), Ákos Valentinyi (Cardiff  Business School) and myself  (Ifo
Institute and University of  Munich). The members participate on a per-
sonal basis and do not represent the views of  the organisations they are
affiliated with.
I would like to express my gratitude for the valuable assistance provided
by the scholars and staff  at CES and Ifo who helped to prepare the report.
This year’s participants were Darko Jus and Nadjeschda Arnold (research
assistants), Tim Oliver Berg, Nikolay Hristov and Johanna Plenk (eco-
nomic forecast), Lisa Giani Contini and Julio Saavedra (editing),
Christoph Zeiner (graphics), Elisabeth Will (typesetting) and Ines Gross
(cover). I also wish to thank Swiss Re for hosting our autumn meeting. 
Hans-Werner Sinn
President, CESifo Group
Professor of Economics and Public Finance
Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich
Munich, 25 February 2013
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EUROPE
Chapter 2: EUROPEAN IMBALANCES
There is no quick-fix solution for countries that have lost their competi-
tiveness. These countries need a realignment of prices. An internal devalu-
ation through falling prices is usually accompanied by mass unemployment
and deep recession, which can potentially stoke social unrest. An external
devaluation, achieved via exiting the euro, is likely to create capital flight
before the event, and uncertainty afterwards as a result of ensuing legal
challenges, particularly from non-residents. An internal devaluation by
inflating the core countries may generate political resistance and violate the
ECB’s mandate of maintaining price stability. However, countries strug-
gling to restore competitiveness can:
• Try a fiscal devaluation. Increasing VAT while cutting direct taxes might
be a way to slightly improve the competitiveness of uncompetitive euro
countries.
• Cut expenditure rather than raising taxes during fiscal consolidation. The
empirical evidence shows that tax-based fiscal adjustments tend to be
less successful than expenditure-based ones. The periphery countries
should therefore focus more on cutting expenditure, rather than raising
taxes to reduce their deficits. Ireland and Spain, for instance, relied more
on cutting expenditure and seem far more on track with their internal
adjustment than Greece and Portugal, which raised taxes. 
• Reduce the Greek debt overhang. Policy-makers should deal with
Greece’s debt overhang in a credible way that does not require hard-
fought political renegotiation every few months. Writing-off a signifi-
cant amount of Greek debt under strict conditionality and surveillance
would be one way forward. 
Chapter 3: LABOUR MARKET REFORMS AND YOUTH
UNEMPLOYMENT
• Two-tier labour markets should be eliminated. They are characterised by
a marked distinction between temporary and permanent jobs. The bur-
den of adjusting to change falls heavily on those in temporary jobs,
while those in permanent jobs are shielded from it. They tend to make
the position of younger workers, among others, more precarious. Efforts
to reduce these differences should be kept up. 
• Make dismissal costs for firms modest and predictable. Long drawn-out
legal proceedings with highly uncertain and costly outcomes must be
avoided. Where they do not already exist, it may be worthwhile to estab-
lish employment tribunals or an arbitration service to resolve labour dis-
putes quickly and cheaply. Severance payments should depend on the
length of time a worker has been employed.
2013
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• Reconsider the automatic, legally binding extension of wage bargains
across sectors. Wage bargains should not be imposed on firms where
unions do not represent a large enough fraction of the labour force.
There should be further moves towards firm-level bargaining. In cases
where industry-wide agreements exist, firms and their workers should be
able to deviate from them, as local conditions dictate.
• Vocational education, training and apprenticeships need to be improved
in most European countries.
Chapter 4: US PRECEDENTS FOR EUROPE 
• Establish a common state before federalising debt. In the United States,
the federalisation or mutualisation of state debt depended on the cre-
ation of a fiscal mechanism that produced a stream of revenue to ser-
vice the debt. Debt was only mutualised after the foundation of a com-
mon state.
• Limit liabilities. The 1790 US compromise might be seen as a precedent
for limiting the liabilities of the northern European surplus countries in
the case a common European bond, or Eurobond, is created.
• Fiscal Equity. The choice of the fiscal mechanism to service a federalised
debt potentially raises deeply divisive issues about the distributive effects
of the tax or tariff  on the constituent states.
• Ensure that Europe's central bank is flexible and strictly governed.
Designing a central bank for a very large area is complicated, and re -
quires some measure of flexibility (such as differing collateral require-
ments) to respond to local or regional circumstances, as well as checks
and balances in its governance structure.
• Set up a US-style settlement mechanism in Europe. Europe needs a US-
style settlement mechanism that requires a securitisation of balances to
keep outstanding debts small; and even creates incentives to take coun-
tervailing local policy measures to avoid the build-up of balances in the
first place. A settlement system would protect the European creditor
countries against losses arising from a break-up of the currency union,
while making them more resistant to pressure to participate in bail-out
activities.
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SUMMARY
2012 was another tough year for the world economy,
and especially for the euro area. The euro crisis, which
developed into more than just a sovereign debt and a
banking crisis, intensified during the first half  of
2012. This triggered recessions in many member
countries, although tensions and fears have abated
somewhat in recent months. The underlying roots of
the crisis are the balance-of-payments imbalances that
accumulated in the years preceding it. This year’s
EEAG report addresses the resulting need for a major
rebalancing within Europe. 
Chapter 1 of  the report discusses the immediate
macro economic outlook for the global economy,
with a particular focus on the European situation.
Chapter 2 focuses on the major macroeconomic
imbalances within the euro area and argues that a
substantial devaluation in the crisis economies is
needed to achieve a sustainable solution. Against a
background of  surging unemployment rates in
many European countries in recent years, Chapter 3
analyses Euro pean labour markets, with a special
focus on youth unemployment. Finally, Chapter 4
looks at the situation in Europe from across the
pond to determine whether Europe can learn any
lessons from the historical development of  a fiscal
union in the United States.
Chapter 1: Macroeconomic Outlook
A renewed escalation of the euro crisis pulled the
world economy out of recovery mode in mid-2011.
Global economic momentum has slackened since, pri-
marily due to the huge adjustment processes that are
currently taking place in the euro area. Especially the
bursting of real-estate bubbles in a number of coun-
tries led to job-losses and declining income levels,
resulting in very high levels of private debt that in
many cases are no longer serviceable. This, in turn,
created further distress in the banking sector, causing
the macroeconomic conditions for finance to deterio-
rate significantly as the inflow of private capital from
abroad dried up, or even reversed in the form of cap-
ital flight. The deleveraging of private debt and the
reallocation of  production factors required to
improve the situation will probably take some time.
Meanwhile, the problems outlined above are consider-
ably heightened by the state of public finances in the
crisis-afflicted countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
Spain, Cyprus and Italy). 
In response to the sharp increase in perceived solven-
cy risks, these countries have launched extensive aus-
terity programmes and implemented a series of struc-
tural reforms in recent years. The resulting contrac-
tion in their economies not only carried over to the
rest of the world via massively reduced demand for
imports, but also through a heightened increase in
uncertainty. This, in turn, led to a sharp decline in
capital flows to the emerging economies of Asia,
Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
Some of the economic decisions taken in the summer
and early autumn have had a somewhat calming effect
on the financial markets. It was agreed in July 2012
that Spain should receive up to 100 billion euros from
the ESM’s permanent rescue fund to support its
beleaguered banking sector. The early election in the
Netherlands also handed anti-euro parties a bitter
defeat and produced a relatively stable coalition,
which has agreed to continue fiscal consolidation. In
addition, the German Constitutional Court gave a
green light to the permanent ESM bail-out mecha-
nism. Finally, shortly thereafter the ECB announced a
new programme of unlimited purchases of govern-
ment bonds. This reduced the risk of disorderly exits
from the monetary union by member states and has
since been reflected in lower risk premiums in the
European sovereign debt markets. Macroeconomic
uncertainty nevertheless remains high and is placing a
huge burden on economic development in the Euro -
pean Union, especially in the euro area. 
Unlike developed countries, most emerging eco no -
mies have significantly more fiscal room to manoeu-
vre and stimulate their economies thanks to their rel-
atively low public debt levels. Many emerging econo -
mies are expected to ease their fiscal policies this year,
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albeit moderately. Monetary policy has already, or
looks set to, become more accommodative in these
countries too. Furthermore, increasing levels of dis-
posable income should provide an additional stimulus
to private consumption. Economic activity in emerg-
ing countries is therefore likely to pick up noticeably
and should prevent the world economy from slipping
into a recession this winter. Global economic expan-
sion is expected to accelerate somewhat over the
course of the year, but remain below its potential. 
With the contractive fiscal impulse set to have a lesser
impact on the euro area than in 2012, the advanced
economies should also see slightly higher growth this
year. The US economy is also expected to continue
along a moderate growth path, i.e. after the negative
fiscal shock at the beginning of the year, growth will
gradually strengthen again. This will especially be dri-
ven by the improving real-estate market, as well as the
slowly, but steadily improving asset positions of pri-
vate households. 
In the European economy, domestic demand looks
set to shrink further in 2013. Tight fiscal policies,
albeit less restrictive than in 2012, will dampen eco-
nomic activity in almost all member states. The con-
tinued deterioration of  the labour market and fur-
ther efforts to reduce private debt will also put an
additional strain on the willingness of  private house-
holds to spend. On a brighter note, expansionary
monetary policies and increased growth in exports
will allow private investment to stabilise somewhat in
the second half  of  2013. With imports set to remain
very weak, net foreign trade will provide a strong
positive impulse and GDP growth in the euro area
should pick up slightly over the year, albeit remain-
ing at a low level. 
The economic divide among individual member
states in the euro area will continue to widen, while
aggregate production in most of  the crisis-afflicted
countries looks set to shrink. Fiscal policy in these
countries will be far more restrictive than in the rest
of  Europe. Although financing conditions in the cri-
sis-afflicted countries have already started to im -
prove, and despite a more expansionary monetary
policy, they are likely to remain relatively un -
favourable, at least compared to the European core
countries. After a temporary period of  weakness this
winter, stable economies like those of  Germany, Fin -
land and Austria will benefit from relatively stronger
demand from emerging markets and domestic forces
during the rest of  2013. 
Chapter 2: European Imbalances
Europe is in the grip of three interrelated crises: a bal-
ance-of-payments crisis, a sovereign debt crisis and a
banking crisis. Although progress has been made to
resolve the sovereign and banking crises in the past
four years, policy-makers have paid little attention to
the balance-of-payments problem. Yet a credible
strategy for getting the euro back on track needs to
address this key issue.
Large imbalances have emerged in the euro area since
2000 in the form of current account deficits and sur-
pluses. The euro area periphery countries of Greece,
Portugal, Spain and Ireland in particular experienced
credit bubbles that led to current account deficits and
corresponding capital imports. The Northern core of
the euro area, on the other hand, ran persistent cur-
rent account surpluses. This led to an accumulation of
net foreign liabilities in the periphery and net foreign
assets in the core. Prior to the crisis the current
account imbalances were financed by private capital
inflows. When the crisis struck, however, these private
capital inflows were increasingly replaced by public
flows, primarily by the ECB’s Target balances, and to
a lesser extent by the various aid packages of the
European Union, the ECB and the IMF. 
The periphery countries therefore now have to deval-
ue to make their consumers and firms switch from
imports to domestic goods, thereby reducing their
imbalances. Ireland is the only country to have
achieved this to date by cutting wages, contributing to
a fall in its price level relative to the core of the euro
area. The key policy question is whether the other
periphery countries affected by the crisis will also pur-
sue this course, i.e. the course of internal devaluation;
or whether they will resort to an external devaluation
by exiting the euro area. As yet, no clear answer to
this question has emerged. Let us consider the basic
mechanism of an external devaluation. As a country
devalues, the prices of its exports and imports change,
making the former more profitable and the latter
more expensive. This boosts exports and reduces
imports, thereby improving the current account.
Under an internal devaluation, this process – due to
price and wage stickiness – takes a long time to com-
plete because it requires higher inflation in the core
than in the periphery. Moreover, it is also associated
with a prolonged recession and high unemployment
because prices only adjust slowly. Under external
devaluation this process is completed over a short
period of time, since the exchange rate depreciates
EEAG Report 2013 10
Summary
quickly. Moreover, there is theoretically no loss of
output and employment. 
Both external and internal devaluation inevitably
raise the debt-to-income ratio, which may drive com-
panies into bankruptcy. In addition, the prerequisite
of external devaluation is an exit from the euro area,
and anticipation of such an event could cause desta-
bilising capital flight and contagion effects. Only an
internal devaluation via price increases in the core
would be able to improve the competitiveness of the
periphery countries without increasing the relative
burden of external or internal debt. However, this
would violate the ECB's mandate to ensure price sta-
bility and would meet with considerable resistance in
the core countries, since it would deprive savers in the
core of some of their wealth. In other words, the euro
area appears to be trapped in a situation with no easy
escape route. 
Since the beginning of the crisis, the periphery coun-
tries have all been undergoing adjustment. Ireland was
hit first. It started its adjustment early, introduced
decisive policy measures and underwent a significant
internal devaluation. The other Southern countries
were not hit by the crisis until almost two years later.
Given that some of them were largely financed by the
ECB, they delayed the reforms required and initially
made little progress along the painful road towards
internal realignment. Their current accounts improved
largely because of a sharp decline in imports due to the
recession. In addition to Ireland, Spain was also able
to improve its exports, suggesting that it is making
progress. Adjustments in Portugal, on the other hand,
and particularly in Greece, seem to be slow. According
to the data available at the time of writing, Greece has
done very little to date to improve its competitiveness. 
To help the crisis-afflicted countries get back on their
feet, a significant amount of debt needs to be written
off. The countries themselves should, in turn, reduce
government deficits. Empirical evidence shows that tax-
based fiscal adjustments tend to be less successful than
their expenditure-based counterparts. The periphery
countries should therefore focus more on cutting expen-
diture than on raising taxes to reduce their deficits. 
Chapter 3: Labour Market Reform and Youth
Unemployment 
Youth unemployment rates in Greece and Spain
recently reached alarming headline figures in excess of
50 percent. At the same time, long-term and overall
unemployment have grown considerably in the wake
of the 2007–8 global financial crisis and the subse-
quent euro area public debt crisis, with its attendant
aus terity policies. The unemployment data focus
attention on youth unemployment and labour market
performance. Why has youth unemployment risen so
much? What can and should be done about it? Why
has overall unemployment risen so much? What can
and should be done? Are labour market institutions at
fault in some way? Should they be reformed?
European labour markets feature, to varying degrees,
high levels of employment protection, high minimum
wages, high taxes, generous unemployment benefits,
generous publicly provided pay-as-you-go pensions
schemes, pensions available from an early age, and
strong trade unions. All of these features lead to a
high structural unemployment rate. Public sector
employment accounts for a large fraction of the total.
The short-term need to cut deficits has led to cuts in
the numbers of public employees and in public sector
pay, increased retirement ages, and less generous ben-
efits. There have also been moves to cut minimum
wages in some countries. 
The experiences of  Germany, where the Hartz
reforms of 2002–2004 lent new dynamics to a sclerot-
ic labour market, and cooperative industrial relations
delivered wage restraint from 2001 to 2008, contribut-
ing to falling unemployment since 2005, are widely
seen as a model. The successes of the Danish (and to
some degree Dutch) system of “flexicurity” have been
trumpeted repeatedly. However, the large rise in un -
employment in Denmark since 2007 casts doubt on its
superiority. When demand contracted sharply in
2008, flexicurity naturally enabled Danish firms to
reduce their staff  numbers rapidly. The labour market
policies of the British government lean towards the
free-market end of the spectrum. They have delivered
a low rise in unemployment, despite the UK’s pro-
longed fall in output. There is a contrast between
those countries in which policies that encourage
short-time working have spread the cost of the reces-
sion and created small increases in unemployment,
and others such as Denmark, where employment cuts
took the form of a rise in unemployment, rather than
widespread reductions in working hours. 
Pressure to reform labour market policies and institu-
tions has been fuelled by the need to cut public bor-
rowing. Policy changes in Spain and Italy, for exam-
ple, have reduced the differences between temporary
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and permanent jobs, advanced progress towards a sin-
gle form of labour contract, and reduced employment
protection for established workers. However, they
have hardly touched upon the problems of youth
unemployment and vocational training. There are
good reasons why youth unemployment rates are
almost always higher than those of older workers, but
the current figures nevertheless give cause for concern.
The scarring effects of unemployment at the start of,
or early in, a working life tend to be lasting. They sug-
gest that resources are being largely wasted, and that
many young workers will suffer. The youth unemploy-
ment problem is the result of a combination of:
(i) two-tier labour markets, in which well-established
workers enjoy heavily protected jobs while others,
including many new entrants, work in unprotected
temporary jobs, and can be dismissed at low cost to
the employer; (ii) unsatisfactory arrangements for
apprenticeships and vocational education in many
European countries; and (iii) the collapse of the
house-building boom in Spain and Ireland. These
problems tend to go hand-in-hand and have thrown
the burden of adjusting to the recession onto young
and unskilled workers.
While Germany, Austria, and Switzerland have high-
ly successful apprenticeship and vocational education
systems that have been much studied by their neigh-
bours, few countries have been able to emulate them.
The German system succeeds in Germany with the
support of  local firms, chambers of  commerce, trade
unions, colleges and public authorities: a post-
apprenticeship qualification is a legal requirement for
those seeking to work in many skilled trades. While
the success of  the system is envied, its rigidity is an
obstacle to its adoption elsewhere, as it channels
young workers into a particular occupation at an
early stage. In the United Kingdom, by contrast,
young workers typically hold a succession of  jobs for
short periods, interspersed with periods of  unem-
ployment, while they look for a suitable career.
College training aims to impart general skills, while
short apprenticeships are intended to provide on-the-
job training and firm-specific skills. Many observers,
however, merely regard the latter as subsidised labour
for firms. Spain, Italy, and other European countries
face similar problems. 
While it is tempting to advocate the universal adop-
tion of successful labour market institutions, caution
is advisable. Institutions do not transplant easily and
what works in one socio-economic environment may
not work in another. The social pacts possible in a
small, cohesive Nordic country may not be realistical-
ly applicable to a large, more diverse society like that
of Spain. Besides, beyond the policy changes and
reforms imposed by the need to stabilise national debt
levels, longer-term changes, aimed at improving the
labour market’s functioning when growth returns,
may increase public spending and unemployment in
the short term.
Some aspects of current labour market institutions
nevertheless demand attention. Two-tier labour mar-
kets – created by introducing temporary contracts, but
leaving regular employees well-protected against los-
ing their jobs – have thrown the burden of adjustment
onto a small fraction of the labour force. The distinc-
tion between regular and temporary employment
needs to be narrowed. There is a case for devising pro-
cedures for resolving labour disputes, like employ-
ment tribunals, that would be able to resolve disputes
arising from severance decisions without recourse to
very long and costly court procedures. Moreover, the
legally enforced extension of pay bargains to all firms
in an industry has allowed a few workers in highly
unionised firms to impose unsuitable wage settle-
ments on a wider industry, with adverse consequences.
Greater flexibility in wage bargaining is needed.
Finally, massive improvements are required in the
provision of education and training for young people
in most European countries, both to improve their
level of skills and to reduce unemployment.
Chapter 4: US Precedents for Europe 
The discussion of European integration – both in the
past and in the future – has largely been driven by
analyses of how precedents on the other side of the
Atlantic have worked. Two of the most widely debat-
ed aspects of US fiscal and financial integration are:
(1) the federation’s responsibility for state-level debts
and the creditworthiness of states; and (2) the work-
ing of a federal central bank. Today’s fiscal federalism
in the United States is relatively robust, but the road
from 1790 was rocky; and a closer analysis of the first
two decades of the Federal Reserve System reveals
that they were filled with monetary mistakes. 
In 1790 Alexander Hamilton pushed through an
assumption of state debt arising out of the War of
Independence. The federalisation or mutualisation of
state debt depended on the creation of a fiscal mech-
anism (a federally-administered customs tariff) pro-
ducing a stream of revenue to service the debt. The
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1790 compromise might be seen as a precedent for
limiting the liabilities of the Northern European sur-
plus countries should a common European bond or
Eurobond be created. Important parts of Hamilton’s
financial architecture were not realised, or only
realised imperfectly. He proposed a model of joint-
stock banking on a national scale, which ran into
immediate opposition, and which, curiously, was
much more influential in Canada than in the United
States. Secondly, his proposal for a national central
bank, based on the model of the Bank of England,
was eventually blocked by political opposition.
Moreover, the choice of the fiscal mechanism to ser-
vice a federalised debt potentially raises deeply divi-
sive issues about the distributive effects of the tax or
tariff  on the constituent states, and the customs tariff
was at first the major cause of the growing political
strains between North and South. The fiscal union
was also dangerous because it allowed states to
recommence their borrowing. There are strong paral-
lels between the development of American states in
the 1830s and that of modern Europe. The American
states that borrowed most heavily, and then ran into
problems, were the less developed states that saw bor-
rowing as a way of financing development infrastruc-
ture, especially in transport. The borrowing states
were also keen to encourage the development of
domestic financial institutions in order to stimulate
growth and development. When problems emerged,
discussions centred on whether they were due to exter-
nal circumstances (a crisis in the world’s financial cen-
tre, the United Kingdom then, the United States
now), to a flawed development strategy, or to gover-
nance problems and corruption in both state govern-
ments and banks. These issues were extensively debat-
ed in the 1840s, and a contrast was made with the
position of state finances in the aftermath of the War
of Independence. In the case of the US state defaults
of the early 1840s, as in that of contemporary Greece,
the problems stemmed primarily from misguided poli-
cies, and cannot be blamed on external circumstances,
war or a global crisis. The eventual solution lay in the
adoption of debt restraints or balanced budget laws.
A commitment not to renew the assumption of state
debts was a condition for the stable financial and
political development of the Union.
The question of the relationship of a central federal
bank to local banking systems – and to the patronage
systems built up by local elites – has always been a
highly contentious issue in North American politics
from the very outset. The Federal Reserve System
relied on a complicated governance system that was
designed to preserve checks and balances, and to
ensure that the system could be neither dominated by
the powerful East Coast financial community, nor by
the federal government in Washington. The regional
Federal Reserve Banks corresponded to what were felt
to be logical economic areas, which did not necessari-
ly overlap with state boundaries. Like national central
banks in the international gold standard order, the
various American Reserve Banks had their own dis-
count policies and applied different rates – especially
at moments of strain. By the late 1930s, the rate dif-
ferences were disappearing, but they only vanished
completely during World War II, for the simple reason
that operating with federal bills (a single instrument)
in open market operations, rather than with a multi-
plicity of differently valued private securities, became
the primary tool of US monetary policy. When it
came to monetary policy instruments, the ECB’s
founders adopted the practice of the post-war Federal
Reserve, and assumed that the debt instruments of
different member states could fill the monetary policy
role of a single financial instrument (federal govern-
ment securities) in the case of the Federal Reserve’s
open market policy. It was only in the 1930s, with the
new Bank Law of 1933, that the Federal Reserve Sys -
tem really started to act as a modern central bank. 
Interdistrict Settlement Account balances, like Target
balances, expanded greatly in the aftermath of the
2008 financial crisis. These imbalances reflect the fun-
damentally changing market perceptions of US pri-
vate financial institutions, and they do not display the
permanence that has characterised their European
equivalents, where banks in deficit countries are
paralysed because of the ties between banks and sov-
ereigns (with banks holding the paper of the sover-
eigns that bail them out). The pronounced differences
between the United States and the European settle-
ment processes stem fundamentally from the central
fact that the Federal Reserve System as a whole has a
sovereign as a counterpart, while the ECB does not.
Moreover, only the United States has a settlement
mechanism that requires a securitisation of balances.
This system has kept the outstanding balances small,
and has even created incentives to take countervailing
local policy measures to avoid any balances in the first
place. A settlement system would protect the Euro -
pean creditor countries against a break-up loss and
make them more resistant to pressure to participate in
bail-out activities.
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MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOK
1.1 Introduction
The euro crisis is putting a strain on the world econo-
my. As a result, economic activity lost momentum
nearly everywhere over the course of last year and the
world economy is going through a weak phase this
winter. The underlying adjustment processes that have
been at work in the United States and in other
advanced economies ever since the real-estate bubble
burst in 2007, and which have not yet been completed,
also continue to curb economic activity. Economic
growth will therefore remain weak for the moment,
and only looks set to recover again slightly over the
course of the year. 
The global economy will gradually recover after these
winter months, assisted by the relaxation of monetary
policy in the United States and Europe, as well as
stronger economic momentum in the emerging mar-
kets. In the case of China in particular, it is safe to
assume that the government will continue to follow its
recent course, and will upscale the expansionary char-
acter of its policy until economic activity clearly starts
to pick up again. Furthermore, European financial
markets are likely to become more stable as the reso-
lutions of the EU summit in June 2012 (such as the
introduction of a banking union) are implemented.
This offers the perspective that the uncertainty cur-
rently crippling economic activity in the crisis coun-
tries will continue to slowly subside.
Gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to increase
by 0.1 percent in the European Union this year, with
foreign trade as the main driver of growth; while infla-
tion looks set to increase modestly. The situation in
the labour market will deteriorate further, with the
unemployment rate rising to an average of 10.9 per-
cent this year. The euro area will remain in a mild
recession for the time being. Growth should gradual-
ly pick up in the United States after an initial decline
due to partial implementation of the fiscal cliff, since
the structural problems in the banking and real-estate
sectors will diminish and the labour market is also
expected to continue to recover.
1.2 The current situation
1.2.1 The global economy
With the further escalation of the euro area debt cri-
sis in spring 2011 the world economy has moved out
of recovery mode and into what can broadly be
described as stagnation. World trade has been falter-
ing around a historically low growth rate of below
3 percent (see Figure 1.1)1 for roughly two years. This
has been apparent in all key economic regions, albeit
to differing degrees. A look at world industrial pro-
duction reveals that there were signs of recovery dur-
ing summer 2011 and early 2012. There were hopes
that the relatively strong growth performance of the
emerging markets during the first quarter of 2012
would act as a sparking plug for the world economy.
However, a further escalation of the euro area crisis
together with a stronger than expected slowdown in
Chinese growth caused world industrial production to
basically stagnate from the second quarter of last year
onwards. Whereas the emerging world has recently
shown signs of recovery, industry in the advanced
economies appears to have taken a downturn. 
The global economic slowdown has been accompa-
nied by a marked decline in the results of the Ifo
World Economic Survey since spring 2011. The
assessment of the economic situation by the partici-
pating experts has fallen for all regions overall and is
now, despite the recent increase in North America and
Asia below its neutral levels (see Figure 1.2).
Producers and consumers in the euro area also
became fare gloomier, although sentiment has sta-
bilised somewhat in recent months. In the United
States, China and several East Asian and Latin
American emerging markets, a number of confidence
indicators stabilised, and even improved in the winter
after suffering drastic drops in the preceding months.
The overall sentiment in these economies nevertheless
remains at a fairly low level.
The slackening of global economic momentum since
spring 2011 is primarily due to the huge adjustment
processes that are currently taking place in the euro
EEAG (2013), The EEAG Report on the European Economy, "Macroeconomic Outlook", CESifo, Munich 2013, p. 13–53.
1 If  not mentioned otherwise, all growth rates reported are annu-
alised growth rates.
area. In a number of countries, especially after the
bursting of real estate bubbles, workers have been
released in large numbers and incomes have declined
resulting in often very high levels of private debt that
are no longer serviceable. This in
turn brought the banking sector
into further distress causing the
macroeconomic conditions for
finance to deteriorate significant-
ly as the inflow of private capital
from abroad dried up or even
reversed in the form of capital
flight. The requisite deleveraging
of private debt and the realloca-
tion of production factors will
most likely take some time. The
problems are considerably heigh -
tened by the state of public fi -
nances in the crisis countries
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain,
Cyprus and Italy) which were
either already overloaded or fell
into disarray as a result of the
public sector having to shoulder
increasingly higher burdens
caused by the new economic real-
ity. In response to the sharp in -
crease in perceived solvency risks
since the spring of 2010, these
countries have undertaken exten-
sive austerity programs and a
series of  structural reforms.
Confidence in the sustainability
of their public financ es continued
to erode during 2011, causing pri-
vate financing conditions to dete-
riorate even further, and encour-
aging the crisis countries to step
up the intensity of their reform
efforts. The resulting contraction
in their economies not only car-
ried over to the rest of world via
massively reduced import de -
mand, but also through a further
increase in uncertainty resulting
in a sharp decline of capital flows
to the emerging eco nomies of
Asia, Latin America and Eastern
Europe. Circums tances like these
tend to result in investors moving
their assets to countries seen as
“safe havens” such as the United
States, Japan, Germany or Swit -
zerland.
Moving into the second half  of  last year, the reces-
sion in the euro area persisted and macroeconomic
uncertainty remained ex ceptionally high. Global
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inves tors, producers and con-
sumers re mained unsettled by
next to no easing up of  concerns
about the solvency of  the state
and the banking system in the
euro area crisis countries and the
risk of  disorderly exits from the
Euro pean Monetary Union.
This has resulted in the post-
ponement of  many private
investment projects and sup-
pressed the demand for durable
goods. In September 2012, the
European Central Bank (ECB)
announced that it was ready to
undertake extensive interven-
tions in the sovereign debt mar-
kets when needed. This has
somewhat reduced the risk of  disorderly exits of
member states from the monetary union and has
since been reflected by the lowering of  risk premiums
on the European sovereign debt markets. 
In the United States, the recovery after the financial
crisis of 2007–2008 has been steady but slow. Many
private households in the United States are still
engaged in reducing their debt to sustainable levels.
This process has curbed consumption somewhat.
Uncertainty as to the future orientation of fiscal pol-
icy has also had an adverse impact on the United
States. The threat of dramatic tax increases and
expenditure cuts triggered by a “fiscal cliff” at the
beginning of this year caused concern for some time,
and not just to US investors. Although a large part of
the fiscal cliff  has been dealt with earlier this year,
some decisions – notably on cuts to defence and edu-
cation spending – have only been
delayed into March. Hence, some
uncertainty still remains.
In key emerging markets, the
slowdown in the rate of expan-
sion was also in part caused by
domestic concerns. In order to
counter high inflation and over-
heating in credit markets, mone-
tary policy became significantly
more restrictive in many places by
mid-2011. These measures began
to show their impact in the quar-
ters that followed. Between sum-
mer 2011 and summer 2012 infla-
tion rates in emerging and devel-
oping countries fell considerably.
The overall slowdown of the world economy together
with an overall sideward movement of energy and
food prices allowed world inflation to steadily fall by
in total 1.5 percentage points to a level of slightly
above 3.2 percent by mid-2012 (see Figure 1.3). It more
or less stabilised at that level since.
1.2.2 United States
Albeit steady, the economic recovery in the United
States continues to lag behind past recoveries. Since
early 2010, real GDP growth has hovered around
2 percent before temporarily dropping in the last
quarter of 2012 (see Figure 1.4). The restructuring of
the real estate and the deleveraging of the financial
and household sectors are taking their time and will
have to be followed by a prolonged period of fiscal
consolidation. Private consumption and investment in
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
% change over previous year's month % change over previous year's month
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, last accessed on 31 January 2013.
Inflation in the world and oil price movements
Oil price changes (dollar)
(right-hand scale)
Inflation in the 
world (left-hand scale)
Figure 1.3
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Change in inventories
Foreign balance
Final domestic demand (excl. inventories)
a) Annualised quarterly growth. 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, last accessed on 31 January 2013; EEAG calculations.
Contributions to GDP growtha) in the United States
%
Seasonally adjusted data
Real GDP
growth
%
Figure 1.4
equipment and machinery continue to contribute pos-
itively to economic growth (see Figure 1.5). The drop
in GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2012 was pri-
marily due to a negative growth impulse coming from
investments in inventories. This reflected the uncer-
tainty about the implementation and severity of then
the forthcoming fiscal consolidation. At the same
time, however, it brought forward substantial defence
spending in the third quarter of last year.
Foreign trade also contributed positively throughout
the year 2012. Although export growth fell to just
3.2 percent (following 6.7 percent in 2011) due to the
weak global economy, the even weaker development of
imports – up by only 2.5 percent
from last year – caused by weak
domestic demand for capital
goods in particular was able to
outweigh this. 
Other impulses were provided by
the private housing sector.
Coming from historical lows the
number of private housing con-
struction starts and the number of
building permits have both
increased by well over 25 percent
last year (see Figure 1.6). Hous ing
starts were given a sustainable
boost as the supply of  ex cess
unsold real estate began to drop.
As compared to 2011, the sales of
new homes have picked up by on
average 20 percent. The average
financial burden on home owners
posed by payments on mortgage
interest and principal dropped
from 11.3 percent of their dispos-
able income in the fall of 2007 to
9.0 percent by mid-2012. This
value is significantly below the
long-term average since the 1980s.
At the same time, the Case-Shiller
Index of real estate prices rose in
the past 12 months by nearly
4 percent. This increase was sup-
ported mainly by a far-reaching
reduction in the surplus of unsold
residential real estate brought
about by the financial crisis.
Household debt also fell from its
peak in the third quarter of 2008
nominally to around 1.4 trillion
dollars; a drop of almost 11 percent, which when
adjusted for inflation is almost twice as high. Against
this background, the decline in the average savings rate
of 5.5 percent during summer 2010 to 4.7 percent in
the fourth quarter of 2012 reflects a progressive im -
provement of the asset position of households.
The labour market has resumed some momentum in
the second half  of last year. After a slow period in
early summer, an average of 160,000 new jobs has
been created since July, causing the unemployment
rate to decline to 7.8 percent in December (see
Figure 1.7). Yet employment growth remains below
average in comparison to previous recoveries in the
EEAG Report 2013 16
Chapter 1
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Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, last accessed on 31 January 2013.
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United States and the unemploy-
ment rate is dropping at a modest
pace. A major hurdle to employ-
ment growth is the still hesitant
attitude of  business and con-
sumers. A clearer upturn on the
labour market can be expected no
earlier than when the two major
parties in Washington agree on
the course of fiscal policy consol-
idation to be taken. Although
progress has been made on this
earlier this year, the necessary
lifting of the debt ceiling – i.e. the
amount the US government can
borrow which is capped by legis-
lation –, the automatic spending
cuts still in the pipeline and the
fact that the United States has
been operating without a federal
budget since October last year
which will need to be passed by
March all create uncertainties
regarding the future course of fis-
cal policy.
After having peaked in Sep -
tember 2011 at 3.9 percent, the
inflation rate in the United States
swiftly came down again reaching
a low of 1.4 percent in July last
year (see Figure 1.8). As also in -
dicated by the by then stable core
inflation rate, i.e. the rate of infla-
tion excluding energy and food
costs, the subsequent in crease
was primarily due to higher ener-
gy prices. Overall, actual inflation
has reached an average of
2.2 percent in 2012.
1.2.3 Asia
After a clear cooling over the
winter of 2011/2012, the Chinese
economy has been able to resume
some momentum again in the
course of the year. Its GDP grew
by around an annualised 8 and
9 percent during the second and
third quarter, respectively, up
from a low of  approximately
6 percent during the first quarter.
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The economy is more and more supported by private
consumption and the continued expansion of invest-
ment. Exports, on the other hand, have from an his-
torical perspective developed in a rather restrained
manner. Besides the slowdown of the world economy,
the in recent years rapidly rising labour costs in China
have affected its price competitiveness and thereby
also negatively impacted its exports. Simultaneous
strong increases in real imports led foreign trade to
deliver a negative contribution to the overall econom-
ic expansion for seven quarters in a row. The total
overall increase in GDP amounted to 7.8 percent in
2012 (after 9.6 percent in 2011).
Overall, it appears that China is in a transition
towards a lower trend growth path. Its labour force
tends to grow at a slower pace and labour costs have
been increasing in international comparison. In addi-
tion, the real estate sector is in a downturn since 2011.
The slowdown in growth was merely masked by the
stimulus measures undertaken during the Great
Recession. 
The weaker economic expansion has apparently not
led to a significant increase in unemployment – the
unemployment rate in urban areas has been around
4.1 percent and thereby similar as in 2007. This sug-
gests that the economic growth rate required to inte-
grate the additional labour, which used to be estimat-
ed at around 8 percent, has decreased. The in March
last year to 7.5 percent reduced official growth target
is in line with this.
After having peaked at 6.5 percent in summer 2011,
the inflation rate swiftly came down to slightly below
2 percent last autumn. This allowed the Chinese cen-
tral bank, the People’s Bank of China, to respond to
the slowdown in economic growth by loosening its
monetary policy stance. Firstly, reserve ratios were
reduced in three steps by in total 1.5 percentage
points. Subsequently, its key interest rate was lowered
in two steps by 56 basis points to 6 percent in July
2012. And finally, by the end of August 2012, the cen-
tral bank increased the liquidity in the banking sector
quite strongly. Pronouncements by officials point to a
possible further easing of monetary policy. 
In addition to these monetary measures, the Chinese
government again resorts to fiscal stimuli measures to
avoid a fall in the growth rate below its target. Early
September 2012 they decided to support export-ori-
ented firms by introducing tax breaks and less bureau-
cratic and expensive export approval procedures.
Furthermore, various infrastructure projects are
introduced or brought forward in time.
With negative growth rates in the second and third
quarter of  2012, Japan moved once again back into
recession. Whereas in 2011 the earthquake and
nuclear reactor disaster caused a sharp decline in eco-
nomic activity, this time the decline can largely be
attributed to a drop in exports resulting from falling
world demand, a continued overvaluation of  the yen
and the territorial dispute with China (and Taiwan)
regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The latter led
to the boycott of  Japanese goods and services
(including tourism) and to the disruption of  Japanese
business activities in China. As a result, the Japanese
trade balance has turned persistently negative since
spring 2011. In addition, there were declines in
domestic consumption and investment activity after
reconstruction and fiscal measures had injected some
life into the domestic economy in the winter of
2011/2012. Due to high GDP growth during the sec-
ond half  of  2011 and the beginning of  2012, aggre-
gate output for 2012 is expected to have risen by
2.1 percent as compared to 2011.
Although actual inflation rates turned positive during
the first half  of the year the underlying core inflation
dynamics, reflecting the strong appreciation of the
yen and the overall weak economy, remained negative
throughout. For 2012 the inflation rate is expected to
have been – 0.1 percent, after – 0.3 percent in 2011. Ja -
pan has so far not been able to escape the “secular
stagnation” from which it is suffering since 1997. It is
a persistent challenge for the Western world not to fall
into such a Japanese liquidity trap.
India’s economic growth has cooled noticeably since
the beginning of  2012. After year-over-year growth
rates of  5.6 and 3.9 percent in the first and second
quarter, respectively, GDP only expanded by 2.8 per-
cent in the third quarter of  2012. This was mainly due
to a slowdown in private capital investment and
exports. Private consumption, which accounts for
more than half  of  GDP, has also reduced pace. One
reason might be that consumer price inflation, partly
due to the weak monsoon and reduced subsidies on
fuel, accelerated again during the first half  of  2012 to
approximately 10 percent and stayed around that
level since. After going through stepwise increases
from its low of 4.75 percent in spring 2010 to 8.5 per-
cent in October 2011, the Reserve Bank of India cut
its key short-term lending rate by 50 basis points in
April last year. In addition, the Indian government
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announced some structural reforms such as the liber-
alisation of  the retail trade and the aviation sector.
Although there is still uncertainty regarding the
implementation of  these reforms, these announce-
ments together with the interest rate cut and the
improved global economic outlook seem to have
strengthened investor confidence. As a result, both
portfolio investment and foreign direct investment
have started to recover in the third quarter after hav-
ing been eroded in spring last year.
The East Asian countries Indonesia, South Korea,
Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines and Singapore (in
the order of  their economic significance) have seen a
further reduction in economic growth. This is mainly
attributable to weak foreign trade, which struck hard
in this region due to its high dependence on exports.
In the third quarter, in particular Taiwan began to
benefit from the increased momentum in China.
South Korea, on the other hand, experienced with an
annualised 0.2 percent the lowest growth of  its econ-
omy since the Great Recession. As a reaction the
Bank of Korea reduced its base rate in two steps from
3.25 percent to 2.75 percent. Given a moderate infla-
tion rate of  below 1.5 percent since summer last year,
it has enough room for additional interest rate cuts.
Also the government has some leeway as there is cur-
rently no need for fiscal consolidation given the low
government debt of  approximately 35 percent of
GDP. The economies of  Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines have remained relatively stable last year.
Although the global economic slowdown also
impacted their exports, this was outweighed by a
strong expansion in domestic demand. Overall, it is
expected that the economic performance of  these
East Asian countries will have increased by only
3.6 percent last year. 
1.2.4 Latin America
In most Latin American countries such as Chile,
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela the economies
were still running smoothly during the first half  of
2012. Although the expansionary dynamics cooled
down somewhat during the rest of  the year, eco-
nomic performance overall remained relatively
robust despite the weak global environment. High
prices for soy, corn and wheat helped the exporters
of  these goods. While a solid labour market provid-
ed ample domestic consumption, expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies also supported eco-
nomic activity. 
In the two largest economies of the region, Brazil and
Argentina, the economic expansion was, however,
already in the first half  of 2012 considerably weaker.
The Argentine economy even shrank in the second
quarter. Private consumer demand and consumer
confidence remained subdued due to double-digit in -
flation and continued restrictions on exchanging
domestic currency for US dollars. The dissatisfaction
of the population also was on the rise, expressed
increasingly in protests and demonstrations against
the government. Finally, the investment climate, as
well as relations with important trading partners for
Argentina (Spain and its MERCOSUR partners),
both deteriorated due to increasing government inter-
vention in the form of nationalisation, import con-
trols or foreign exchange controls.
Brazil is only slowly finding its way out of the weak
expansion still lingering since the middle of 2011
largely caused by the strong appreciation of its cur-
rency during and after the global financial crisis. The
pace of growth picked up somewhat in the past two
quarters with the GDP rising by 2.4 percent in the
third quarter. As in the previous quarters, the increase
was mainly driven by consumption; investment con-
tinued to recede. Tax breaks and step-wise interest
rate cuts bringing the main refinancing rate to an his-
torical low of 7.25 percent appear to take hold only
hesitantly. 
1.2.5 The European economy
The cyclical situation
The economic development of  the European Union
is still under the shadow of  the European debt crisis.
The World Economic Survey for Western Europe in
January continued to deteriorate, following its down-
ward trend since the mid-2011 (see Fi gure 1.2).
Although the risk premiums on government bonds
of  several member states decreased markedly
throughout the year, they nevertheless remained
quite high as compared to pre-crisis years. This still
reflects the continuing doubts of  financial markets
on the ability of  the relevant countries to bear the
burden of  their sovereign debt. Concerns over a pos-
sible breakup of  the currency union and concomi-
tant exchange rate risks and financial market tur-
moil remained present, but weakened substantially,
particularly as of  Sep tember 2012. These fears began
to escalate in the early summer of  2012 when it
appeared uncertain if  and how legislative action
could help recapitalise the ailing
Spanish banking sector. After
the parliamentary elections in
June, Greece also had enormous
difficulties in forming a func-
tioning government ready and
willing to meet the conditions
agreed upon with the “troika”.2
Some economic decisions in the
summer and early autumn have
had a calming effect on the
financial markets. It was agreed
in July that Spain will receive up
to 100 billion euros from the
European Stability Mechanism’s
(ESM) permanent rescue fund
to support its banking sector.3
In addition, the early election in the Netherlands
handed anti-euro parties a bitter defeat and pro-
duced a relatively stable coalition which has agreed
to continue fiscal consolidation. Moreover, the
German Constitutional Court gave green light for
the permanent ESM bailout mechanism. Finally, the
ECB announced shortly thereafter a new programme
of unlimited purchasing of  government bonds. If
needed, the ECB will purchase public bonds issued
by countries engaging in reasonable structural
adjustment programmes, whose interest rates are
classified by the ECB as exaggerated. 
Consumer and manufacturer confidence in the
European Union continued to slide before stabilising
at a nadir in autumn. More service-oriented sectors
have recovered slightly in recent months, as has cons -
truction more recently (see Fi gure 1.9). The neverthe-
less still overall prevailing pes-
simism reflects doubts whether
enough political will is present in
the crisis countries to continue
eliminating the structural weak-
nesses at the core of the debt cri-
sis. As a result, macroeconomic
uncertainty re mained high. Since
the beginning of the debt crisis it
has been throttling the willing-
ness of consumers and companies to spend and final
domestic demand has thereby contributed negatively
to GDP growth since the second quarter of 2011 (see
Figure 1.10). During the forecast period, uncertainty
will remain an essential burden on economic develop-
ment in the European Union and the euro area in par-
ticular. 
In view of growing doubts about their solvency in the
wake of the debt crisis and the resulting increase in
market pressures, crisis countries have been forced to
initiate massive structural adjustments in many areas
including fiscal policy, labour markets, goods and ser-
vice markets, and pension and health care systems.
These measures are likely to promote the soundness of
public finances, competitiveness and the growth
potential of  these economies in the long term.
However, the resulting fiscal cuts and reallocations of
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Figure 1.10
2 The “troika” consists of the European
Commission, the International Monetary
Fund and the ECB.
3 At the time that the agreement with Spain
was made, it was not entirely sure the ESM
would be approved. In particular,
Germany’s Constitutional Court had not
yet given the ESM a green light. In a back-
up scenario the financial means would
have stemmed from the EFSF.
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production factors are causing significant burdens on
these economies in the short term. 
Fiscal policy has had a particularly strong dampening
effect. With the exception of Ireland, in especially the
crisis countries the degree of  restrictiveness has
increased sharply since mid-2011. As a result, Italy
and Spain, the third and fourth largest economies of
the euro area, as well as Cyprus, have slid into a deep
recession, while the economy has continued to con-
tract in Greece and Portugal. 
In the face of a strong decline in demand from crisis
countries, the high level of uncertainty and restrictive
financial policy pursued in almost all member states,
the level of economic activity in the European Union
has dropped sharply since autumn 2011. Aggregate
economic performance in the European Union
shrank by a cumulative 0.5 percent between autumn
2011 and mid-2012, after which the stronger growth
performance of the United Kingdom caused by the
catch up of the additional holiday for the celebrations
marking 60 years of  the Queen’s reign and the
Olympic Games kicked in. In the euro area the reces-
sion continued and has now resulted in a cumulative
reduction of GDP of 0.6 percent. Private consump-
tion and both private and public investment have
declined rapidly. Only foreign trade has made signifi-
cant po sitive contributions to
growth, mainly due to extremely
weak growth in imports (see
Figure 1.11). 
Economic developments in the
euro area are characterised by a
growing divide among the indi-
vidual member states in recent
years. Cyprus, Greece, Portugal,
Spain and Italy are experiencing
a deep recession. The numerous
structural adjustments are play-
ing a decisive role in addition to
highly contractive fiscal policy.
The financing conditions for the
private sector in these countries
are also significantly less favour -
able than anywhere else in the
monetary union, despite the ex -
tremely loose monetary policy
of  the ECB. Economic develop-
ment was somewhat more robust
in Belgium, France, Finland and
the Netherlands, where fiscal
policy was much less restrictive
than in the crisis countries.
How ever, these countries also
suffer from some structural
weak nesses. Finland and Bel -
gium appear to have a poor
competitive position interna-
tionally, as they are posting loss-
es in their share of  world mar-
kets (see Table 1.1). The Nether -
lands has a highly indebted pri-
vate sector painfully hit by
plummeting real-estate prices.
Finally, some member states
(Aus tria, Ger many, Malta andSource: Eurostat, last accessed on  31January 2013.
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Figure 1.11
Slovakia) have seen far more robust economic
momentum in recent years. They have benefitted
from the relatively solid condition of  their public
and private finances, as well as their high level of
international competitiveness.
The deterioration of the economic situation in the
euro area has had a noticeable impact on the labour
market, where the unemployment rate increased from
9.9 percent in summer 2011 to 11.7 percent in October
2012. This rapid rise was preceded by a period of sta-
bilisation in 2010 and in the first half  of 2011 (see
Figure 1.7). Developments in national labour markets
continue to be marked by increasing heterogeneity.
Unemployment in countries with relatively robust
economies (Austria, Denmark, Germany, the United
Kingdom and the Baltic states) has declined slightly
over the past year. The crisis countries of Cyprus,
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, which were suffer-
ing from structural problems, saw noticeable rises in
unemployment (see Figure 1.12). In Spain and Greece
roughly a quarter of the work force is now unem-
ployed. In Chapter 2 we attribute this disaster to an
inflationary credit bubble that deprived these coun-
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Table 1.1 
Labour costsa) 
  
  
Compensation 
per employeeb) 
Real compen-
sation costsc) 
Labour 
productivity 
Unit labour 
costs 
Relative unit 
labour costsd) 
Export 
performancee) 
1999–
2011 2012 
1999–
2011 2012 
1999–
2011 2012 
1999–
2011 2012 
1999–
2011 2012 
1999–
2011 2012 
Germany 1.2 1.9 0.4 0.5 0.8 – 0.1 0.5 2.8 – 1.6 – 2.2 0.9 3.0 
France 2.7 2.8 1.0 1.3 0.7 0.2 2.0 1.9 0.3 – 2.8 – 2.3 1.2 
Italy 1.9 2.0 – 0.2 0.9 – 0.1 – 1.7 2.6 2.4 0.8 – 2.3 – 3.1 – 1.1 
Spain 2.8 2.0 – 0.2 1.7 0.7 2.9 2.7 – 2.7 1.0 – 5.7 – 0.4 2.8 
Netherlands 2.9 2.0 0.8 1.2 0.9 – 0.8 2.2 1.5 0.5 – 4.2 – 0.1 1.1 
Belgium 2.5 3.1 0.6 1.0 0.7 – 0.4 2.0 3.4 0.6 – 1.9 – 1.5 – 1.5 
Austria 2.1 2.7 0.5 0.7 1.0 – 0.6 1.1 3.6 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 0.1 
Greece 4.8 – 2.0 – 1.2 2.1 3.4 – 0.2 1.0 – 11.4 – 2.2 – 5.0 
Finland 3.2 2.1 1.7 0.1 1.2 0.5 2.0 3.2 0.0 – 2.8 – 1.8 – 3.9 
Ireland 3.8 1.4 2.1 – 0.4 2.4 2.0 2.0 – 0.8 0.8 – 6.2 1.6 1.5 
Portugal 3.4 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 2.7 – 0.4 0.7 – 6.5 – 1.1 3.8 
Slovakia 7.2 3.4 3.6 1.7 3.7 2.2 2.6 0.5 2.7 – 3.2 2.9 7.7 
United 
Kingdom 3.6 2.3 1.3 0.2 1.3 – 1.1 2.4 3.2 – 1.4 5.4 – 1.7 – 2.2 
Sweden 2.9 3.6 1.2 2.5 1.7 0.5 1.4 2.5 – 0.6 1.3 – 0.4 – 1.4 
Denmark 3.1 1.9 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.5 2.6 1.0 0.9 – 4.1 – 0.7 0.2 
Poland 5.1 6.5 1.8 4.0 3.7 2.1 2.1 1.8 – 0.3 – 3.5 2.6 0.1 
Czech 
Republic 5.7 2.8 4.0 1.8 3.1 – 0.9 2.0 2.4 3.3 – 2.9 3.1 2.1 
Hungary 7.3 3.8 1.6 0.9 2.3 – 2.3 5.6 5.9 2.8 – 2.3 4.0 – 0.5 
Iceland 6.5 5.5 1.0 1.9 1.6 2.8 5.8 5.3 – 1.5 0.9 0.5 3.2 
Norway 4.6 4.2 – 0.6 0.8 0.6 1.3 4.4 2.6 3.4 0.9 – 3.8 – 1.1 
Switzerland 1.8 1.2 0.7 1.0 0.7 – 0.3 1.1 1.5 1.6 – 2.1 – 0.6 – 2.2 
Japan – 0.8 1.2 0.5 2.1 1.0 1.3 – 1.5 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 3.7 – 2.7 – 2.7 
United 
States 3.5 1.7 1.3 – 0.2 1.8 0.8 1.9 1.3 – 1.9 1.5 – 1.5 0.4 
Canada 3.1 3.3 0.6 2.3 0.8 1.0 2.4 1.5 3.0 0.5 – 3.0 – 1.1 
China – – – – – – – – – – 10.8 2.3 
a) Growth rates for the total economy. – b) Compensation per employee in the private sector. – c) Compensation per employee 
deflated by GDP Deflator. – d) Competitiveness – weighted relative unit labour costs. – e) Ratio between export volumes and 
export markets for total goods and services. A positive number indicates gains in market shares and a negative number 
indicates a loss in market shares. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 92, December 2012. 
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tries of their competitiveness. The effects of this cred-
it bubble will have to be overcome via a downward
realignment of prices and wages. Ireland, which also
belongs to the group of crisis countries, is the only
country in which the situation in the labour market
has broadly stabilised, with unemployment declining
slightly from its peak of 15.1 percent in January 2012
to 14.7 percent last October, following a sizeable real
devaluation.
The inflation rate in the euro area has been declining
since autumn 2011 falling from 3.0 percent in
September 2011 to 2.2 percent in December 2012
(see Figure 1.13). Increasingly weak domestic de -
mand and the slowing of  wage growth were mainly
responsible for this drop. The inflation rate never-
theless sank less quickly and less pronouncedly than
may have been expected based on the recessionary
state of  the euro area. Excluding energy and
unprocessed food items, i.e.
looking at core inflation, the
trend is similar, albeit less pro-
nounced. This was primarily due
to the increase in administered
prices and excise duties arising
from fiscal consolidation in
some member states. Both actual
and core inflation would have
been 0.4 percentage points lower
on average throughout 2012 if
the direct effect of  excise taxes
had been excluded. Inflation has
especially been driven by tax in -
creases in the crisis countries of
Italy, Portugal and Greece.
Differences across Europe
After a strong start, overall economic output in
Germany increasingly lost momentum over the course
of 2012. The cooling down in the world economy
combined with the recession in Southern Europe did
slightly infect the German economy via its exports.
Furthermore, lingering uncertainty resulting from the
European debt crisis curbed the upward forces of
domestic demand. Out of all segments of domestic
demand, investment in equipment and machinery was
the most seriously affected and fell sharply over the
course of  the year, despite extremely favourable
financing conditions. Investments in buildings also
dropped somewhat until the middle of last year, but
this was mainly due to a slump in public sector invest-
ment in construction after the subsidies of the eco-
nomic stimulus packages agreed upon during the last
recession expired at the end of
2011. In residential construction,
on the other hand, low interest
rates and the uncertainty over
investing abroad continued to
stimulate domestic investment
demand. Although impulses
clearly weakened in autumn
2012, growth was particularly
boosted by international trade
last year.
The economic slowdown has also
impacted the labour market. The
number of  persons in work
stopped rising recently, while the
number of  hours worked dropp -
ed considerably. Compa nies have
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obviously been able to offset lower demand for staff
by reducing overtime work. The fact that unemploy-
ment has been increasing since the spring, however, is
primarily due to a reduction in active labour market
policies.
In the fourth quarter of 2012 overall economic output
growth was negative. However, Germany does not
look set to slip into an outright recession. The Ifo
Business Climate Index started to rise again slightly
for the first time in six months in November 2012.
This increase was accompanied by a clear improve-
ment in the outlook component of the index. The
economy therefore looks set to recover in the first
quarter of 2013. Overall economic production is like-
ly to have reached a growth rate of 0.7 percent for
2012 and, on balance, should stagnate in the winter
months of 2012/2013.
France’s economy is in the doldrums. The probability
of a recession in the winter months is high. After
slightly negative growth during the first half  of 2012,
real GDP rose again in the third quarter of 2012,
albeit by only 0.9 percent. It was particularly impact-
ed by declining gross investment. Public and private
consumption, however, provided a positive contribu-
tion. Private consumption showed a much weaker
than usual increase which can mainly be attributed to
higher unemployment. After an overall tendency of
the trade balance deficit to increase, exports picked up
somewhat, while imports declined in the third quarter
of 2012. With a growth rate of 0.0 percent, GDP has
stagnated in 2012. 
The French unemployment rate stood at 10.7 percent
in October 2012, its highest level since 1999, and
reached 10.4 percent on average in 2012. The annual
inflation rate fell to 2.1 percent in October 2012, down
from 2.6 percent at the start of the year. Higher ener-
gy and food prices resulted in a comparatively strong
increase in the price level over the last year. These
effects are now nearly expired and annual inflation
reached 2.3 percent last year. 
After shrinking for three consecutive quarters, GDP
in the United Kingdom grew by 3.8 percent in the
third quarter of  2012, i.e. between July and Sep -
tember. This strong growth can be explained by tem-
porary special factors. According to an estimate of
the Bank of England, there were catch-up effects
after a 0.5 percent loss of  production due to the
Queen’s Diamond Jubilee in spring and a 0.4 percent
demand increase during the Summer Olympics in
London. Given that these were one-time events, how-
ever, economic performance did again decrease by
1.2 percent in the fourth quarter. Total economic out-
put overall stagnated last year. The unemployment
rate fell slightly during the course of  last year and
averaged at 7.9 percent. Inflation slowed down from
4.5 percent in 2011 to 2.9 percent in 2012. However,
despite the overall weak economy it still remained at
an elevated level.
Italy remains embroiled in recession. GDP has been
falling since the third quarter of  2011, primarily
due to a significant decline in private investment,
which is suffering from the banks' restrictive lending
conditions, high interest rates and uncertainty
about the future course of  the sovereign debt crisis,
as well as a sustained flight of  capital. Con -
solidation measures initiated by Monti's govern-
ment have also placed a heavy millstone on public
investment and caused government spending to
decline slightly. Private consumption, driven down
by rising unemployment, higher taxes and higher
energy and food prices, has also contributed nega-
tively to the economic growth. Only net exports
have had an expansionary impact. This, however, is
less due to a revival in exports, and more to a
decline in imports. Nevertheless, it turned the pre-
vailing trade deficit of  recent years into a surplus in
the second quarter of  2012. Overall, GDP shrunk
by 2.0 percent last year.
The unemployment rate continued its rise and stood
at 11.1 percent in October 2012, its highest level in
13 years. The average unemployment rate was
10.6 percent last year. The Italian labour market is
characterised by strong segmentation into a core of
well-protected workers with permanent contracts and
a growing number of temporary employees – mainly
young workers. A central project of Monti's govern-
ment was to break this segmentation within the
framework of comprehensive labour market reforms,
and to improve the functioning of the labour market.
Under pressure from the political parties, industry
and trade unions, the planned measures, however,
were mitigated to the extent that they now appear
inadequate to bring about a sustainable recovery of
the labour market in the near future.
After an increase in value-added tax (VAT), consumer
prices have risen sharply in 2012. Inflation, which
peaked in March 2012 at 3.8 percent, has since fallen
to 2.6 percent in November. The average annual infla-
tion rate stood at 3.0 percent last year, which is well
EEAG Report 2013 24
Chapter 1
EEAG Report 201325
Chapter 1
above the euro area average and
continues to undermine Italian
competitiveness. 
Spain is experiencing a cyclical
and structural crisis. In the third
quarter of 2012, GDP declined by
an annualised 1.1 percent, the fifth
quarterly decline in a row. Spain’s
annual growth rate amount ed to 
– 1.3 percent for 2012. With the ex -
ception of net exports, no demand
component has been able to make
a positive contribution. State
expenditure has been slashed con-
siderably due to the central gov-
ernment’s consolidation measures.
Uncer tain ty about the stabilisa-
tion of the banking sector, as well as high interest rates
and persistent capital flight, are hampering private
investment. Excess capacity in the construction sector
has not yet been relieved. Private consumption is falling
because of record unemployment and a high level of
household indebtedness. 
Exports have been significantly revived in recent years
and are increasingly supporting economic activity.
Recent structural reforms, particularly aimed at
improving price competitiveness, are starting to bear
fruits: in the second quarter of 2012, exports exceed-
ed imports for the first time since 1998. The trade bal-
ance is now showing a surplus, while the deficit in the
current account has declined significantly. However,
as in the other crisis-stricken countries, the improve-
ments come primarily from imports declining due to
the recession, rather than structural improvements in
the economy resulting from a real devaluation (see
Chapter 2). 
The labour market situation has worsened again. The
unemployment rate stood at 26.2 percent in October
2012, the highest level ever recorded. The average
unemployment rate stood at 25.1 percent in 2012. The
annual rate of inflation has accelerated significantly
during autumn last year to 3.5 percent, which is large-
ly due to an increase in VAT by 3 percentage points in
September. The average change in consumer prices
was 2.1 percent in 2012.
Greece, Portugal and Ireland have been undergoing an
adjustment programme agreed with the “troika”
designed to bring public finances, as well as the devel-
opment of the external debt of these countries, on a
sustainable path through a series of  structural
reforms. All three economies have made significant
efforts since the beginning of the debt crisis; but each
of the three has achieved very different levels of
progress. 
As seen in the continuous improvement of  national
trade balances over the course of  the last four years,
the accumulation of  external liabilities has slowed
noticeably in all three countries since the outbreak of
the financial crisis in 2008 (see Figure 1.14). However,
again, a significant part of  this adjustment only re -
flects the cyclically-related decline in imports relative
to exports. The low interest rate for aid loans and the
extra ECB refinancing credit standing behind the tar-
get liabilities have contributed to the improvement in
current accounts, because interest payments on for-
eign loans are posted as debits on these balances.
Current account adjustments are sustainable only if
the crisis countries can permanently increase their
price competitiveness, which fell heavily in the decade
prior to the outbreak of  the financial crisis. In this
respect, a very mixed picture emerges in the three
countries. 
Ireland enjoyed comparatively flexible labour and
product markets already before the outbreak of the
financial crisis. The country was accordingly able to
restore its price competitiveness compared to the rest
of the euro area swiftly via a sectoral redistribution of
its labour force combined with rapid wage and price
reductions. Whereas Ireland’s unit labour costs have
declined by 12.5 percent since 2008, relative to those
of its competitors this even amounted to 24 percent.
In addition, the noticeable improvement of the Irish
current account is due to advantageous sectoral and
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Germany Benelux+Austria+Finland Greece+Ireland+Portugal New euro area countries
Italy Spain France Euro area
% of euro area GDP % of euro area GDP
Trade balancesa) in the euro area
a) Four quarter moving averages.
Source: Eurostat, last accessed on 31 January 2013; 2012Q4: EEAG forecast.
Figure 1.14
regional specialisations of the Irish export sector.
Ireland benefitted from the clearly more robust
economies in the United States and in the emerging
markets. 
In contrast to Ireland, both Greece and Portugal face
severe economic rigidities and a significantly less
favourable sectoral and regional specialisation. A
noticeable recovery in international competitiveness
can only be expected in Greece and Portugal after
profound reforms in the labour and product markets,
and only to the extent that these reforms enable wide-
spread wage and price cuts. These processes, however,
only began after adjustment programmes were adopt-
ed in 2010 by Greece and in 2011 by Portugal. As a
result, unit labour costs did still increase by 5 percent
in Greece and 4 percent in Portugal overall since 2008.
The competitiveness of these economies has only
started to improve in more recent years and relative to
their trading partners. 
It is difficult to assess whether the implemented and
scheduled reforms are sufficient to bring about the
necessary price movements in Greece and Portugal in
the years ahead. Although some significant progress
has been made, this does not yet seem to have been
substantial enough to warrant a sufficient improve-
ment of competitiveness in the medium term. The
improvement seen in the current account has only
been induced by price effects to a limited extent, and
is primarily the result of the recession in the wake of
the collapse in domestic demand for imports. 
The three crisis-afflicted countries also showed very
different developments last year. While Ireland’s eco-
nomic output stagnated, Greece and Portugal contin-
ued to shrink sharply. The rela-
tively positive development in
Ireland was mainly due to the
dynamic expansion of exports to
countries outside of  Europe.
Nevertheless, there are still struc-
tural problems in Ireland. The
real-estate bubble burst in 2008,
leaving a debt-ridden household
sector and severely troubled
banks, and creating a large num-
ber of unemployed workers in
the construction sector. 
With the decline in demand from
the euro area, the economic
recovery has ground to a stand-
still in all countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. The increase in exports slowed
significantly in the first half  of 2012 and the confi-
dence of businesses dropped everywhere. Although
production growth was still positive in some coun-
tries, especially in Poland and the Baltic states, the
expansion slowed significantly over the course of last
year. The Czech Republic and Hungary, on the other
hand, moved into recession at the start of 2012. While
consumer spending declined in the Czech Republic,
Hungary recorded a sharp decline in investment. In
both countries, inflation rates rose as a result of
increases in excise taxes. Political turmoil in Romania
led to a significant devaluation of the Romanian leu,
an increase in inflation and higher risk premiums. 
1.3 Fiscal and monetary policy in Europe
1.3.1 Fiscal policy
The growing concern of financial markets about the
sustainability of  public debt has forced many
advanced economies to consolidate. In 2010 and 2011
substantial parts of the resulting improvement in fis-
cal balances could be ascribed to improvements in
economic conditions (relative to the crisis years of
2008/2009) automatically leading to improved tax rev-
enues and reduced unemployment and welfare bene-
fits; in 2012, however, this was not the case as the year
saw a return to recession in Europe and a weakening
of global dynamics. Furthermore, the relatively easy
to implement cut-backs of fiscal stimulus packages
introduced during the Great Recession were largely
implemented in the first years after it. Nevertheless
sharp declines in structural deficits, i.e. deficit mea-
sures that attempt to exclude business cycle effects,
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remain visible for the euro area and the United States
in 2012 (see Figure 1.15). However, while this year’s
structural budget deficits will also remain substantial-
ly above pre-crisis levels in the United States, Japan
and the United Kingdom, the euro area’s structural
budget deficit is estimated to fall to 0.4 percent of
GDP in 2013, its lowest level since 1991, i.e. the first
year for which this data is available.
Fiscal policy in most countries of the euro area
remained restrictive in 2012 (see Table 1.2). The
improvement in the overall fiscal balance, however,
was, mainly due to the business cycle and was less pro-
nounced than in 2011. For most EU countries the
improvements in primary fiscal balances lagged
behind those of the year before. Some countries with
relatively sound fiscal histories, notably Sweden,
 
Table 1.2 
Public finances 
  
  
Gross debta) Fiscal balancea) 
1999–
2007 
2008–
2010 2010 2011 2012 
1999–
2007b) 
2008–
2010 2010 2011 2012 
Germany 63.7 74,6 82.5 80.5 81.7 – 2.2 – 2.4 – 4.1 – 0.8 – 0.2 
France 61.7 76,6 82.3 86.0 90.0 – 2.7 – 6.0 – 7.1 – 5.2 – 4.6 
Italy 106.4 113,9 119.2 120.7 126.5 – 2.9 – 4.1 – 4.3 – 3.8 – 2.8 
Spain 49.4 51,9 61.5 69.3 86.1 0.2 – 8.5 – 9.7 – 9.4 – 8.0 
Netherlands 51.7 60,8 63.1 65.5 68.8 – 0.5 – 3.4 – 5.0 – 4.4 – 3.6 
Belgium 98.6 93,5 95.5 97.8 99.9 – 0.4 – 3.5 – 3.9 – 3.9 – 3.1 
Austria 64.7 68,3 72.0 72.4 74.6 – 1.8 – 3.2 – 4.5 – 2.5 – 3.2 
Greece 102.3 130,3 148.3 170.6 176.7 – 5.3 – 12.1 – 10.8 – 9.5 – 6.8 
Ireland 31.8 67,2 92.2 106.4 117.6 1.6 – 17.4 – 30.9 – 13.3 – 8.4 
Finland 42.1 42,0 48.6 49.0 53.1 3.9 – 0.4 – 2.8 – 0.9 – 2.0 
Portugal 59.9 82,8 93.5 108.1 119.1 – 4.1 – 7.9 – 9.8 – 4.4 – 5.0 
Slovakia 41.0 34,8 41.0 43.3 51.7 – 5.3 – 5.9 – 7.7 – 4.9 – 4.9 
Slovenia 26.2 31,9 38.6 46.9 54.0 – 2.3 – 4.5 – 5.7 – 6.4 – 4.4 
Luxembourg 6.3 16,3 19.2 18.3 21.3 2.5 0.5 – 0.8 – 0.3 – 1.9 
Estonia 5.0 6,1 6.7 6.1 10.5 0.7 – 1.6 0.2 1.2 – 1.1 
Cyprus 64.3 56,2 61.3 71.1 89.7 – 2.7 – 3.5 – 5.3 – 6.3 – 5.2 
Malta 62.9 66,0 68.3 70.9 72.3 – 5.2 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 2.7 – 2.6 
Euro area 69.0 78,6 85.6 88.1 92.9 – 1.9 – 4.9 – 6.2 – 4.1 – 3.3 
United 
Kingdom 41.1 66,5 79.4 85.0 88.7 – 1.4 – 8.9 – 10.2 – 7.8 – 6.2 
Sweden 51.5 40,3 39.5 38.4 37.4 1.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 – 0.2 
Denmark 44.3 39,0 42.9 46.6 45.4 2.4 – 0.7 – 2.7 – 1.9 – 4.0 
Poland 43.2 50,9 54.8 56.4 55.5 – 4.1 – 6.3 – 7.9 – 5.0 – 3.4 
Czech 
Republic 25.2 33,6 37.8 40.8 45.1 – 3.9 – 4.3 – 4.8 – 3.2 – 3.5 
Hungary 59.8 78,2 81.8 81.4 78.4 – 6.4 – 4.2 – 4.5 4.3 – 2.6 
Romania 19.6 22,5 30.5 33.4 34.6 – 2.6 – 7.2 – 6.8 – 5.5 – 2.8 
Lithuania 20.5 27,6 37.9 38.5 41.6 – 1.8 – 6.6 – 7.2 – 5.5 – 3.1 
Bulgaria 46.2 14,8 16.2 16.3 19.5 0.6 – 1.9 – 3.1 – 2.0 – 1.5 
Latvia 12.7 33,7 44.5 42.2 41.9 – 1.6 – 7.3 – 8.1 – 3.4 – 1.7 
European 
Union 61.9 72,3 80.2 83.0 86.8 – 1.7 – 5.3 – 6.5 – 4.4 – 3.6 
United 
States 62.0 88,1 98.6 102.9 107.2 – 3.1 – 10.4 – 11.2 – 10.1 – 8.7 
Japan 166.1 205,8 215.3 229.6 236.6 – 6.0 – 8.0 – 9.4 – 9.8 – 10.0 
a) As a percentage of gross domestic product. For the European countries, definitions according to the Maastricht Treaty. For 
the United States and Japan, definitions according to the IMF.  – b) For the United States, 2001–2007. 
Source: European Commission, Autumn 2012; IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2012. 
Austria, Finland, Estonia, Luxembourg and Den -
mark, were even able to provide their economies with
some fiscal impulses (see Figure 1.16).
However, consolidation efforts in recent years have
nevertheless been very pronounced leading to a clear
concomitant dampening of domestic demand almost
everywhere. Given the scope of the austerity mea-
sures, demand is particularly weak in the crisis coun-
tries of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, Spain and more
recently Cyprus. Spain was even forced to step up con-
solidation once again last summer. This was a
response to the looming threat of missing the deficit
target for that year, as well as the additional financial
requirements of regional authorities. As a result,
financial markets put the government in Madrid
under substantial pressure by withdrawing capital at a
temporarily accelerated rate in early summer. Despite
the additional 13 billion euros consolidation package
agreed in August last year, the Spanish government
failed to push the 2012 budget deficit to the targeted
5.3 percent of GDP. This was due to substantial rev-
enue losses and expenditure increases caused by the
recession. Italy also responded to the financial market
turbulence and inadequate progress in restructuring
its public budget by passing additional austerity mea-
sures. The majority of the other member states have
also passed extensive austerity measures to cut their
public deficits, as these currently lie above those per-
mitted by the Fiscal Compact. 
Although to a somewhat smaller degree than in previ-
ous years, fiscal policy in the euro area will remain
highly restrictive in 2013. Largely due to slightly
improved business cycle conditions, the degree of
restrictiveness will be slightly lower than in 2012 in
almost all member states. As a result, the negative
impact on domestic demand should also be somewhat
less pronounced than in 2012. This forecast is based
on the assumption described in the baseline scenario
that the consolidation and reform measures an -
nounced by the European governments will be uni-
formly implemented. All in all, the cost-saving efforts,
and particularly the increases in tax revenues in the
euro area, will decrease the combined deficit of
3.3 percent of GDP in 2012 to 2.6 percent in 2013.
The debt-to-GDP ratio will rise from 92.9 percent in
2012 to 94.5 percent in 2013.
In Portugal the deficit-to-GDP ratio of 9.8 percent in
2010 fell to 4.4 percent in 2011, causing the “troika”
to give a positive testimony. This substantial deficit
reduction, however, was largely caused by special cir-
cumstances. The primary deficit was not reduced any
further last year as a result. Nevertheless, Portugal’s
most recent budget figures indicate a continued reduc-
tion in the near future. The fixed deficit targets of
both last year and this year, however, are likely to be
missed, because the consolidation plans are, as is
often the case, based on macroeconomic develop-
ments that must be regarded as overly optimistic from
today’s perspective. The public deficit in relation to
GDP amounted to 5 percent last year, and is likely to
reach 4.7 percent this year. 
In Greece, the deficit-to-GDP ratio was only slightly
retracted from 10.8 percent in 2010 to 9.5 percent in
2011, which was well above the originally targeted
7.6 percent of GDP. This was largely due to the inten-
sification of the recession, the failure to implement
more structural reforms in the
state apparatus, as well as insuf -
ficient progress in the privatisa-
tion of state-owned enterprises.
Greece also failed to reach the
deficit target of 4.2 percent of
GDP, despite a successful cut to
its privately-held debt. Early
summer saw strong delays in
implementing the consolidation
programme due to the inability of
the Greek government to act. The
public deficit probably amounted
to around 7 percent of GDP in
2012 and is forecast to drop to
about 6 percent this year. The in -
terest forgiven to Greece accord -
ing to the renegotiated debt relief
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programme of autumn 2012 will
provide some relief  to Greece’s
public finances. However, huge
primary surpluses are needed in
the years ahead to reduce the
government debt-to-GDP ratio
as agreed. According to estimates
by the European Commission,
the primary fiscal balance is sup-
posed to be close to zero this 
year (coming from – 10.5 percent
of GDP in 2009). We will be sur-
prised if  these official forecasts
do not turn out to have again
been overly optimistic. 
In contrast to Greece and Por -
tugal, the consolidation of  pub-
lic finances in Ireland has largely followed the plan
agreed with the “troika”. The deficit-to-GDP ratio
declined to 13.3 percent in 2011, after reaching
30.9 percent in 2010 as a result of  the rescue mea-
sures for the banking sector. The deficit reduction
of  19.1 percentage points, as intended in the rescue
plan, was almost achieved. Fiscal consolidation is
likely to remain on schedule. A deficit of  8.4 per-
cent of  GDP in 2012 is expected to drop to 7.3 per-
cent in 2013.
1.3.2 Monetary conditions and financial markets
Monetary conditions
Monetary policy has recently become more expan-
sionary in all major industrial countries and emerg-
ing markets. In September 2012 the ECB signalled
that it is willing to expand its purchase of  the sover-
eign debt of  countries that have agreed to a fiscal
adjustment policy. This decision was apparently
made in response to rising rates on Italian and
Spanish government bonds. ECB policy is expected
to remain extraordinarily expansionary during this
forecast period since the deep recession in the
peripheral euro area countries will keep the pressure
on the EU-wide price level extremely low. The US
Federal Reserve (Fed) announc ed another round of
monetary easing given the persistent weakness in the
la bour market. The Fed continues to purchase mort-
gage-backed securities, at least initially, without pre-
defined limits. Further more, the Fed has announced
further expansion of  the monetary policy if  the eco-
nomic situation does not improve in the foreseeable
future. The Bank of  Eng land and the Bank of  Japan
also expanded their securities purchases significantly
last year.
Most emerging economies also started to gradually
ease their monetary policies as of  mid-2012, after
having tightened them repeatedly in the preceeding
year and a half. The easing of  monetary policies
should counteract the economic slowdown primarily
due to falling demand from the euro area and high
levels of  uncertainty. Given the relatively low infla-
tionary pressure since the beginning of  2012, mone-
tary policy is likely to become more expansionary in
the majority of  emerging economies this year, espe-
cially if  the global economic outlook continues to
look un favourable. 
Since its last 25 basis point cut in July 2012, the ECB
has left its interest rate for open market operations
unchanged at 0.75 percent (see Figure 1.17). The liq-
uidity provided through refinancing operations is still
plentiful. While the outstanding volume of longer-
term refinancing loans has remained relatively con-
stant since the second round of three-year loans was
announced in March 2012, demand for the weekly
main refinancing operations has continued to drop
since the summer. Government bond purchases had
not been made since March 2012. The programme to
purchase government bonds replacing the previous
programme for securities markets as decided in Sep -
tember 2011 has not yet been implemented. Overall,
the liquidity pumped into the banks in the euro sys-
tem started to fall at a moderate, but continuous pace
from its peak in July 2012 until the end of last year
(see Figure 1.18). Over summer, the liquidity actually
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in circulation had risen quite substantially because
banks reduced the amount of liquidity parked in the
euro system (fixed-term deposits, deposit and surplus
reserves). As the overnight deposit rate was reduced to
0 percent in July, the incentive to park money in the
ECB's deposit facility disappeared. 
As a result of ample liquidity, interest rates in the
interbank money market have fallen substantially
during 2012. Since July, the interest rate for secured
three-month money (Eurepo) on the interbank money
market has even turned negative. The interest rate for
unsecured three-month cash (Euribor) offered only
slightly higher interest rates of less than 0.2 percent at
the end of last year. Hence, the money market spread,
i.e. the risk premium on the money market, fell signif-
icantly during the course of last year and is only 10 to
15 basis points above levels that pertained in the years
before the housing market bubble
burst in the United States. This
reduction in the risk premium on
the money market allowed unse-
cured money market rates to fall
by approximately 120 basis
points during the year.
Lending rates on new corporate
and consumer loans also fell dur-
ing 2012. In the euro area as a
whole, such rates were reduced
by between 30 and 90 basis
points. However, these declines
were seen primarily in the core
countries of the euro area (espe-
cially in Germany, Finland and
the Netherlands), while lending
rates in most crisis countries fell
by sub-average amounts, or even
rose as in the case of Italy. 
Despite these falls in rates trig-
gered by a further easing of mon-
etary conditions, the volume of
outstanding bank loans to the
private sector in the euro area has
been declining since the end of
2011. Lending to non-financial
corporations, which accounts for
roughly half  of total credits to
the non-financial sectors of the
economy was significant in this
respect (see Figure 1.19). The
outstanding amount of consumer
credits also declined considerably
during the year. Only the amount of mortgages con-
tinued to expand, albeit at a somewhat more moder-
ate pace compared to previous years. 
As with lending rates, the credit dynamics have dif-
fered widely across the euro area. While lending in
most of  the core countries is still expanding (espe-
cially in the Netherlands), loan portfolios in the cri-
sis countries have dropped, in some cases substan-
tially. Despite declining lending to the private sector
in the euro area as a whole, the monetary aggregate
M3 managed to expand by 3.5 percent in October
2012 as compared to the year before. The discrepan-
cy between the growth rates of  M3 and the expan-
sion of  loans to the private sector is mainly due to
growth in loans to the public sector, as well as a
decrease in the long-term liabilities of  the banks
among each other.
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Although not very likely, it is still
possible that the ECB will again
lower its key interest rate by
25 basis points to 0.5 percent
during the first half  of this year.
Such a move would correspond
to the logic behind the previous
interest rate changes. Since then
the economic situation has dete-
riorated and inflationary pres-
sure has eased. However, because
money market interest rates and
credit and capital market interest
rates in the core countries are
already at historically extremely
low levels, such an interest rate
cut is likely to remain largely
ineffective. It would only benefit
those banks in the crisis countries
that have only managed to keep
afloat to date with the help of
ECB refinancing loans. Under
the assumption that the ECB will
continue these unconventional
measures, the liquidity of  the
banking system will remain
ample and money market interest
rates will remain low. The
announced unlimited govern-
ment bond purchase programme
has reduced, and will reduce, the
risk premiums on bonds from cri-
sis countries. After all, the ECB
has implicitly declared that it will
take over the bonds of any bank-
rupt state of the euro area before they default, and has
thus guaranteed the repayment of  these bonds.
Through a cut in ECB profits redistributed across
national governments, any costs arising from bond
purchases will ultimately be borne by the taxpayers.
Bonds, stocks and foreign exchange markets
The implicit guarantees provided by the ECB and the
new permanent rescue fund, ESM, have halted the
trend (particularly marked during 2011) towards gov-
ernment bond yields in the euro area decoupling from
those in other major regions in the world, and even
started to reverse it in summer 2012. Whereas in the
United States and the United Kingdom these long-
term interest rates basically stagnated at historically
low levels during the second half  of 2012, they under-
went a substantial reduction in the euro area over the
course of the year (see Figure 1.20). German govern-
ment bond yields have remained more or less
unchanged since summer 2012, at least partly because
of Moody's announcement that it is considering
downgrading Germany based on its exposure in res-
cue operations. The yields on bonds from crisis coun-
tries, however, have declined substantially (see
Figure 1.21). 
Monetary easing boosted the stock markets in
Europe, the United States and many emerging mar-
kets. Measured in local currencies, the Dow Jones
industrial average, the Nikkei 225, the FTSE 100 and
the Euro STOXX 50 correspondingly improved by
8.8 percent, 15.8 percent, 8.1 percent and 15.1 percent
respectively during 2012 (see Figure 1.22) as investors
are increasingly willing to reallocate their wealth away
from low-interest assets. The realised appreciations of
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the UK pound and Japanese yen
relative to the euro reduce these
gains somewhat from a euro area
perspective (see Figure 1.23). The
dollar-euro exchange rate, on the
other hand, remained more or
less stable in 2012 and compared
to other years (see Figure 1.24).
Although there was some depre-
ciation of the euro relative to the
dollar during the first half  of the
year, the overall stabilisation of
European financial markets has
led to a subsequent appreciation
of a similar magnitude since sum-
mer 2012.
As far as the other major curren-
cies in the world are concerned,
only the yen turned out to be rel-
atively volatile again last year,
reflecting the fast-changing senti-
ments in financial markets re -
garding the importance of so-
called safe haven currencies.
After a substantial depreciation
in early 2012 and a comparable
appreciation during the summer,
it lost ground again at the end of
the year. The real effective ex -
change rate of the United King -
dom remained on a steady appre-
ciation path that began mid-2011.
For China, the stabilisation in
inflation also implied a relatively
flat development in its real
exchange rate.
1.4 The macroeconomic outlook
1.4.1 Assumptions, risks and
uncertainties 
How well the European debt cri-
sis is controlled remains a deci-
sive factor for global economic
growth. The bail-out promise of
the ECB, the ruling of  the
German Federal Constitutional
Court upholding the ESM and
the agreement to provide ESM
loans to support the Spanish
banking sector calmed the finan-
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cial markets substantially after summer 2012. This
also led to a decline in risk premiums on government
debt issues by the crisis countries Greece, Portugal,
Spain, Italy and Ireland. This respite does not hide
the fact that the European debt crisis is far from over.
The ECB support programme will only be able to alle-
viate the symptoms of the crisis in the short term, and
does not eliminate its structural causes. Tackling the
systemic problems will depend heavily on how suc-
cessfully the crisis countries implement structural
reforms to restore their public finances, to improve
their price competitiveness, and ultimately, to enhance
their growth potential.
This forecast is based on the assumption that there
will be no further escalation of the European debt cri-
sis during the forecast period. This assumes that the
crisis countries will strictly adhere to the course of fis-
cal consolidation and implement the planned struc-
tural reforms in many areas. However, it also means
that other euro area countries (France, Belgium and
the Netherlands) will have to implement the measures
already decided or envisioned to reduce public deficits
and to improve the international competitiveness
without amendment and in a timely manner. This is
the only way that the financial markets will be con-
vinced that these countries will be able to service their
public and foreign debt without disruption in the
future. 
Based on these assumptions, it is likely that investor,
producer and consumer confidence will gradually sta-
bilise over the forecast period, albeit at a low level.
Today’s still heightened levels of uncertainty are not
expected to increase again either. This opens up the
possibility that the euro area, supported by the
German economy and the recovery of non-European
economies, will exit the recession in 2013. Albeit to a
lesser extent than last year, it still implies on-going
publicly organised capital outflow from Germany to
fund continuing European bail-outs; it will probably
also allow for a slow, but steady reduction of the
imbalances in the Target system of the European
Monetary Union. 
These assumptions, however, do not mean that all
member countries of the euro area can expect an eco-
nomic recovery in the year ahead. The structural
problems in some crisis countries are simply too big to
be solved at short notice. The discussions over
Greece’s potential exit from the euro that culminated
in early summer 2012 have tapered off, at least for the
time being. They may only flare up again if  the crisis
re-escalates. Such a scenario appears less likely from
today’s perspective and this baseline scenario excludes
the possibility that any such speculation will lead to
on-going turmoil and contagion in the European
financial markets.
However, there remains a high risk of  a marked dete-
rioration in the economic situation in the euro area,
or even of  a massive escalation of  the crisis. This rep-
resents the main threat to the world’s economic devel-
opment. The success of  reform efforts in the crisis
countries is far from assured because their govern-
ments face strong political opposition at home. The
premature resignation of  the Italian government
under Mario Monti illustrates this risk. In particular,
the announcement of  the ECB’s willingness to exten-
sively intervene in the government bond markets, or
the currently discussed possibility of  directly recapi-
talising banking systems through the ESM could
reduce the willingness to reform. If  the structural
adjustment processes in the crisis countries slow
down or fail entirely, increased macroeconomic
uncertainty, a significant decline of  confidence in the
euro area and a new recession can be expected. In
such a situation the flight of  capital from the crisis
countries would probably continue, which would fur-
ther increase demands on the part of  local banks to
be financed by the euro system and the ESM.
However, if  the ESM’s outstanding loans were to
grow strongly, its credit rating could be downgraded
again. This could be intensified further if  confidence
were to drop in the fiscal solvency of  important core
countries like France, Belgium or the Netherlands
that are backing up the ESM although they have
their own high levels of  public debt and structural
weaknesses. In this case, the ESM and the euro area
would probably be on the verge of  collapse. De -
pending on how strongly the escalating debt crisis
succumbs to this risk scenario, this could unleash dif-
ferent levels of  burden for the real economy and the
financial sector in almost all industrialised and
emerging economies. In extreme cases, it could even
come to a worldwide recession.
Risks emanate from the monetary policy of  the ECB
and the Fed. Both central banks announced addi-
tional, and this time unlimited programmes to pur-
chase securities in late summer 2012. Moreover, the
provision of  liquidity in both regions has been very
expansive since the beginning of  the global financial
crisis. This extremely loose monetary policy could
encourage the formation of  bubbles in various asset
markets. The credibility of  the two central banks
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Box 1.1
The ECB and medium-term price stability1
During the global financial crisis which was followed by the euro crisis, the ECB exhausted its traditional mone-
tary policy instruments and gradually took a rising number of extraordinary measures. The associated potential
consequences for future price stability have led to heated debates in- and outside of the profession. In the short
term, it is understandable that the ECB has entered the political vacuum that exist(ed) in the European Monetary
Union. Medium- to long-term threats to their independence and credibility, and thus to medium-term price stabil-
ity in the euro area, however, appear to be high.
The primary objective of the ECB, or more precisely of the Eurosystem (i.e. the ECB and the national central banks
of the member states that use the euro), is the maintenance of price stability in the euro area. To achieve this target
in the medium to long term, the independence and credibility of a central bank are nowadays considered to be essen-
tial. The price setting behaviour of economic agents is often based on future price expectations. A credible central
bank is able to influence these expectations and thereby achieve the goal of price stability with lower social costs.
Politicians, however, have a potential interest in using the central bank for their often more short-term oriented pur-
poses. They could try to persuade the central bank to buy government bonds in order to finance additional gov-
ernment spending, or lower interest rates in order to generate short-term above-average economic growth. In nor-
mal circumstances, both would lead to a loss in credibility and subsequently in price stability. Therefore, it is social-
ly desirable to have monetary policy decisions take place independent of political considerations. This theoretical
finding is confirmed in many empirical studies: more independent central banks generally have lower average infla-
tion rates and lower inflation variability.2
Although the primary objective of the ECB is price stability, the ECB also has to assure a properly functioning
financial system. To secure the functioning of this system the ECB, like other central banks in the major industri-
alised nations in 2008 and 2009, was forced to intervene heavily. Almost all of the extraordinary measures taken
since can be attributed to this. As indicated by the sky-rocketing risk premiums in interbank money markets in
autumn 2008, banks lost trust in other banks and were barely willing to lend each other money. Central banks
stepped in and provided the credit that the market was no longer willing to provide, or not at the same conditions. 
The subsequent liquidity and solvency problems of some governments, the fragile situation in the banking sector
and the balance-of-payments problems that have resulted from capital flight in Europe, prevented risk premiums
on the interbank market from returning to pre-crisis levels and, during the second half  of 2011, even triggered a
sharp rise again. This prompted the ECB to take further measures and to again expand gross liquidity supply sub-
stantially in countries from which private capital had fled. More specifically, the introduction of so-called long-
term refinancing operations providing liquidity via three-year tenders led to a substantial increase in gross liquidi-
ty. However, a large part of this money was hoarded, i.e. kept at deposits at the ECB. As a result, net liquidity pro-
vision, even if  narrowly measured, fell substantially during the second half  of 2011 (see Figure 1.18). The official
net liquidity provision only jumped to historical heights when the overnight deposit rate of the ECB fell to zero per-
cent in July last year and there was no longer any incentive to transfer money to the deposit facility provided by the
ECB system. Total credit provision and the development of broad monetary aggregates, however, still indicate that
this ample liquidity is being hoarded by the financial sector and hence is not really being put into circulation. Short-
run inflationary pressures coming from this side therefore remain extremely moderate. Nevertheless, in the medium
to long term, this ample liquidity could, in principle, make it difficult for the ECB to maintain price stability. If
needed, the ECB has enough instruments at its disposal to circumvent a strong increase in the demand for credit.
It could raise interest rates or limit the liquidity provided to the banking sector. The only question is whether the
ECB would be willing to use these instruments given that it would thereby create problems for over-indebted coun-
tries and banks. 
The real danger for the ECB therefore lies in the loss of its political independence, i.e. its ability to fulfil its man-
date without political interference from over-indebted countries and banks. In addition, the ECB has an extreme
interest in keeping the euro project alive: its own existence depends on it. From a political-economy perspective, this
opens the door for time-inconsistent behaviour on the side of the ECB and thereby is another source that jeopar-
dises its credibility. This raises the question of whether the public is already starting to have doubts regarding the
future objectives of the ECB and thus its independence. For this purpose it is useful to evaluate the current situa-
tion with regard to its primary mandate of maintaining price stability.
The anchoring of medium-term inflation expectations is important for this. Medium-term expectations are largely
unaffected by cyclical and other temporary price effects, and are therefore a good way of judging whether econo-
mists trust a central bank to realise that mandate. According to the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters,
although the average inflation expectations for the euro area have remained at around 2 percent, their distribution
has become more dispersed over time. 
When asked to assess the probability of euro area inflation being in between 1.5 and 1.9 percent in five years –
which can be interpreted as “below but close to 2 percent”, i.e. the ECB’s interpretation of price stability – then
participating professional forecasts consistently on average answered around 40 percent prior to the crisis. This 
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might suffer to the extent that inflationary expecta-
tions could become less attached to their current
medium-term anchors of  approximately 2 percent
(see Box 1.1). In the euro area this could be encour-
aged by the ECB actually implementing its recently
adopted securities purchase programme or expand-
ing its financing of  crisis banks. This would reinforce
the impression that the ECB is no longer independent
or has embarked on the course of  monetary financ-
ing of  the state. Even in the short term such fears
could lead to a significantly enhanced flight of  capi-
tal into secure investments. The resulting realloca-
tions and international capital flows could immedi-
ately lead to distortions in financial markets, but also
in the real economy, which would become a heavy
burden for the world economy.
The further tightening of the fiscal reins in the United
States in March of this year via the still open ends of
the fiscal cliff, the so-called “sequester”, represents
some smaller risks to the United States, and thereby
to global economic development. If  these still sched-
uled automatic spending cuts in the fields of educa-
tion, defence and infrastructure as agreed upon in
2011 on the occasion of raising the debt ceiling were
to be fully implemented, this would imply a negative
impulse of around 110 billion US dollars. Although
large, the concomitant loss of demand would proba-
bly not pull the United States into a recession again.
If, on the other hand, the government were to have to
shut down in March, due to the lack of any agreement
to raise the debt ceiling again, then that would have
far greater implications for both the United States and
the world economy. 
Finally, there is an appreciable risk emanating from
the recent tensions in the Middle East. A worsening of
the situation in this region could lead to significant
drops in oil production and thus a sharp rise in the
price of oil. Such an oil price shock would be a subs -
tantial burden to economic development in the oil-
importing countries.
1.4.2 The global economy
Most of the advanced and emerging economies are
experiencing a period of economic weakness this win-
ter. This is particularly intense in the euro area, where
aggregate economic performance very probably
shrunk in the fourth quarter of last year. The decisive
factor for this will be the progress made in the adjust-
ment processes of the private and the public sector in
the euro area.
Even the United States is likely to tighten its fiscal
reins significantly during the forecast period. The
“fiscal cliff”, the automatic expiration of  numerous
probability has been reduced
substantially during the crisis to
close to 25 percent more recent-
ly (see Figure 1.25). Both the
probability that inflation could
move beyond 2.5 percent and
the likelihood of inflation rates
below 1.5 percent have increas -
ed substantially. Whereas the
former could be interpreted as
evidence that the ECB might
lose control at the upper end as
a result of  expected political
pressure, the latter rather sug-
gests a prolonged weakness of
the European economy which is
sure to be a matter of concern
to politicians.
In summary, the amalgamation
of public finance and monetary
policy could harm the indepen-
dence of the ECB and thus its credibility. Medium-term inflation expectations that are less well anchored can, as
in the past, be seen as the first signs pointing in such a direction.
1 This box is based on Lamla and Sturm (2012). 
2 See for instance Klomp and De Haan (2010) for a broad survey of this literature.
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continued Box 1.1
fiscal support measures at the
beginning of  this year, has been
partly avoided. This forecast
assumes that about 60 percent of
the measures taken in the United
States will be extended either
permanently or into the next
year; but even the remaining
40 percent is likely to be a signif-
icant burden to the US economy.
As long as no clear political
agreement is made in the United
States about the structure of  the
budget, planning will remain
highly uncertain for many com-
panies. This is likely to weigh on
investment demand in the Unit -
ed States, as well as in other
regions of  the world, at least during the remaining
winter months. Of the developed countries, an expan-
sionary fiscal policy is basically only likely to be
implemented in Japan this year.
In contrast to developed countries, most emerging
economies have relatively low public debt levels and
thus significantly more fiscal scope to stimulate the
economy if  needed. These low debt levels drove deci-
sions taken in autumn 2012 by some major emerging
countries (China, Brazil and South Korea) to respond
to the economic slowdown with measures to stimulate
the economy. Many emerging economies are also
expected to further ease their fiscal policies this year,
albeit to an initially moderate degree.
These expected developments also mean that the
overall world economy is not expected to slip into a
recession during the forecasting
period. Ifo World Econom ic
Survey participants foresee some
improvement in the economic
situation in all major regions
during the first half  of  2013 (see
Figure 1.26). Hence, the global
economic expansion is expected
to accelerate somewhat in the
course of  the year, al though it
should remain below potential.
We expect world GDP to in -
crease by 3.3 percent in 2013
(after 3.0 percent last year),
using purchasing-power-parity
adjusted weights to aggregate
the eco nomies (see Figure 1.27).
Using market prices, world economic growth will
reach 2.5 percent (versus 2.3 percent last year, see
Table 1.A.1).
A noticeable acceleration in economic activity is like-
ly in emerging countries due to the monetary and fis-
cal stimulus measures already taken and those await-
ing implementation in the near future. Furthermore,
disposable income in these countries is likely to
remain strong, thereby giving additional stimulus to
private consumption. The advanced economies are
also expected to experience slightly higher growth this
year as the contractive fiscal impulse in the euro area
is likely to have a less severe impact than in 2012. The
United States should be able to stick to its moderate
growth path, i.e. after the negative fiscal shock at the
beginning of the year growth will gradually strength-
en again. This will be driven by the already improving
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real-estate market, as well as the slowly but steadily
improving asset positions of  private households.
Nevertheless, the consolidation efforts required of the
private and public sectors will dampen the pace of
expansion in virtually all advanced economies, once
again implying that the strongest contribution to
world economic growth will be made by the emerging
markets, and particularly Asia (see Figure 1.28).
Accordingly, after having expanded by a weak 2.4 per-
cent last year, world trade growth will be able to
recover somewhat to 3.6 percent this year. The trade
balances of most emerging markets are likely to dete-
riorate further due to rising domestic demand. In the
euro area, however, the extremely weak domestic
economy is expected to lead to an improvement in the
current trade balance, while the current US trade
deficit is likely to remain virtually unchanged. Given
the weak recovery, overall inflationary pressures will
remain subdued. 
1.4.3 United States
US fiscal policy will determine the momentum of eco-
nomic activity during the winter months. At the end
of  2012, numerous economic stimulus measures
including the 2010 Tax Relief  Act, which among oth-
ers prolonged the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003,
expired and the automatic spending cuts made under
the Budget Control Act of 2011 to increase the feder-
al debt ceiling were to set in at the beginning of this
year. Although a substantial part of this fiscal cliff
has been resolved, there are still heavy negotiations
going on between the Republicans and Democrats
over across-the-board spending cuts that have only
been delayed until March to date. If  the two parties
fail to reach an agreement, then
the federal budget deficit will be
relieved of about 110 billion US
dollars. At the same time, the
decline in aggregate demand
would dampen economic recov-
ery in the second half  of this
year. 
Besides a direct reduction in gov-
ernment consumption, the vast
proportion of the restrictive im -
pulses would have taken the form
of higher taxes weighing down
private consumption. In the last-
minute agreement reached earlier
this year, these taxes are now
largely off the table, while the tax
reductions implemented under President Bush have
largely been made permanent. Nevertheless, about
30 percent of the consolidation measures implied by
the fiscal cliff  have become active thanks to this last-
minute agreement. We assume that another 10 percent
will take effect this spring. The remaining 60 percent
have thereby either been avoided permanently, or
delayed until next year. 
The protracted negotiations over the entire fiscal cliff
have already generated heightened policy uncertainty
over the eventual tax and spending landscape in the
United States. Thanks to expectation formation, the
dampening effects of these negotiations were already
felt somewhat at the end of 2012, but their main
impact will materialise during the first half  of this
year. The budget deficit for the current fiscal year
would drop to approximately 5 percent of GDP in this
scenario.
Against the background of continued high unem-
ployment, as well as the uncertainty regarding fiscal
policy, the Federal Reserve will continue to follow an
ex tremely expansionary monetary policy. It an -
nounced in September that it was going to expand its
programme to purchase mortgage-backed securities
to 40 billion US dollars each month. Unlike previous
measures, this programme known as “Quantitative
Easing 3” is not time-limited. The Federal Reserve
plans to keep interest rates at a historic low of
0–0.25 percent and to continue its bond purchases
until the situation on the labour market has improved
significantly. This represents an extension of
“Operation Twist”, a programme to increase the
maturity of  government bonds held by the Federal
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
  Other countries
  Latin America and Russia
  Asia
  North America
  Western and Central Europe
  World GDP growth
Regional contributions to world GDP growtha)
%
a) Based on market weights.
Source: IMF; calculations by the EEAG; 2012 and 2013: EEAG forecast.
%
Forecast
period
Figure 1.28
Reserve. Expiring securities in its
portfolio purchased under pre -
vious programmes are also still
being continuously replaced.
The Federal Reserve is attempt-
ing to increase the degree of
monetary expansion and to
reduce long-term interest rates
for mortgage loans in order to
create favour able investment
conditions, as well as to further
support the recovery in the real-
estate market.
Good refinancing conditions and
a stabilising upswing in the real-
estate market will provide relief
to household budgets and support consumer behav-
iour. In view of this development and the upcoming
consolidation of the federal budget deficit, a further
reduction in the private savings rate is likely. This may
compensate for some of the dampening effects of fis-
cal consolidation.
Despite the extremely expansionary monetary policy,
the risks to price stability remain relatively low against
the background of currently weak economic growth.
However, the recent rise in the price index for rental
and owner-occupied residential property suggests that
a continued recovery in the real-estate market could
drive up prices in the medium term. 
Largely due to the dampening effect of  increased
uncertainty on business and household investment,
economic activity in the United States is expected to
have been weak this winter. The lack of  an agree-
ment to avoid the fiscal cliff  last year; followed by
the debate over the necessity of  increasing the feder-
al debt ceiling in early 2013 and the lack of  a feder-
al budget for the second half  of  the current fiscal
year fed uncertainty. In the underlying fiscal sce-
nario, the US economy is therefore expected to do
little more than stagnate in early 2013, but should
gain some momentum over the course of  the year
driven by the catching-up effects and the recovery in
the real-estate market. The continuing failure to
reach an agreement on medium-term fiscal policy
represents a downward risk to the forecast. 
Due to the economic slowdown among major US
trading partners this winter, exports are not expected
to provide much stimulus in the short run either.
However, the consolidation efforts in the United
States will also significantly reduce import demand,
meaning that net foreign trade will still be able to
make a small, but positive contribution to overall eco-
nomic growth in 2013.
The increase in average annual GDP will slow down
from 2.2 percent in 2012 to 1.6 percent this year (see
Figure 1.29). Weak economic conditions are likely to
provide only a slight decline in unemployment from
an average of 8.1 percent in 2012 to 7.8 percent in
2013. For the same reason inflation will remain mod-
erate this year, averaging at around 2.1 percent.
1.4.4 Asia
Several leading indicators suggest that the recently
increased pace of expansion in China will continue.
Industrial production picked up at a slightly faster
pace during the last few months of 2012. In addition,
different Purchasing Managers’ indices for the manu-
facturing and service sectors have recently brightened
and moved back into the expansion zone. These posi-
tive signals indicate an increase in private investment
dynamics, which also benefit from public infrastruc-
ture projects that were brought forward. 
Private consumption should provide a powerful stim-
ulus as per capita disposable income in the third quar-
ter of 2012 increased by over 10 percent versus the
previous year’s level, with very moderate inflation
rates that are currently around 2 percent. Consumer
confidence indices have also risen in recent months,
with retail sales seeing rapid growth recently. The high
wage rises are, however, increasingly wearing away the
price competitiveness of the Chinese economy, with
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the real exchange rate jumping by close to 6 percent in
2012. This effect is likely to impact exports already
suffering from the continuing weak demand from
Europe. Due to growing domestic demand, imports,
however, are likely to expand at even higher rates,
causing foreign trade to stop contributing positively
to Chinese GDP growth. All in all, economic growth
in China has bottomed out and will gain some
momentum again to reach 9 percent this year.
The on-going confrontation with China over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands will continue to hamper for-
eign trade with Japan. As a result of the unofficial
boycott of Japanese products by the Chinese popula-
tion, exports of Japanese cars to China dropped by a
stunning 75 percent from July to October 2012. In
September the trade balance against China therefore
went into the red for the first time since data have
been recorded.
As long as the outlook for Japan’s export markets
remains overcast, a weak recovery in the economy is
expected for 2013. Weak consumer and producer
confidence and the gradually decreasing public
reconstruction investments caused by the earth-
quake and tsunami disaster in 2011 will prevent the
domestic economy from supporting growth. The
change in government and the recent implementa-
tion of  two stimulus packages amounting to
approximately 11 billion euros should create some
albeit weak impulses from fiscal policy. A total in -
crease in GDP of  0.8 percent is expected. Despite
continuing expansionary monetary policy, the sub-
dued economic growth will keep inflation at
about – 0.2 percent.
The economy of  India should
slowly pick up this year. Al -
though the persistently high
inflation rate will restrain the
Indian central bank from cut-
ting interest rates substantially,
ex ports are likely to accelerate as
a result of  better eco nomic de -
velopments in im portant export
des tinations for India, China
and the United States. Ac cord -
ingly, GDP growth looks set to
increase from 3.7 percent in 2012
to 4.6 percent this year. After
9.4 percent in 2012, inflation will
continue to soar at 8.2 percent in
2013.
Supported by an expansive fiscal policy and an
improved extern al environment, the economic growth
in other Eastern and Southern Asian countries should
remain stable and GDP will expand by 4.5 percent
this year. 
1.4.5 Latin America
In 2013, the Latin American region, i.e. Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, is
expected to grow by 3.6 percent (following 2.4 percent
in 2012). Growth will be driven by improving condi-
tions in Brazil, the largest economy in the region, and
increased momentum in China, which is a major con-
sumer of raw materials coming from this region. The
interest cuts implemented and public investments in
the pipeline for the FIFA World Cup in 2014 should
boost Brazil’s economy. Elsewhere in Latin America
inflation rates have now fallen to a degree such that
monetary policy can be relaxed. Overall, this allows
the region to return to what can be considered more
or less potential growth. 
1.4.6 The European economy
The cyclical situation
The aggregate economic performance of the Euro -
pean Union is expected to have fallen in the fourth
quarter of 2012 and looks set to stagnate during the
first half  of 2013 (see Figure 1.30). This is suggested
by the majority of leading sentiment indicators. These
seem to have managed a turnaround in early winter at
extremely low levels, after having suffered strong ero-
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sion in the previous six months. Multiple stress factors
were probably instrumental in unfavourable econom-
ic developments in the remaining winter months. The
contractive impulse of fiscal policy in several member
states will have driven down domestic demand in
Europe. In addition, the uncertainty arising from the
European debt crisis has probably led to a decline in
private investment and dampened private consump-
tion. Moreover, financing conditions for households
and businesses in many member states have remained
exceptionally poor to date. Finally, the fiscal tighten-
ing in the United States at the beginning of 2013 is
expected to have dampened the expansion of exports
during the winter months. No further deterioration in
producer and consumer confidence is expected, and
macroeconomic uncertainty will not increase over the
course of the year ahead. 
Accordingly, these factors are no longer significant
additional negative factors weighing down on the
European economy, but nor are they positive factors
either. However, domestic demand will shrink further
in the course of the year 2013 (see Figure 1.31).
Restrictive fiscal policies, albeit less restrictive than in
the previous year, will dampen private and public
spending and investment spending in almost all mem-
ber states. The continued worsening of the labour
market and the further efforts to reduce private debt,
especially in Spain and Ireland, will also put addi-
tional strain on the willingness of private households
to spend. Business investment is also likely to decline
further in the first half  of this year. The very low
capacity utilisation in many countries and weak
domestic prospects will be significant. In the crisis
countries financing conditions have even worsened of
late, which will additionally complicate the accumula-
tion of capital. 
In the second half  of 2013, private investment is like-
ly to stabilise somewhat. This will be supported by
continued expansionary monetary policies and
increased growth in exports. Private investment
should also benefit significantly from the acceleration
of the pace of expansion in emerging markets and the
slight growth expected in the United States in the cur-
rent year. As imports are likely to remain very weak
during this period, net foreign trade will provide a
strong positive economic momentum. GDP growth in
Europe will pick up slightly in the course of the year,
although it is likely to remain extremely low. 
All in all, GDP in the European Union decreased by
0.3 percent last year and is basically expected to stag-
nate at 0.1 percent growth this year. The economic
gap among the individual member states should con-
tinue to grow in the forecast period (cf. Tab -
le 1.A.2–Table 1.A.4). Aggregate production in the
crisis countries will continue to shrink with the
exception of  Ireland. In these countries fiscal policy
will be much more restrictive than in the rest of
Europe. Although financing conditions in the crisis
countries have already started to improve and
despite more expansionary monetary policy, they are
likely to remain unfavourable, at least relative to the
European core countries. After a temporary period
of  weakness this winter, stable economies like
Germany, Finland and Austria will benefit in the rest
of  2013 from relatively stronger demand from
emerging markets and domestic forces; and will
therefore continue to expand, if  only moderately. 
The weakness of the economy
will continue to reduce employ-
ment in the European Union (see
Figure 1.32) and thereby lead to a
further rise in the overall unem-
ployment rate from 10.5 percent
last year to 10.9 percent this year
(see Figure 1.33), with already
large regional differences increas-
ing further. Given the high rate of
unemployment, wage increases
will be very moderate, gradually
slowing the rate of inflation. The
recent increases in excise duties,
as well as higher prices for energy
and food will gradually also lose
their impact. With a phasing out
of  these tax increases taking
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place mostly in the crisis countries, the upward pres-
sure on inflation in these economies will be signifi-
cantly below the euro area average. In the aggregate,
the rate of inflation should have declined to 2.5 per-
cent last year, before further weakening to 1.8 percent
this year. Thus, the core inflation rate, which particu-
larly reflects the underlying momentum in the econo-
my, should fall from 1.6 percent in October 2012 to
1.3 percent at the end of 2013. This will take the infla-
tion rate well below the ECB’s target inflation rate of
just under 2 percent.
Differences across Europe
Over the course of 2013 the German economy should
experience an upswing. If  the euro crisis does not
escalate and remains in line with the baseline scenario,
domestic upward forces and rising demand for
German export goods from out-
side the European Union should
boost the economy. Private con-
sumption and investment in
equipment and machinery look
set to pick up clearly as a result;
a surge in foreign orders indicates
that exports should also increase.
Inter na tional trade will not, on
balance, make any direct contri-
bution to an increase in GDP, as
imports will be equally wide-
spread due to livelier domestic
demand. The steady increase in
building permits indicates that
construction activity will remain
an engine for growth.
When comparing the fourth quarter of  2013 with the
fourth quarter of  2012, the German economy is
expected to expand by 1.4 percent. However, due to
the low starting level caused by the weak winter, the
average annual growth rate in GDP in 2013 will be
just 0.7 percent (see Figure 1.34). There will be no
significant growth in employment. The number of
persons employed in 2013 should only be around
35,000 people higher than the previous year’s value.
The number of  unemployed will increase during the
winter months, but should gradually fall again over
the course of  the year ahead. Due to the abandoning
of  training measures, there will be a measured annu-
al increase of  60,000 persons in 2013. The unem-
ployment rate is expected to fall slightly from
5.5 percent in 2012 to 5.4 percent this year. The
German inflation rate was 2.2 percent in 2012 and is
expected to weaken to 1.7 percent this year.
France will see its economy grow
by a very moderate 0.3 percent
this year. Private investment will
at best see a moderate increase
due to the continuing uncertainty
about the further course of the
euro crisis and the subdued earn-
ings prospects of  companies.
Companies will also face a 10 bil-
lion euro tax increase in 2013.
Hollande’s government has paved
the way for consolidation mea-
sures in 2013 amounting to a
total of 30 billion euros. A third
of this amount is to be achieved
by keeping nominal budgets con-
stant and thereby reducing
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expenditure in real terms. The remaining 10 billion
euros will affect private households in the form of tax
hikes and reduce the disposable income already
threatened by rising unemployment. Consumer
spending is therefore expected only to make a limited
positive contribution, although decreasing inflation-
ary pressure should create some breathing space in
household budgets. Exports are expected to be a drag
on the economy because France has gradually lost its
price competitiveness and its share of the world mar-
ket in recent years (see Chapter 2).4
The above-mentioned consolidation measures are not
likely to go far enough to achieve the stated goal of an
overall government deficit of
3 per cent in relation to GDP in
2013. One of the reasons for this
is that this goal is based upon
overly optimistic economic con-
ditions. The government of Pre -
sident Hollande is thus under
pressure to adopt further consol-
idation measures in the near
future, which could also strain
the economy over the forecast
period. In addition to a large
public debt, the French economy
has other structural aberrations
that particularly affect price com-
petitiveness and the labour mar-
ket. Countermeasures could in -
clude reducing labour costs and a
simpler protection against dis-
missal. If  labour market reforms
are actually implemented, this
will probably only begin to have
any impact by the end of the fore-
cast period.
The unemployment rate is ex -
pected to rise further to 11.1 per-
cent in 2013. Inflation, on the
other hand, is expected to de -
crease to 1.8 percent this year due
to under-utilised production ca -
pacity.
In the forecast period, the United
Kingdom is not expected to fall
back into recession, but should
instead experience a moderate
expansion. This is indicated by
the leading indicators, which have
mostly improved since autumn. The recovery of the
labour market will drive domestic demand, despite
restrictive fiscal policies. Although the unemployment
rate has been declining since autumn 2011 when it
reached 8.4 percent, it remains relatively high com-
pared to an average rate of just over 5 percent between
2000 and 2008. Moreover, the central bank’s funding
conditions have improved since the August introduc-
tion of the “Funding for Lending” programme, under
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unions and employers will introduce flexible working times, but will
not tackle the problem of worker protection. However, to the extent
that these measures prove effective, the benefits will probably not
materialise during our forecasting horizon.
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which the Bank of England provides liquidity at mar-
ket rates to commercial banks depending on their
loan portfolios. Since then, the credit conditions, par-
ticularly for households, have improved slightly.
Finally, foreign demand is also expected to improve
somewhat in 2013. Although the weak dynamics in
the euro area will negatively affect exports, support
will come from the emerging Asian markets. 
Total economic output this year is expected to grow
by 0.8 percent in the United Kingdom. Unemploy -
ment is expected to slowly drop to an average level of
7.6 percent in 2013, while inflation is expected to slow
down only slightly, despite the overall weak economy.
Due to the large increase in university tuition fees last
autumn, inflation will probably only drop to 2.4 per-
cent this year.
Italy will narrowly escape recession during the fore-
casting period. After continued negative growth dur-
ing the first quarters, GDP will stagnate over the
course of this year, which, given its initial position at
the start of the year, should result in an average growth
rate of – 0.9 percent in 2013. The uncertain political si -
t uation continues to have an overall dampening effect.
Gross investment is likely to suffer from state consoli-
dation, restrictive credit provision, high interest rates
and capital flight. Private consumption will also be
unable to make a positive contribution because un -
employment is expected to rise and disposable income
will be impacted by a VAT increase of 1 percentage
point on July 1, 2013. State expenditure is also likely to
fall due to the envisaged consolidation measures. Only
net exports are expected to make a positive contribu-
tion, as imports are likely to continue to decline and
exports will increase slightly. However, if  Italy does not
rapidly bring forward structural reforms aimed at cut-
ting its product prices, exports will barely be able to
contribute positively to GDP growth during the fore-
cast period.
Due to the recession, the average unemployment rate
will rise to 11.7 percent this year. The recession should
keep inflation down to on average 2.3 percent, while
any stronger decline will be prevented by the VAT
increase.
The Spanish economy is likely to remain in a structur-
al crisis until the end of the forecast period. GDP will
shrink significantly by 1.2 percent this year. Private
consumption spending will suffer under households’
efforts to cut their debt and from falling disposable
income. Disposable income will be dampened, espe-
cially by rising unemployment and state consolidation
measures. State consumption is also likely to fall fur-
ther. As a rapid and sustainable solution to the bank-
ing crisis is not yet in sight, private investment will
continue to contribute negatively to the economy until
the end of 2013. Only net exports are expected to con-
tinue to rise because imports are falling due to
decreasing incomes and exports are increasing as a
result of improved competitiveness. Whereas the trade
balance turned already positive last year and will
improve further, the current account is still in deficit.
The latter will not be completely eliminated before the
end of the forecast period.
As a result of the recession, Spain’s average unem-
ployment rate is expected to rise to 26.8 percent this
year. Due to a continuing decline in economic perfor-
mance and expiring VAT effects, the change in con-
sumer prices is expected to fall to 1.8 percent this year.
Portugal and Greece are expected to remain in reces-
sion this year. Ireland, on the other hand, is likely to
see a moderate expansion dampened by the on-going
restructuring of the construction and banking sector.
The moderate expansion is not likely to be sufficient
to bring about a change in the Irish labour market and
unemployment will continue to increase in all three
crisis countries, albeit to varying degrees.
During the forecast period, most economies in Central
and Eastern Europe (except for Hungary) are likely to
benefit from orderly government finances after massive
austerity and reform measures. These orderly public
finances will be an important pillar of their creditwor-
thiness. One weakness, however, remains the position
of the banking sector, which is still overwhelmingly
controlled by foreign banks in the region. The high per-
centage of Greek banks in Romania and Bulgaria is a
cause for concern. However, Western European parent
banks have also deleveraged their debt and credit risks
significantly in other countries in the region. Although
international institutions can prevent an uncoordinated
withdrawal of funds from the transition countries with
the establishment of the Vienna Initiative, the Western
European banks have reduced their loan portfolios in
Eastern Europe.5 However, there were significant dif-
ferences between the countries of Eastern Europe in
this respect. While Hungary was affected to a much
5 The European Bank Coordination Vienna Initiative was launched
in January 2009 to provide a framework for coordinating the crisis
management and crisis resolution of financial sector issues that were
highlighted by the economic downturn and involved large cross-bor-
der bank groups systemically important in Central and Eastern
Europe. It has brought together public and private sector stakehold-
ers of EU-based cross-border bank groups present in that region.
greater extent, the cross-border capital reduction by
banks was relatively low in the Czech Republic and
Poland, the two largest economies in the region.
Capital reduction was also cushioned by inflows of EU
funds. The European Commission, the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the
International Monetary Fund again provided extensive
aid packages to avoid jeopardising the economic recov-
ery in the region. By 2014, a total of 30 billion euros
will have been made available for the Eastern European
countries (including Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hun -
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania).
Around 30 percent of this sum is intended to support
the financial sector and thereby improve the availabili-
ty of credit. Current deleveraging and the high propor-
tion of non-performing loans (in Hungary, Romania
and Bulgaria their share is currently estimated at 15 to
20 percent) are affecting lending and therefore invest-
ment activities. There are also demand-side reasons for
the slowdown in lending. A speedy turnaround is not
expected given the decelerating economic momentum.
During the forecast period, recessionary trends will
continue in most countries of the region, especially in
Hungary and the Czech Republic. Countries like Bul -
garia and Romania are threatening to slip into reces-
sion because of their high dependence on exports and
weak domestic demand. Poland is struggling to com-
pensate for the weakness in export demand in its
domestic market, and no revitalising impulses can be
expected in terms of fiscal policy. The economic slow-
down will complicate the return of public deficits,
resulting in governments having to maintain their
restrictive stance in terms of fiscal policy. In general,
all indicators point to a cyclical deterioration in the
region during the forecast period.
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Appendix 1.A
Forecasting tables
 
Table 1.A.1 
GDP growth, inflation and unemployment in various countries 
  
  
  
Share of 
total 
GDP 
in % 
GDP growth CPI inflation Unemployment 
rated) 
in % in % 
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
Industrialised countries:           
European Union 28.8 1.5 – 0.3 0.1 3.0 2.6 1.9 9.7 10.5 10.9 
Euro area 21.5 1.4 – 0.5 – 0.1 2.7 2.5 1.8 10.2 11.4 12.1 
Switzerland 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.2 0.1 – 0.7 0.2 4.0 4.3 4.5 
Norway 0.8 1.4 3.1 2.3 1.2 1.0 1.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 
Western and Central 
Europe 30.7 1.6 – 0.1 0.2 2.9 2.4 1.9 9.5 10.3 10.7 
United States 24.8 1.8 2.2 1.6 3.1 2.2 2.1 9.0 8.1 7.8 
Japan 9.6 – 0.6 2.1 0.8 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.2 4.6 4.4 4.3 
Canada 2.8 2.6 2.0 1.9 2.9 1.7 1.8 7.5 7.3 7.2 
Industrialised countries 
(total) 67.9 1.4 1.1 0.9 2.5 1.9 1.6 8.6 8.6 8.7 
Newly industrialised 
countries: 
Russia 3.0 4.3 3.0 2.5 6.6 6.5 6.0 – – – 
China 12.4 9.6 7.8 9.0 5.4 2.7 2.8 – – – 
India 2.7 7.0 3.7 4.6 8.9 9.4 8.2 – – – 
East Asiaa) 5.8 4.3 3.6 4.5 4.6 3.5 3.8 – – – 
Latin Americab) 8.2 4.0 2.4 3.6 7.2 6.0 6.4 – – – 
Newly industrialised 
countries (total) 32.1 6.5 4.9 5.8 6.1 4.6 4.7 – – – 
Totalc) 100.0 3.0 2.3 2.5 3.7 2.8 2.6 – – – 
World trade growth in % 5.8 2.4 3.6       
a) Weighted average of Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore and Hong 
Kong. Weighted with the 2011 levels of GDP in US dollars. – b) Weighted average of Argentina, Brasil, Chile, 
Columbia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela. Weighted with the 2011 level of GDP in US dollars. – c) Weighted 
average of the listed groups of countries. – d) Standardised unemployment rate. 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, IMF, ILO, National Statistical Offices, 2012 and 2013: forecasts by the EEAG. 
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Table 1.A.2 
GDP growth, inflation and unemployment in the European countries 
  
  
  
Share of 
total GDP 
in % 
GDP growth Inflationa) Unemployment rateb) 
in % in % 
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
Germany 20.3 3.0 0.7 0.7 2.5 2.2 1.7 5.9 5.5 5.4 
France 15.8 1.7 0.0 0.3 2.3 2.3 1.8 9.6 10.4 11.1 
Italy 12.5 0.6 – 2.0 – 0.9 2.9 3.0 2.3 8.4 10.6 11.7 
Spain 8.5 0.4 – 1.3 – 1.2 3.1 2.1 1.8 21.7 25.1 26.8 
Netherlands 4.8 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.1 2.5 2.8 2.2 4.4 5.3 6.0 
Belgium 2.9 1.8 – 0.2 0.1 3.5 2.6 1.6 7.2 7.4 7.8 
Austria 2.4 2.7 0.6 0.8 3.6 2.6 1.7 4.2 4.3 4.5 
Greece 1.7 – 7.1 – 6.2 – 5.0 3.1 1.1 – 1.0 17.7 24.3 26.4 
Finland 1.5 2.7 – 0.1 0.6 3.3 3.1 2.1 7.8 7.7 8.1 
Portugal 1.4 – 1.6 – 2.9 – 1.6 3.6 2.8 0.7 12.9 15.7 16.6 
Ireland 1.2 1.4 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.9 1.0 14.7 14.9 15.1 
Slovakia 0.5 3.2 2.5 2.0 4.1 3.7 2.1 13.6 13.9 14.1 
Slovenia 0.3 1.0 – 2.2 – 1.5 2.1 2.8 2.0 8.2 8.4 9.2 
Luxembourg 0.3 1.7 0.4 0.5 3.7 2.9 1.7 4.8 5.1 5.4 
Cyprus 0.1 0.5 – 2.2 – 1.1 3.5 3.1 1.4 7.9 11.7 13.5 
Estonia 0.1 8.3 3.4 3.5 5.1 4.2 3.7 12.5 10.1 9.9 
Malta 0.1 1.6 1.2 1.4 2.5 3.3 2.5 6.5 6.4 6.7 
Euro areac) 74.6 1.4 – 0.5 – 0.1 2.7 2.5 1.8 10.2 11.4 12.1 
United Kingdom 13.8 0.9 0.0 0.8 4.5 2.9 2.4 8.0 7.9 7.6 
Sweden 3.1 3.8 1.4 2.3 1.4 0.9 1.5 7.5 7.7 7.8 
Denmark 1.9 1.1 – 0.3 1.1 2.7 2.4 1.6 7.6 7.7 8.1 
EU-20c) 93.3 1.4 – 0.3 0.1 3.0 2.5 1.8 9.7 10.7 11.2 
Poland 2.9 4.3 2.3 1.0 3.9 3.7 2.9 9.6 10.1 10.1 
Czech Republic 1.2 1.9 – 1.0 0.0 2.1 3.5 1.4 6.7 6.9 7.1 
Romania 1.1 2.1 0.2 1.0 5.8 3.4 3.5 7.4 7.1 7.5 
Hungary 0.8 1.6 – 1.4 – 0.3 3.9 5.7 5.4 10.9 10.9 11.1 
Bulgaria 0.3 1.8 0.5 0.5 3.5 2.4 2.5 11.3 12.3 12.0 
Lithuania 0.2 5.9 3.3 3.9 4.1 3.2 3.0 15.3 12.9 12.3 
Latvia 0.2 5.2 4.9 3.2 4.2 2.3 2.0 16.3 14.9 14.0 
New membersd) 6.7 3.2 0.9 0.8 3.9 3.7 3.0 9.4 9.5 9.6 
European Unionc) 100.0 1.5 – 0.3 0.1 3.0 2.6 1.9 9.7 10.5 10.9 
a) Harmonised consumer price index (HICP). – b) Standardised unemployment rate. – c) Weighted average of 
the listed countries. – d) Weighted average of Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Latvia. 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, IMF, 2012 and 2013: forecasts by the EEAG. 
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Table 1.A.3 
Key forecast figures for the European Union 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 
 Percentage change over previous year 
Real gross domestic product 2.1 1.5 – 0.3 0.1 
   Private consumption 1.1 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.1 
   Government consumption 0.7 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.7 
   Gross fixed capital formation 0.2 1.4 – 2.4 – 0.5 
   Net exportsa) 0.5 1.0 1.2 0.8 
Consumer pricesb) 2.1 3.0 2.6 1.9 
 Percentage of nominal gross domestic product 
Government fiscal balancec) – 6.5 – 4.4 – 3.6 – 2.9 
  Percentage of labour force 
Unemployment rated) 9.7 9.7 10.5 10.9 
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous year). – b) Harmonised consumer 
price index (HCPI). – c) 2012: forecasts of the European Commission. – d) Standardised unemployment rate. 
Source: Eurostat, 2012 and 2013: forecasts by the EEAG. 
 
 
Table 1.A.4 
Key forecast figures for the euro area 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 
 Percentage change over previous year 
Real gross domestic product 2.0 1.4 – 0.5 – 0.1 
   Private consumption 0.9 0.1 – 1.1 – 0.5 
   Government consumption 0.7 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.9 
   Gross fixed capital formation – 0.1 1.5 – 3.6 – 1.1 
   Net exportsa) 0.7 0.9 1.7 1.0 
Consumer pricesb) 1.6 2.7 2.5 1.8 
 Percentage of nominal gross domestic product 
Government fiscal balancec) – 6.2 – 4.1 – 3.3 – 2.6 
  Percentage of labour force 
Unemployment rated) 10.1 10.2 11.4 12.1 
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous year). – b) Harmonised consumer 
price index (HCPI). – c) 2012: forecasts of the European Commission. – d) Standardised unemployment rate. 
Source: Eurostat, 2012 and 2013: forecasts by the EEAG. 
 
Appendix 1.B
Ifo World Economic Survey (WES)
The Ifo World Economic Survey (WES) assesses
worldwide economic trends by polling transnational
as well as national organizations worldwide about
current economic developments in the respective
country. This allows for a rapid, up-to-date assess-
ment of the economic situation prevailing around the
world. In January 2013, 1,169 economic experts in
124 countries were polled. WES is conducted in co-
operation with the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) in Paris.
The survey questionnaire focuses on qualitative infor-
mation: on assessment of a country’s general eco-
nomic situation and expectations regarding important
economic indicators. It has proved to be a useful tool,
since economic changes are revealed earlier than by
traditional business statistics. The individual replies
are combined for each country without weighting.
The “grading” procedure consists in giving a grade
of 9 to positive replies (+), a grade of 5 to indifferent
replies (=) and a grade of 1 to negative (–) replies.
Grades within the range of 5 to 9 indicate that posi-
tive answers prevail or that a majority expects trends
to increase, whereas grades within the range of 1 to
5 reveal predominantly negative replies or expecta-
tions of decreasing trends. The survey results are pub-
lished as aggregated data. The aggregation procedure
is based on country classifications. Within each coun-
try group or region, the country results are weighted
according to the share of  the specific country’s
exports and imports in total world trade.
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EUROPEAN IMBALANCES
2.1 Introduction
Europe is in the grip of three interrelated crises: a bal-
ance-of-payments crisis, a sovereign debt crisis and a
banking crisis. Both EU leaders and analysts have
focused heavily on the sovereign debt and the banking
crises. The fiscal compact agreed upon in December
2011 was supposed to ease the former, while the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was
designed to ease the latter. However, the announce-
ment of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) unlimit-
ed bond buying scheme on September 6, 2012, sig-
nalled that the crisis is far from over; and that the exis-
tence of the euro area in its present form is still on the
line. In our report last year (EEAG, 2012, Chapter 2)
we argued that a credible strategy for getting the euro
area back on track needs to address the problem of the
large imbalances reflected in current account deficits
and surpluses, as well as in foreign asset positions.
This chapter identifies the factors that led to imbal-
ances in the euro area, which resulted in the current
balance-of-payments crisis. The
chapter also discusses how rebal-
ancing might be achieved, and
how fiscal policy could accelerate
this process. 
2.2 Imbalances in the euro area
There is a large body of literature
on global imbalances. To date,
however, little attention has been
paid to the imbalances within the
European Union or the euro
area.1 One reason for this may be
that the current account of the
European Union and that of the
euro area have always been rough-
ly in balance. Hence, Europe did,
and does not make any great contribution to global
imbalances. Moreover, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
concluded, using a general equilibrium analysis, that a
global rebalancing would have no major effect on the
European Union as a whole, but would affect individ-
ual member states asymmetrically due to differences in
their existing external balances. At that time, however,
very little was known about the effect of such a shock
on individual euro area member states, and it was not
perceived to be a major problem. In earlier analyses,
Sinn and Koll (2000) and Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2002) even argued that divergence in external balances
is natural within the euro area. This is because the euro
area forms a convergence club, where poorer individual
member states are catching up with their richer coun-
terparts, and naturally run a current account deficit
during this process. Thus, current account imbalances
within the euro area are a natural phenomenon.2 All in
all, imbalances were not previously recognized as a
problem within the euro area.3
EEAG (2013), The EEAG Report on the European Economy, "European Imbalances", CESifo, Munich 2013, p. 55–72.
Box 2.1
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure in the European Union 
The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) is part of the set of rules
that came into force on December 13, 2011, the so-called “six-pack”. The
MIP is intended to identify imbalances early, and to require countries to
design policies to correct large imbalances. Part of the MIP is an alert
mechanism based on a set of indicators and corresponding threshold val-
ues for these indicators (European Commission, 2012). Importantly, the set
of indicators includes not only the usual fiscal indicators, but others includ-
ing current account balance, real effective exchange rate, private credit
stock and flow, house prices etc. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
considered a similar system of indicators (IMF, 2010).
While it seems to be a good idea for the Commission to broaden the focus of
its macroeconomic monitoring, there are a number of problems with the
MIP. Firstly, the set of indicators and the suggested thresholds are somewhat
arbitrary, suggesting the lack of a coherent conceptual basis for the MIP
(Whelan, 2012). Secondly, the large body of empirical literature on the so-
called early warning indicators suggests that these indicators lead far too
often to false alarms (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Finally, unlike in the
case of fiscal policy, policy instruments tend to have an indirect effect on
these indicators. Hence, it is unclear how the economic policy of a particular
country could be monitored or assessed in terms of correcting imbalances.
1 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), EEAG
(2006, Chapter 2) and Sinn (2010) among
many others.
2 It is important to note that global imbalances were generated by
capital flowing from poor to rich countries (primarily to the United
States). In contrast, European imbalances came about because capi-
tal was flowing from rich to poor countries.
3 The European Comission now recognises the problem as the intro-
duction of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure suggests. See
Box 2.1 for more details.
This section begins by describing
the facts behind current account
imbalances and international in -
vestment positions within the
euro area. It subsequently dis-
cusses the factors that may
explain the emergence of these
imbalances. Finally, it concludes
with an analysis of how rebal-
ancing within the euro area could
be achieved.
2.2.1 Facts behind the imbalances
The current account of  the euro
area as a whole was roughly bal-
anced over the period of  1995 to
2011, with alternating small sur-
pluses or deficits. The external balance of  the euro
area, however, disguised a considerable imbalance
within the euro area. In particular, Figure 2.1 shows
that the GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain) countries, which have received a great deal of
attention during the current crisis, have run a com-
bined current account deficit that has been rising
since the late 1990s. This deficit was largely offset by
the German current account surplus during the
whole period, which balanced the current account of
the euro area. The other member states of  the euro
area ran declining current account balances, moving
from a 1 percent surplus to a balanced current
account overall.
Greater insights into current account imbalances 
within the euro area can be gained by looking at indi-
vidual countries’ balances. Figure 2.2 plots the current
account balances of individual euro area countries for
the period 2003–2011 against those for the period
1995–2002. Firstly, the figure shows that current
account balances are highly persistent. Balances for
the first period are good predictors of balances for the
following period. However, it should also be noted
that the current account balances of some countries
improved, while those of others deteriorated across
the two periods. The current account balances of
countries above the straight line shown in Figure 2.2
improved, while those of the countries below it dete-
riorated. Germany, for example, turned a roughly bal-
anced current account into a surplus averaging 5 per-
cent of GDP. In contrast, France, Italy and Ireland on
average ran a current account surplus in the first peri-
od, which turned into a small deficit in the second
period. More importantly, three countries at the heart
of  the current crisis, namely Greece, Spain and
Portugal, as well as Cyprus, not only ran a significant
current account deficit over the period 1995–2002, but
that deficit increased significantly
during the period 2003–2011. 
Figure 2.3 shows the main com-
ponents of the current account of
the four countries (Portugal,
Ireland, Greece, and Spain) that
were hit hardest by the crises.4
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4 Italy is also one of the crisis hit countries,
but it cannot easily be included in the
periphery of the euro area. As Figure 2.2
also shows, it contributed relatively little to
the imbalances during the run-up to the
crisis. However, the Italian economy has
deep structural problems, which are mani-
fested, among other areas, in one of the
lowest growth rates among major industri-
alised countries in the last 20 years.
EEAG Report 201357
Chapter 2
The countries of  Southern Europe show a pattern
different to that of  Ireland. Their balance in services
was positive and slowly improved between 1995 and
2011, while their balance in goods was negative and
deteriorated until 2007. Finally, their balance in
income was negative and also deteriorated through-
out the period. By contrast, Ireland’s balance was
negative in services and positive in goods throughout
the period. Like that of  the Southern countries,
Ireland’s balance in income was negative and deteri-
orating. Overall, imbalances in goods and services
led to an increasing imbalance in income as coun-
tries accumulated external liabilities. Importantly,
since the beginning of  the crisis the balances both in
goods and services have improved in these countries,
primarily due to the fact that the real contraction has
driven down imports. 
As the balance in income for the
above four countries has already
suggested, current account de -
ficits and surpluses resulted in
corresponding changes in the net
international asset position. As
Figure 2.4 shows, Germany
steadily improved its asset posi-
tion over the entire period
1995–2011, giving it a net foreign
asset position of nearly 10 per-
cent of the euro area’s GDP by
2011. In contrast, the GIIPS
countries swiftly accumulated a
net foreign liability position over
the decade between 1999 and
2009, which amounted to about
20 percent of  the euro area’s
GDP in 2009. Since then the
GIIPS countries have maintained
their international asset position
at this level, although they have
continued to borrow abroad, on
the back of the declining market
value of their existing debt, a fact
that is statistically treated like a
debt re demption. The rest of the
euro area net foreign asset posi-
tion was roughly zero.
Considering only the total inter-
national investment position does
not show the changes in its com-
position. In particular, our last
report (EEAG, 2012, Chapter 2)
highlighted that, during the crisis,
the ECB played a growing role in financing current
account deficits and capital flight, providing extra
refinancing credits that went beyond the task of pro-
viding internal liquidity for the crisis countries. As
shown by Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012), Target
imbalances result from net-payment orders across the
euro area countries and are identical to balance-of-
payment imbalances (the sum of current account
imbalances and private and intergovernmental capital
exports). As a result of endo genous market reactions,
they indirectly also measure the reallocation of the
ECB's refinancing credit from the core to the periph-
ery, which was made possible by a reduction in the
ECB's collateral requirements. 
The ECB's role in replacing the capital market is
illustrated by Figure 2.5, which plots the ECB's
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Target balances. The left panel shows that the
Target debt of  the GIIPS countries and Cyprus
(GIPSIC) vis-à-vis the ECB began to increase in
autumn 2007, after the first break-down of  the
interbank market; and that the increase has acceler-
ated dramatically since the second half  of  2011. It
only slowed down for the first time in October
2012, following the ECB's announcement that it
would repurchase unlimited amounts of  govern-
ment bonds and the German Supreme Court's
rejection of  appeals against the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM), but it remains too early to say
whether this reflects a turning point. This rise in the
debt of  the GIPSIC countries was matched by a
corresponding increase in four countries’ claims
against the ECB, and especially the claims of
Germany. The right panel in Figure 2.5 shows the
distribution of  ECB Target credit as of  the end of
2012: Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
Finland financed the GIPSIC countries’ borrowing
from the ECB, which amounted to almost 1 trillion
euros by this date. As discussed in EEAG (2012,
Chapter 2), during the crisis, the GIPSIC countries
relied increasingly on public support to finance
themselves internationally; and the main source of
this public support was ECB Target credit. The
extra refinancing credit that is reflected in the
increase in the Target balances basically compen-
sated for the reversal of  capital flows, financing or
co-financing the current account deficits of  Greece,
Portugal and Spain since winter 2007/2008, and
compensating for capital flight from Ireland after
the Lehman crisis, as well as from Spain and Italy
since summer 2011.
Even although it operates via the mechanics of the
ECB's money providing operations, Target credit rep-
resents a public rescue operation very similar to the
EFSF and ESM open rescue operations controlled by
the parliaments of Europe, but in quantitative terms it
is far greater than the latter. In EEAG (2012,
Chapter 2) we argued that the euro area might need to
settle Target balances; and Chapter 4 of this report
compares the European Target system with the US
settlement system. 
2.2.2 Causes of the imbalances
Arguably, there were two primary and interrelated
causes of  current account imbalances. Firstly, as we
argued in EEAG (2012, Chapter 2), the introduction
of  the euro eliminated the exchange rate risk and
induced investors to disregard country-specific
bankruptcy risks, given the unlimited firing power
of  the ECB.5 Secondly, the Eurosystem created opti-
mistic expectations regarding the rapid convergence
of  the periphery countries (Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain) with the core of  the euro area.6
Both causes generated an investment and credit
boom in the periphery and imply that there was a
catching-up process, with international capital
movements from the core to the periphery that
materialise as current account imbalances. The
periphery countries, which are catching up, run cur-
rent account deficits as imports grow together with
incomes, and as inflation undermines export com-
petitiveness. 
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5 Sinn and Koll (2000) and Sinn (2010) study the elimination of risk
premiums in the context of a simple Harbergian two-country model. 
6 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) set up a multi-country growth
model that, in addition to rate-of-return induced capital flow, focus-
es on growth expectations and its implications for savings, empha-
sizing that catching-up countries will reduce savings, which con-
tributes to their current account imbalances. Lane and Pels (2012)
argue that growth expectations not only explain lower savings rates,
but also higher construction investment at the expense of  equip-
ment investment.
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It is important to emphasise that convergence only
takes place as long as the sole relevant difference
between core and periphery is the difference in capi-
tal stocks. If  there are additional differences in
human capital, economic policies or institutions,
convergence cannot be taken for granted. However,
the European Union in general, and the euro area in
particular, can be viewed as a convergence club in
which all other differences are not really relevant to
the convergence process. Figure 2.6 illustrates this
idea. The poorer a country was in 1995 relative to the
average, the larger its current account deficit was
from 2002 to 2007. Estonia, for example, which had
an average income level that was only about 30 per-
cent of  that of  the other euro area members in 1995,
ran a deficit of  about 12 percent of  GDP on average
from 2002 to 2007. 
Current account balances have a natural counterpart
in national accounts in terms of  the difference
between savings and investment. The first panel of
Figure 2.7 shows the difference between private sav-
ings and investment, and the differences between gov-
ernment saving and investment,
and how they contributed to the
current account balances. It is
worth noting that, among the cri-
sis countries, Greece and Por -
tugal posted large imbalances in
the government sector, while the
imbalances in Spain and Cyprus
basically resulted from the pri-
vate sector. The second panel of
Figure 2.7 shows to what extent
differences in net investment rates
(private and public) contributed
to these imbalances. Originally
poorer countries such as Estonia,
Spain and Ireland topped the list
of investment rates, while more
mature countries like the Netherlands, Finland, and
Germany were to be found at the lower end. Germany
had the lowest rate of net investment of all euro area
countries in the period considered, which explains
why it had the euro area's second lowest growth rate in
this period after Italy, and why it turned from a net
immigration to a net emigration country in the years
prior to the crisis.7 As the euro had lured capital from
the core to the periphery, the periphery grew via
stronger investment at the expense of the core, and
thus brought about convergence. 
Growth and investment in the periphery was accom-
panied by rapidly rising prices and led to the bubble
that ultimately burst. The left panel of Figure 2.8
shows that the price levels of individual countries
evolved at a rather different pace between 1995, the
year of the Madrid Summit where the euro was ulti-
mately agreed, and 2011. Prices increased relatively
little in Germany, Austria and Finland (capital
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7 As a result of net emigration, Germany's growth performance looks
somewhat better in per capita terms than in absolute terms, see
Figure 2.8. 
exporting countries), but to a much greater degree in
Estonia, Greece and Spain, which were all capital
importers. The price level changes indicate that all
euro area countries appreciated in real terms relative
to Germany to a smaller or larger extent. 
However, to understand the implications of inflation
differentials within the euro area for current account
imbalances, we need to look more closely at the source
of this inflation. If an inflation differential occurs
because of strong demand at home due to the surplus
of investment over savings, the higher inflation leads
to real appreciation and the loss of competitiveness at
home. If, however, the inflation differential occurs due
to the Balassa-Samuelson effect,8 higher inflation at
home may not lead to a loss of competitiveness
because it results from higher differential productivity
growth in the domestic sector of tradables that trans-
lates into higher wages and higher prices for non-trad-
ed and labour intensive goods. The right panel in
Figure 2.8 shows the labour productivity change mea-
sured by GDP per employee over the period
1995–2011. Italy, Portugal and Spain are in the bottom
half of the productivity league table, while Greece and
Ireland are in the top half. It is hard to determine
empirically how much extra inflation in a country can
be justified by the Balassa-Samuelson effect, but it is
probably safe to say that Italy’s 0 percent productivity
growth is hard to relate to the 45 percent increase in its
price level. Comparing productivity and price level
increases in Spain (10 percent vs. 58 percent) and
Greece (25 percent vs. 75 percent) also suggests that
the Balassa-Samuelson effect alone cannot explain the
price level increases of these countries. 
To get a better idea of how productivity growth may
dilute the effect of real appreciation on competitive-
ness, and hence on current account imbalances in the
euro area, we calculated the ratio of the price level
index and the productivity index for the period
1995–2007 and normalised it such that Germany’s
value equals 100. This (inverse) competitiveness indi-
cator measures the deterioration in a country’s com-
petitiveness relative to Germany under the simplifying
assumption that all of the measured average aggregate
productivity growth resulted from a productivity
growth in the tradables sector only, while there was no
productivity growth in the non-tradables sectors.
While this admittedly is a strong assumption, it may
still be useful to gain a first rough adjustment of the
price effects for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The
idea is that a price level increase must exceed the pro-
ductivity increase in order to have a negative effect on
competitiveness.9 Countries with values of this com-
petitiveness indicator below 100 improved their com-
petitiveness relative to Germany, while countries with
values above 100 saw their competitiveness deteriorate
relative to Germany. Figure 2.9 plots the current
account balances between 2001–2007 against the
competitiveness indicator. Firstly, it is worth noting
that Austria and Finland improved their competitive-
ness during this period relative to Germany. Secondly,
Figure 2.9 suggests that there is a pronounced nega-
tive relationship between our (lack-of) competitive-
ness indicator and current account deficit. All
Southern European countries lost competitiveness
relative to Germany, which contributed to the deteri-
oration of their current account balances. Ireland
improved, but still ran a current account deficit due to
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8 The Balassa-Samuelson effect implies that higher productivity
growth in the tradable sector leads to higher wage increases that spill
over to the non-tradable sector because of cross-sector labour mobil-
ity, thereby resulting in substantial price rises there. See Rogoff
(1996) for more details, as well as EEAG (2002, Chapter 4, p. 49–50).
9 Rising prices also imply a negative effect on competitiveness to the
extent that the measured productivity increase also results from a
productivity increase in the non-tradable goods sector. In the
extreme case scenario, if  all sectors exhibit the same productivity
increase, the full price increase relative to Germany shows a loss in
competitiveness. 
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a deficit in its income balance, as we have seen earlier.
Greece, on the other hand, lost less competitiveness
than Italy and Spain, but still ran the largest deficit in
the group. 
2.3 Rebalancing in the euro area: current account 
balances
2.3.1 Internal versus external devaluation
Countries of the European periphery need to devalue,
i.e. to become cheaper relative to the countries of the
core to reduce their imbalances. This boosts exports
and reduces imports, thereby improving the current
account. In principle, there are three ways of imple-
menting this kind of devaluation:
i) Exit and external devaluation
ii) Internal devaluation through falling prices in the
periphery 
iii) Internal devaluation through rising prices in the
core.10
This subsection discusses the main costs, benefits and
risks of the different scenarios.
If  exit and external devaluation can be performed
quickly, there should be no loss of  output and
employment in principle. However, such devaluation
calls into question the stability and persistence of the
monetary union. Internal devaluation through falling
prices in the periphery leads to a
long period of stagnation and
mass unemployment in the pe -
riphery due to the downward
rigidity of  prices and wages.
Internal devaluation through ris-
ing prices in the core does not
lead to recession in the periphery.
The core, however, is required to
bear the cost of higher inflation
in terms of internal and interna-
tional wealth redistribution,
which is likely to trigger substan-
tial political resistance. In addi-
tion, higher inflation may also
undermine the stability of the
monetary union.
An important distinguishing aspect concerns a cur-
rency mismatch effect in the balance sheets of compa-
nies and banks.11 By virtue of both external devalua-
tion and internal devaluation through price cuts, the
burden of the foreign currency debt rises, which cre-
ates problems for domestic debtors and may drive
banks and firms into bankruptcy. Supply declines as a
result, while output and employment may also be neg-
atively affected. The effect on exports, and hence on
the current account, depends on how domestic pro-
ducers that supply intermediate goods for exporters
are affected by the currency mismatch. 
As we pointed out in EEAG (2011), the fact that inter-
nal devaluation via price cuts distorts the internal bal-
ance sheets of companies of the real economy is often
overlooked. Let us consider the balance sheet of a
typical domestic company: its assets include real-
estate property and equipment, and its liabilities
include domestic bank debt. After an internal price
cut following the burst of a real-estate bubble, the
value of reproducible assets is likely to fall together
with that of newly produced goods, but the value of
the bank debt remains unchanged, pushing up the
company's debt ratio to potentially dangerous levels
and leading to a wave of bankruptcies. This problem
can only be avoided by resorting to an open devalua-
tion after an exit from the currency union, as both
internal credit contracts and asset prices would be
converted to the new currency in that case.
If  internal devaluation occurs through rising prices in
the core, there is no adverse balance sheet effect in the
periphery. However, as savers in the core suffer wealth
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10 Internal devaluation can be achieved via a combination of the lat-
ter two, i.e., via a rise in the price level in the core exceeding that in
the periphery. For expositional simplicity we focus on these two cases
only. 11 See Krugman and Taylor (1978).
losses, there is political resistance to such a policy in
the core. If  inflation in the core is higher than infla-
tion in the periphery, price stability in the euro area,
which is the ECB's foremost and only mandate
according to the Maastricht Treaty, could be under-
mined.
The ultimate goal of  any devaluation is to stimulate
the economy. While existing empirical evidence
supports the argument that large external devalua-
tions improve the current account, the effect on
output is mixed. Freund and Warnock (2007)
analysed 26 current account reversals between 1980
and 2003 in OECD countries. They found that out-
put growth slows down during the adjustment
process. Using a data set on emerging and develop-
ing countries between 1960 and 2006, a more recent
study by Bussière et al. (2012) finds that large
devaluations are typically preceded by a decline in
output, but followed by growth.12 More precisely,
the contraction observed around the time of  large
devaluations is typically caused by factors that lead
to this devaluation. After the devaluation, however,
the economy is twice as likely to experience positive
growth within a year than to experience negative
growth. 
However, external devaluation is associated with a
major additional difficulty13 that can lead to loss of
output and employment in the short run. External
devaluation requires an exit from the euro area,
which, in turn, requires the redenomination of
assets, liabilities, contracts and prices into the new
currency. This is no simple matter. Firstly, the rede-
nomination must be swift and unanticipated in a
country, leaving a strong currency to adopt a weak
one;14 otherwise there will be a run on financial
assets. Both financial and non-financial firms’ bal-
ance sheets are put under strain before an exit, lead-
ing inevitably to a loss of  employment, output and
export in the short run. Secondly, the redenomina-
tion should be complete in the sense that all con-
tracts, including all debt contracts, wage contracts
and price tags, are to be redenominated into the new
currency. Otherwise, the government creates a cur-
rency mismatch, which has the negative short run
balance sheet effect on output and employment after
exit described above.
Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to implement
redenomination in a democracy on an unanticipated
basis. The process requires legislation by parliament
preceded by discussions with stakeholders, including
representatives of banks, firms, unions, and consumer
associations etc. Implementation measures, such as
distributing the new currency across the country and
resetting teller machines, require extensive planning
and organization and involve a large number of peo-
ple.15 In short, redenomination tends to be anticipat-
ed, hence any attempt to exit a strong currency and to
adopt a weak one is usually preceded by a run on
assets.16 Secondly, it is also hard to make redenomina-
tion complete. If  the government redenominates
external liabilities, this would amount to default by a
country on all of its external debt (public and private).
However, if  external liabilities are not redenominated,
and an exit is anticipated, domestic lenders will trans-
fer as many domestic liabilities abroad as possible in
order to make their internal liabilities external and
protect their values from devaluation. Given the large
degree of integration of the financial markets within
the euro area, this process is not very difficult. Hence
a currency mismatch of some size is bound to emerge
after any country’s exit from the currency union, with
its well-known negative balance sheet effects.17
The government may try to limit the undesired conse-
quences of any anticipated euro exit by introducing
capital control and deposit freezing well before any
preparation for an exit gets under way. However, even
implementing such measures requires some prepara-
tion and discussion. The government, for example,
has to decide what type of deposits should be frozen,
how and for how long.18 The precise nature and legal-
ity of capital control within the euro area also need to
be clarified before implementation. Under all circum-
stances the currency conversion should be carried out
quickly over a weekend and, if  necessary, a subse-
quent bank holiday. It remains unclear whether a
bank holiday time frame exists that is long enough to
complete the preparation, debate and enactment of
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12 See also Gupta et al. (2003).
13 Leaving a currency union is complicated, and there are several
issues that a country needs to solve. Capital Economics (2012) pro-
vides an extensive and detailed analysis of what is involved in exiting
a currency union. See also Born et al. (2012).
14 If  a country leaves a weak currency to adopt a strong one, there
will be no run on assets. For example, if  Greece leaves the euro to
adopt the drachma, there will be a run on assets in Greece. If
Germany leaves the euro to adopt the deutsch mark, there will be no
run on assets in Germany.
15 Recall the planning and organization that was required to distrib-
ute the euro notes across the euro area.
16 Eichengreen (2010) argues that this is the primary reason why it is
very costly to leave a currency union and why member states are
unlikely to do so.
17 See Yeyati and Blejer (2010) for a vivid description of the problems
stemming from redenomination based on the Argentine experience
in 2001–2002.
18 Some withdrawal must be allowed, otherwise households and
firms cannot function. The question is how much and how frequent-
ly? Should there be different rules for different firms or households,
etc.? Even discussing such issues may lead to widespread panic.
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all the legislation necessary for an exit, but also short
enough so that households and firms do not run out
of cash. Some form of capital controls will probably
have to be maintained even after the conversion until
the exchange rate is stabilized, otherwise expectation-
driven capital flight may ensue after the new currency
is introduced. 
The major difficulty is bank note conversion, which
usually takes time. Hence a quick implementation of
the exit would require converting all bank deposits,
wage contracts, credit contracts and price tags to the
new currency (e.g. by just changing the euro to drach-
ma symbols and keeping all the numbers in the con-
tracts), while initially keeping the euro coins and notes
in circulation and turning them into a permanent gift
to domestic citizens. New domestic bank notes could
be printed and issued thereafter. This would immedi-
ately establish a dual currency system of the kind
existing today in many Eastern European countries
and Turkey with strong incentives both for firms and
households to write euro contracts again, but it would
make it possible to accelerate realignment. In any
case, under any scenario, the community of states
should support the exit process by alleviating some of
the external debt and helping out with subsidies for
sensitive imports, which are essential for the working
of the economy. 
Exits from currency unions are difficult, but not
uncommon in history. In 1993 the Czechoslovakian
state split and two separate currencies were formed. In
1979 Ireland gave up the pound and adopted its own
currency. In 1924 the Scandinavian currency union
with Sweden, Norway and Denmark was dissolved;
and prior to World War I, Greece exited from the
Latin Currency Union. All in all, Nitsch (2005) count-
ed 128 exits from currency unions in the post-war
period 1948 to 1997. However, he finds that exits from
a currency union usually occur when inflation differ-
entials are large between members, or when there is a
change in the political status of a member (countries
break up or regain independence). 
When a country devalues externally, the currency
depreciates quickly, export and import prices adjust
relatively fast. Hence, the current account is likely to
improve in the short run. When a country devalues
internally, on the other hand, export and import
prices adjust relatively slowly. Hence, the positive
effect on the current account takes time to materialise.
This must mean that the country will need external
finance for a longer period of time and that the poten-
tial write-off  of losses on the part of foreign private or
public debtors will be larger. However, it also means
that the costs of potential negative balance sheet
effects will be spread over time under internal devalu-
ation, instead of being realized swiftly under an exter-
nal devaluation.
The main difficulty arising from an internal devalua-
tion through price and wage cuts is that it drives a
country into a period of  stagnation and mass unem-
ployment, which undermines the stability of  society
and may lead to social unrest. This is the reason why
economists with otherwise divergent views, like
Keynes and Friedman, have both highlighted the
costs of  internal devaluations. Today, youth unem-
ployment in Spain and Greece, two countries that are
struggling to organize a process of  internal devalua-
tion within the euro area, is above 50 percent; and
there have been riots of  increasing intensity in the
streets, despite the fact that only a tiny part of  the
total devaluation required has already been achieved,
as described below. All in all, the overvalued coun-
tries of  Southern Europe are stuck in a trap from
which there is no easy escape. All of  the options seem
problematic and it is unclear, which is the least prob-
lematic. 
Let us now turn to the policy dilemma of the core
countries. While a periphery country may feel that
keeping the euro is the better option, core countries
could cut their financial support to limit their write-
off  losses, thereby forcing the periphery country out
of the currency union. The costs and benefits of such
an action depend on different kinds of contagion
effects. 
Firstly, there is a risk of a speculative contagion. If  a
periphery country exits the euro, it leaves behind euro
denominated liabilities, which are held as assets in the
euro area. Uncertainty about the value of these assets
could lead to widespread panic and a run on euro area
banks similar to events following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers. Although we do not exclude the
possibility that an exit may generate contagion, we
believe this to be less likely than some suggest. The
shock, which hit the financial markets in the United
States in October 2008, was so severe due to the
opaque nature of the markets for the financial prod-
ucts traded by these institutions. It was unclear who
held the counter-party risks, and how these assets
were distributed across different institutions. The
market for government bonds, on the other hand, is
transparent. The risk of contagion due to a lack of
market transparency is significantly lower than it was
in October 2008. Moreover, this risk could be reduced
by announcing sudden and extensive debt relief. If
such debt relief  were to be extensive, and if  external
devaluation were to be performed quickly, it could
even stabilise expectations given that devaluation,
whether external or internal, was the only way to
improve a country’s current account. The Greek bail-
in of spring 2012 was by far the biggest in history
(Gulati et al., 2012). Prior to the bail-out, many
warned that it would give rise to a Lehman-like crisis,
but these warnings failed to materialise. 
Secondly, there could be political contagion. A cur-
rency union is meant to be a permanently fixed
exchange-rate regime. An exit would demonstrate
that the union does not satisfy this criterion. This
would open the door for currency attacks on other
periphery countries in the euro area in the form of  a
run on their government bond markets. High yields
for a sufficiently long period of  time would make the
debt dynamics unsustainable, eventually forcing the
other periphery countries out of  the euro area and
leading to an eventual break down of  the whole
enterprise. The likelihood of  such an attack is diffi-
cult to predict. However, over the last three years
there have been several occasions on which govern-
ments in the periphery have had problems issuing
new debt because of  market conditions. Policy-mak-
ers currently seem to think that the long-run benefits
of  a single currency are higher than the costs of  pre-
venting it from falling apart.
Thirdly, there is the moral hazard contagion. If  an
exit is ruled out by the community of states, this is
likely to recreate the pre-crisis situation under the
existing institutional arrangements of the euro area,
whereby risk premiums would artificially be eliminat-
ed and the true effective rates of return of the periph-
ery countries would be driven below those in the core
countries (see EEAG, 2012, which includes a propos-
al on how to change the existing arrangements). This
effect may have been at work after the decisions of
September 2012, in particular the ECB’s unlimited-
bond purchase decision, the German Supreme
Court's approval of  the ESM, and the German
Government's turnaround from a policy of tolerating
a Greek exit to a promise of supporting Greece's on-
going participation.19 All of this has reduced risk pre-
miums on Southern government bonds. Whether the
existing premiums remain too high or too low is hard
to judge. However, it can be argued that the
Eurosystem’s ultimate problem was that it created too
much investor safety, thus undermining the watchdog
function of the capital market by creating a system of
overly soft budget constraints (Sinn, 2012). As chap-
ter 4 of this year’s report points out, the debt mutual-
isation scheme of finance minister Hamilton after the
foundation of the United States of America had a
similar effect in that it induced a period of excessive
borrowing, leading to a credit bubble bursting in the
period from 1838 to 1842, driving the majority of US
states into bankruptcy and undermining the stability
of the new nation. 
2.3.2 How to devalue internally
For the time being, the policy decisions of the euro
area countries have placed little emphasis on the
moral hazard effect and seem to have paved the way
towards internal devaluations. So let us now turn our
attention to the question of how such devaluations
can actually be achieved. There are several policy
measures at a government’s disposal.
Firstly, nominal wage changes have a relatively
strong effect on price level changes. Cutting nominal
wages, and subsequently controlling wage growth, is
the most direct way to reduce the price level or sub-
stantially slow down its rise. Lowering unit labour
costs both in goods and service production seems to
be necessary for successful adjustment. Although
governments do not control wages in the business
sector directly, they can still have a strong influence
on market wages. They can cut and control public
sector wages, which affect market wages. Moreover,
they can step in to facilitate nominal wage agree-
ments between employees and employers for a peri-
od of  time to reduce the pressure of  nominal wage
increases on prices.
Secondly, policy-makers may use fiscal tools to
manipulate the price level and relative price, i.e. they
can carry out fiscal devaluations. Among others
Calmfors (1998) suggested fiscal policy instruments
that can change the relative prices between tradables
and non-tradables, and between home and foreign
goods if  policy-makers shift fiscal revenues from
labour to consumption taxes.20 Cutting labour taxes,
and particularly social security contributions, leads
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3) for an analysis of the period before the crisis.
20 For a complete general equilibrium treatment of the problem see
Farhi et al. (2011).
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to a reduction in the costs of  labour. This, ceteris
paribus, leads to a reduction in export prices and the
price level. In addition, an appropriate value-added
tax (VAT) increase makes the labour tax reduction
revenue neutral. The advantage of  the VAT increase
from a devaluation point of  view is that it is levied
according to the destination principle, i.e. it is a tax
on imports, with ex ports re ceiving rebates and effec-
tively eliminating all taxes levied on intermediate
stages of  production. This ultimately increases the
internal prices of  imports and the decline in export
prices leads to expenditure switching from foreign to
domestic goods. In addition, depending on the rela-
tive size of  the labour tax cut and VAT increase on
non-tradables, and on the relative size of  the non-
tradable sector, fiscal policy can also lead to a decline
in the relative price of  non-tradables, thereby gener-
ating switches from tradables to non-tradables. 
The recent empirical study by de Mooij and Keen
(2012) suggests that this idea may work in practice.
They use an unbalanced panel of 30 OECD countries
between 1965 and 2009 to study the effect of fiscal
devaluation on net exports. According to their bench-
mark result, a revenue neutral social security contri-
bution cut and a corresponding VAT increase
amounting to 1 percent of GDP lead to an increase in
net exports of between 0.9 percent and 4 percent of
GDP. This is a significant effect that could be exploit-
ed by the periphery countries in the euro area to
increase their competitiveness. 
The only drawback in the context of the European
crisis could be that the Southern crisis countries have
traditionally based their tax systems on indirect,
rather than direct taxation. Carrying out an internal
devaluation of the kind described above would there-
fore require the euro area to disharmonise its tax sys-
tems even further. 
Thirdly, a country can regain its competitiveness
through faster productivity growth. At a given wage
level, faster productivity growth reduces unit labour
costs without provoking the resistance of unions and
hence enables firms to reduce their prices. 
Fourthly, expectations regarding rapid convergence
with the euro area core are one of  the factors respon-
sible for generating the current account deficits in
periphery countries prior to the crisis. However, the
crisis most likely led to a downward revision of  these
expectations. If  the expectations about future
income growth were reduced, so were expectations
about future consumption. This leads to an increase
in savings and a reduction in aggregate demand,
which decreases the pressure on the price level and
improves the current account. Thus, the fall in
demand should slow down inflation in the periphery
compared to the core, leading to an internal devalu-
ation in the periphery. 
2.3.3 How much devaluation is needed?
The theoretical discussion on how to implement
devaluation needs to be complemented by quantita-
tive considerations. There are three crucial questions
related to the need for depreciation. How do we define
rebalancing, how much real depreciation is needed in
the GIIPS countries to achieve this rebalancing, and
how can such depreciation be achieved. 
Any definition of  rebalancing requires the assump-
tion that the international investment position of
the country relative to GDP is stable at some level.
This may or may not require a balanced current
account. A meaningful quantitative assessment of
the sustainability of  the international investment
position requires a general equilibrium analysis.
Goldman Sachs (2012) has recently carried out such
an analysis for the euro area.21 This analysis uses a
general equilibrium framework, which focuses on
how goods are reallocated across countries as the
real exchange rate changes when the supply of  trad-
able and non-tradable goods is given in each coun-
try. Thus, it solely focuses on how much real
exchange rate adjustment is needed to make expen-
diture switching between home and foreign tradable
goods on the one hand, and between tradable and
non-tradable goods on the other, sufficiently large
so that the implied current account adjustment
implies a sustainable foreign liability position. The
analysis also assumes that the adjustment will last
for about ten years, and requires that the net foreign
investment position is stabilized between ± 25 per-
cent of  GDP.
The calibrated Goldman Sachs model implies that
Portugal is required to make the largest real exchange
rate adjustment. A 35 percent depreciation is required
by Portugal to make its international investment posi-
tion sustainable. Greece and Spain require 30 percent
and 20 percent depreciations, respectively, while the fig-
21 They use a variant of the framework of Obstfeld and Rogoff. See
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) for a canonical open economy model to
analyse current account adjustment.
ure for Italy is lower at around
10–15 percent. Finally, the small-
est real exchange rate depreciation
of around 0–5 percent is required
from Ire land. At the same time,
the real exchange rate of Ger -
many should appreciate by 25 per-
cent.22 The study also calculates
the size of the inflation differen-
tials implied by the de pre ci -
ations/appreciations required.
Assuming an average inflation
rate of 2 percent in the euro area,
the Goldman Sachs (2012) study
concludes that inflation of around
4 percent in Germany and the rest
of the core euro area countries
together with zero inflation in the
periphery is required for the rebal-
ancing process to be completed in
about 10 to 15 years.
2.3.4 Lessons from the Baltics
and Ireland 
Four member countries of the
European Union have undergone
an internal devaluation since
2007. These four countries are
two members of the euro area,
Ireland and Estonia, and the two
other Baltic countries that main-
tained a fixed ex change rate dur-
ing the crisis period. This section
reviews their adjustment process.
Figure 2.10 summarises the main macroeconomic
indicators of  these four countries. All four countries
carried out a substantial internal devaluation while
maintaining the fixed exchange rate. Latvia and
Ireland devalued by over 25 percent from the peak to
the trough of  their exchange rate indexes. Estonia
and Lithuania devalued less, but still by over 15 per-
cent. All of  the countries markedly improved upon
their pre-crisis current account balance as a result,
with Latvia moving from a deficit of  over 20 percent
of  GDP to a surplus of  over 10 percent of  GDP
within just a few years. This adjustment, however,
was very costly both in terms of  output and employ-
ment. The output loss was between 15–25 percent,
with the largest loss recorded in Latvia and the
smallest in Ireland. The Baltic countries have been
growing strongly since this output trough, but they
are still a fair way off  their pre-crisis output levels,
while Ireland’s output, on the other hand, remains
fairly flat. As for unemployment, it jumped to
around 20 percent in the Baltic countries before
dropping to around 15 percent, and to 10 percent in
the case of  Estonia. Unemployment in Ireland rose
gradually, reaching 15 percent at the beginning of
2012. Finally, government balances have also im -
proved since the beginning of  the crisis. Government
debt has risen significantly in all countries apart
from Estonia. The increase was particularly large in
Ireland, where the deficit increased not only because
of  the recession, but also because of  the bail-out of
its banks. However, it must be emphasised that pub-
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22 When calculating the requisite depreciations, potential valuation
effects on the net international investment position are taken into
account.
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lic debt levels remained low in the Baltic countries,
which helped their economies during the adjustment
period.
The lessons to be drawn from the adjustment experi-
ence of the Baltic countries are rather controversial23
and it is debatable whether they offer an example to
be followed. The adjustment was achieved partially
through wage cuts and partially by improving produc-
tivity through reducing employment. Both led to a fall
in aggregate demand, hence to a large output loss. To
restore labour productivity growth after such an out-
put loss, a large reduction in employment was in -
evitably required. Was the internal devaluation suc-
cessful? This question is hard to answer without
knowing the extent to which these countries were
overvalued before the crisis. The negative effect of
appreciation on competitiveness was certainly offset
to some extent by rapid productivity growth.
However, it remains to be seen whether the devalua-
tions carried out in the Baltic countries were sufficient
to achieve rebalancing.
The recession in Ireland was driven by a sharp con-
traction in aggregate demand due to the collapse of
the construction sector. Overall, the decline in aggre-
gate demand led to deflation, and hence realign-
ment.24 The GDP deflator declined by 6.5 percent
between 2008 and 2011, and by about 15 percent
between 2006 and 2012. However, the deprecation of
sterling also contributed to this decrease, since
imports from Britain, which are significant, became
cheaper.
Overall the austerity measures that resulted in the
necessary internal devaluation were costly in terms
of  output and employment, both in the Baltics and
in Ireland. In the absence of  counterfactual evi-
dence, we will never know whether these countries
could have achieved the adjustment at a lower cost if
they had devalued their currency. Past experience
suggests that this may have been possible, although
the currency mismatch would have caused problems.
Why did they not devalue externally? This may have
been more difficult for Ireland because it could only
do so by leaving the euro. Latvia and Lithuania, on
the other hand, had only pegged their currency to
the euro and could have devalued more easily.
According to the Latvian Prime Minister, Valdis
Dombrovskis, Latvia did not opt for external deval-
uation because it would have violated the entry con-
ditions governing a switch from ERM II to the
euro.25 Yet the cost of  postponing entry to the euro
by few years does not seem particularly high com-
pared to the loss of  output and employment subse-
quently experienced by the country. However, if
postponing the entry to the euro were also viewed by
market participants as a signal of  a broader policy
and institutional regime change, abandoning the peg
could have proven very costly for a country that was
just recently regaining its independence and with
institutions supporting the market economy that
were still evolving. 
2.3.5 Adjustment in progress: internal devaluation in
the periphery since 2008
Since the beginning of  the crisis, there has been
adjustment in the periphery of  the euro area, or if  we
include Italy, in the GIIPS countries; but the timing
and the scale of  adjustment has been heterogeneous.
The left panel of  Figure 2.11 shows that Spain and
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23 See Aslund (2012), Blanchard (2012), Krugman (2012) and Sinn
(2012) among others. 
24 See Lane (2011) for further details about the Irish crisis.
25 Speech given at the Munich Economic Summit, see Dombrovskis
(2010). 
Ireland have improved their current account balance
by about 6 percent of  GDP in the last four years,
while Greece and Portugal recorded 4.7 and 3.6 per-
centage point improvements. The current account
balance only deteriorated in Italy, which had a rela-
tively small current account deficit before the crisis.
Overall, the pattern we observe is that the current
account typically improved in countries that started
out with a deficit, and worsened in countries that
started out with a surplus. Figure 2.4 shows that
Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain have improved
their balance on goods markedly since 2007 and con-
tinued to improve their balance on services. It was
the negative balance on income that dragged down
their current account.
The most remarkable adjustment was carried out by
Estonia, which improved its current account balance
by almost 20 percentage points over the four year
period. If  we look at the counter part of  this adjust-
ment in private savings on the right panel of  Fi -
gure 2.11, we see that households in Spain, Portugal
and Ireland adjusted to the crisis environment by
increasing their savings, and contributing substan-
tially to the reduction of  their current account
deficits. In contrast, private savings declined in Italy
and Greece. Without significant improvement in pri-
vate savings, it is doubtful whether rebalancing can
be successful in the long run. This is because higher
demand at home due to lower savings will eventually
push the price level up at home, thereby leading to a
real appreciation.
Unfortunately, most of  the improvements in current
accounts seem to be due to mere income effects.
Given that the crisis drove down incomes and created
rising mass unemployment, imports declined with
incomes, while exports remained relatively more sta-
ble. This sort of  adjustment is not what the euro area
needs to achieve stabilisation. It requires a substitu-
tion away from imports and towards domestic prod-
ucts driven by changes in relative prices, i.e. by a real
devaluation. 
As far as this criterion is concerned, however, there
has been little improvement in the euro area. The
price level in Ireland relative to Germany fell by
7.4 percent between Q1 of 2008 and Q3 of 2012, as
shown by Figure 2.12. Spain depreciated by 2.8 per-
cent relative to Germany, whereas Greece retained its
respective relative price level with Germany. Italy and
Portugal appreciated slightly over this period. 
As noted above, such real appreciation may not have
a negative impact on competitiveness if  there is an
equally strong aggregate average productivity
increase resulting from a productivity increase in the
tradable goods sector only. The right panel of
Figure 2.12 shows the changes in GDP per employ-
ee relative to Germany. Firstly, it is worth noting
that Ireland and Spain not only depreciated inter-
nally between Q1 of  2008 and Q3 of  2012, but also
im proved their productivity markedly. Secondly,
although the price level of  Greece and Portugal did
not change much, both countries managed to
improve their productivity levels. Hence, they might
have improved their competitiveness relative to
Germany insofar as the true decrease in tradables
prices was larger than the GDP deflator shows as,
according to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, the
wages and prices of  non-tradables rose with a dif-
ferential productivity increase in the tradables sec-
tor. There is some uncertainty with this interpreta-
tion, however, because ex port prices in most crisis
countries increased relative to the GDP deflator.
Only in Spain it fell a bit. Thus, even if  there was a
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Ba lassa-Samuel son effect at
work, inflation of  tradable
goods un related to the Balassa-
Samuel son effect ap pears to be
larger in most countries, as in
the period before the crisis. Of
course, if  there is no differential
productivity in crease between
tradables and non-tradables, the
change in price levels cannot be
attributed to the Balassa-Sa -
muel son effect. In all events, the
message as far as Italy is con-
cerned is not very encouraging.
Price level changes indicate a
small real appreciation, but pro-
ductivity deteriorated relative to
Germany. The country’s com-
petitiveness is therefore likely to
have declined since 2008.
An alternative measure of  com-
petitiveness is unit labour costs,
which are defined as the ratio of
wage per unit of  time and labour
productivity. Figure 2.13 shows
the change in nominal unit labour costs broken
down by type of  production (goods versus services)
and by time period (2000–2007 and 2007–2011). The
first important observation is that unit labour costs
in creased significantly in Greece prior to the crisis in
goods production, but less so in the other Southern
European countries or in Ireland. In contrast, unit
labour costs fell in Germany and in several other
countries in goods production. Unit labour costs in
services obey a different dynamic. They in creased
prior to the crisis in all countries apart from Ger -
many. The second observation is that the increase in
unit labour costs has slowed down considerably since
the crisis. It fell in Ireland, Spain and Greece in
goods production. However, it has shown faster
growth in Greece in services production than previ-
ously. Overall, changes in unit labour costs suggest
that cost competitiveness is improving in the crisis
hit countries. It is improving fast in Ireland, slower
in Spain, and to a mixed degree in Greece and
Portugal, where it is improving in one type of  pro-
duction, but slightly deteriorating in the other.
Unlike the changes in price levels, however, changes
in unit labour costs suggest some improvements in
cost competitiveness in the Southern periphery.26
However, it should be emphasised that a decline in
unit labour costs does not in itself  improve competi-
tiveness, but only insofar as it makes it easier for
firms to reduce their prices, which is ultimately
required to improve competitiveness and rebalance
current accounts via a substitution effect, i.e. with-
out increasing unemployment. Should nominal
wages remain unchanged, there is a good chance that
such a decline in unit labour costs does improve
competitiveness. However, as the price level compar-
ison in Figure 2.12 suggests, this process is still in its
early stages.
2.4 Rebalancing in the euro area: government balances
Current account balances must also be consistent
with the balance between saving and investment. This
is partly the balance between government saving and
investment. The GIIPS countries also need to make
eventual adjustment to their fiscal balances. Such an
adjustment, however, can take several years.
However, the immediate concern is how to design a
fiscal policy such that it credibly commits policy-mak-
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26 There is a drawback in unit labour cost comparisons insofar, how-
ever, as statistical improvements might result from wiping out firms
with high unit labour costs first if  the economy goes into a recession,
as it currently does. Thus, the improvement in unit labour costs
might be an artefact with little information about competitiveness.
ers to a deficit reduction plan that is consistent with
long-term external and internal sustainability on the
one hand, and also allows for some counter-cyclical
fiscal policy on the other. During a sovereign debt cri-
sis the danger faced by policy-makers is that if  they
reduce the deficit sufficiently to make the fiscal
adjustment credible for market participants today, it
may well lead to output losses tomorrow, requiring
further adjustments.
It therefore makes more sense to focus on which fiscal
policy mix, i.e. combination of expenditure cuts and
tax increases, is most appropriate at the time that a cri-
sis strikes. Appropriately designed fiscal adjustment
may even prove to have a positive effect on output.27
The general lesson from the empirical literature on this
topic is that a fiscal adjustment based largely on reduc-
ing expenditure is more likely to be more successful,
and longer lasting than adjustment based on tax in -
creases.28 In addition, fiscal adjustment based on
expenditure cuts is likely to boost output, particularly
when it is combined with growth-oriented reforms
such as the liberalization of labour and goods markets.
Figure 2.14 shows the change in government expen-
diture and revenues between 2008 and 2011. It is
interesting to see that the two countries that
increased revenues relative to GDP significantly dur-
ing this period were Greece and Portugal. These are
the two countries where adjustment is slow. Given
that GDP was falling in this
period, adjustment required sig-
nificant increases in tax rates,
leading to higher distortions and
to a negative effect on supply.
More emphasis on expenditure
cuts might have made the adjust-
ment faster in Greece and Por -
tugal as it did in Ireland.29
2.5 Conclusions
Europe is in the grip of three
interrelated crises: a balance-of-
payments crisis, a sovereign debt
crisis and a banking crisis. Al -
though progress has been made to resolve the sover-
eign debt and banking crises in the last four years, pol-
icy-makers have devoted little attention to the bal-
ance-of-payments problem. A credible strategy for
getting the euro back on track also needs to address
this issue.
Since 2000 large imbalances have accumulated in the
euro area in the form of  current account deficits and
surpluses. In the euro area periphery in particular,
Greece, Por tugal, Spain and Ireland have run persis-
tent current account deficits with mostly high
growth, investment and house price bubbles
(Portugal being an exception); while the Northern
core of  the euro area, and most notably Germany,
have run a persistent current account surplus with
declining house prices and low investment. Given
that the capital market is no longer willing to
finance their current account deficits, the periphery
countries need to devalue in order to regain compet-
itiveness and reduce their dependence on foreign
credit. The key policy question is whether they
should pursue internal or external devaluation; or
whether a periphery country should remain within,
or exit the euro area. The answer to this question is
not clear because the preferred route of  internal
adjustment through inflation in the core may not be
available, but deflation will result in severe distor-
tions in company balance sheets. An external deval-
uation, on the other hand, may entail high conta-
gion costs, although it improves the incentives for
debtor countries not to overstretch their credit lim-
its. In addition, it also requires the redenomination
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27 There is an on-going debate over whether the results regarding an
expansionary fiscal contraction are robust or not. Alesina and
Perotti (1997), and Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2012) argue that it is
possible to design such a policy. In contrast, Guajardo et al. (2011)
argue that the empirical evidence on the existence of such a policy is
not robust. See Ramey (2011) for an overview of the literature about
the effects of government expenditures.
28 See Alesina (2012), Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2012), Alesina et
al. (2012), and von Hagen and Strauch (2001).
29 The Irish expenditure figures are misleading in the sense that they
include the cost of bailing-out the Irish banks.
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of  assets, liabilities and contracts prior to exit, which
is likely to cause severe disruption in the short run.
Given that, for the time being, policy-makers have
decided to exclude the exit option, the emphasis of
economic policy must be on seeking possibilities for
internal devaluations. As we showed, a fiscal devalu-
ation by replacing direct with indirect taxes would
be a possibility worth considering. 
Since the beginning of the crisis, the countries of the
periphery have all been undergoing adjustment, albeit
to varying degrees. Whereas the Irish adjustment went
a long way and Spain has made some progress in
terms of productivity increases, the Portuguese, and
particularly the Greek adjustments seem to be slow, to
say the least. Against this background, the competi-
tiveness crisis currently impacting some of the euro
area countries looks set to continue for quite some
time to come. 
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Chapter 3
LABOUR MARKET REFORMS
AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT
3.1 Introduction
High and rising unemployment rates over the last few
years have drawn attention to the functioning of labour
markets in European countries and the need to reform
those institutions and policies that affect them.
Arguments for reform are partly driven by the immedi-
ate need to reduce public borrowing, particularly in
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and other countries
with public debt problems. They are also driven by the
need to rebalance demand towards those countries,
which have become uncompetitive, have been running
persistent current account deficits and now have high
unemployment. Meanwhile in the background there are
the long-term objectives of improving the way that these
markets work, lowering the structural unemployment
rate, making labour markets more shock-resistant, and
giving economies greater scope for growth in the future.
This chapter examines the interactions between the
different institutional characteristics of labour mar-
kets in Europe, and the impact of the current re cession
on their unemployment struc ture and dynamics.
Section 3.2 sketches the wide
variety of unemployment experi-
ences across countries in recent
years, while Section 3.3 discusses
the motivations for and effects of
the existing configuration of
labour market institutions, and
possible reforms to them. Sec -
tion 3.4 looks at youth unem-
ployment, vocational training
and apprenticeships. Section 3.5
trac es the impact of crisis on the
resulting heterogeneous labour
market configurations and dis-
cusses current pressure for re -
form in problem countries; and
Section 3.6 concludes by review-
ing desirable reforms and their
potentially problematic features.
3.2 Unemployment rates1
As shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, aggregate unemploy-
ment in the European Union was 7.2 percent in 2007,
and rose to 10.4 percent in 2012; while in the euro area,
it rose from 7.6 to 11.3 percent over the same period.
These changes (if  not the levels) are comparable to
those seen in the United States, where unemployment
rose from 4.6 to 8.1 percent over the same period.
Within the European aggregates, however, there are
wide differences between countries as regards not only
the overall unemployment rate, but also the level and
changes in its long-term and youth components. Most
relevant and striking is the contrast between the coun-
tries (Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal) with the
most serious debt sustainability issues and those coun-
tries that did not suffer from the resulting high interest
rates and restrictive fiscal policies. Between 2008 and
2012, unemployment increased from 7.7 to 23.7 per-
cent in Greece, from 8.3 to 25.0 percent in Spain, from
4.6 to 14.9 percent in Ireland and from 8.5 to 15.7 per-
cent in Portugal; over the same period, aggregate
unemployment has actually fallen from 7.5 to 5.5 per-
cent in Germany, and risen only slightly in the Nether -
EEAG (2013), The EEAG Report on the European Economy, "Labour Market Reforms and Youth Unemployment", CESifo, 
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1 There is a small discrepancy between the figures quoted in this
chapter and Chapter 1 because the sources are different and the basis
of the calculations differ slightly.
lands (from 3.1 to 5.2 percent),
Austria (from 3.8 to 4.3 percent),
and Finland (from 6.4 to 7.7 per-
cent). The data for other coun-
tries lie in between, and are not as
clearly related to debt sustainabil-
ity issues (as for example Italy’s
unemployment rate, which in -
creased from 6.1 to 10.5 percent
and that of Denmark, which rose
from 3.4 to 7.7 percent). 
Figure 3.3 shows that long-term
unemployment, defined in Eu -
rope as the percentage of  the ac -
tive population that has been
unemployed for over a year, has
also grown considerably, follow-
ing much the same pattern and
rising (to 12.3 percent in Greece,
10.3 percent in Spain, 9.6 per-
cent in Ireland, 6.9 percent in
Portugal) in problem countries,
but remaining low (2.7 percent
in Germany, 1.0 percent in Aus -
tria, 1.8 percent in the Nether -
lands) in countries that recov-
ered quickly from the Great Re -
cession. Other countries again
offer a varied picture, with long-
term unemployment low in
Denmark (at 2.2 percent), but
higher in Italy (5.3 percent) and
France (4.1 percent).
Youth unemployment rates (for
persons aged 15 to 24), shown in
Figure 3.4, now lie in the range of
30–55 percent in Greece, Spain,
Ireland, Portugal and Italy.
Those numbers actually make the
youth unemployment problem
look worse than it really is, as
only a small fraction of the pop-
ulation of persons aged 15–24 is
in the labour force, and most are
in education or training. As
Figure 3.5 shows, youth un em -
ployment as a percentage of the
population rather than the labour
force is high, but less alarming.
Actual unemployment rates can
be considered as the sum of two
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parts. Firstly, structural unemployment is the rate that
would emerge if  the economy were not hit by shocks
to demand or supply, if  inflation were held at a low
steady rate, and the economy grew smoothly.
Secondly, cyclical unemployment, the remainder,
results from shocks: like the boom in real-estate in
some countries and in a wider range of financial
assets in others between 2001 and 2007; and the col-
lapse of demand since 2008. 
How much current unemployment is structural?
Some recent estimates produced by staff  of  the
OECD and the European Com mission are given in
Table 3.1. The OECD estimates
for 2007 range from 3.8 percent
for the Netherlands, 4.2 percent
for Den mark, 4.7 percent for Ire -
land, 4.9 percent for Austria,
5.1 percent for Sweden and
Spain, up to 8.4 percent for Ger -
many and 9.8 percent for Greece.
Structural unemployment rates
change over time, and they can-
not be estimated with much pre-
cision, as the standard errors
reported in Table 3.1, column 2,
indicate. European Commis sion
estimates for 2010 show large
increases for some countries, par-
ticularly Spain, Portugal and
Ireland, which have had large
increases in actual unemployment. In general, how-
ever, these estimates show, unsurprisingly, that cur-
rent unemployment contains a large cyclical compo-
nent for most European countries. Germany, whose
current unemployment rate lies well below the struc-
tural rate, is the notable exception. The countries that
have had to apply the severest “austerity” policies,
namely Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece, have
(again, unsurprisingly) the largest rates of  cyc lical
unemployment, as well as high structural em -
ployment. 
3.3 Motives for and effects of
labour market regulation and
reform
The labour market institutions
that have been the subject of
reforms in the recent past and are
candidates for further change now
are: the system of unemployment
and other social security benefits;
the system of wage determination,
including unions and collective
bargaining; em ploy ment protec-
tion legislation; minimum wages;
the tax wedge; active labour mar-
ket policies; and vocational train-
ing and apprenticeships. 
Some structural policy changes
permit lower public spending and
higher tax revenue. Such changes
combine a short-term budgetary
saving with a possible long-term
0
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Table 3.1 
Estimates of structural unemployment ratesa) 
 Non-accelerating 
inflation rate of 
unemployment 
(NAIRU) 
Standard 
error of 
NAIRU 
estimate 
Non-accelerating 
wage rate of 
unemployment 
(NAWRU) 
Year of estimate 2007  2010 
Austria 4.9 0.30 4 
Belgium 8.0 0.87 8 
Denmark 4.2 0.66 5 
Finland 7.0 0.93 7 
France 8.3 0.71 10 
Germany 8.4 1.09 8 
Greece 9.8 0.54 – 
Ireland 4.7 0.48 12 
Italy 6.4 1.30 8 
Netherlands 3.8 0.45 4 
Portugal 6.9 0.99 12 
Spain 5.1 – 16 
Sweden 5.1 0.80 7 
United Kingdom 5.3 0.45 8 
a) Unemployment rate measured in percent of labour force.  
Source: Gianella (2009), Orlandi (2012).  
 
reduction in structural unemployment. However, they
are highly contentious: some people are made clearly
worse off  by them in the short-term, even if  many
people stand to gain eventually. Cutting unemploy-
ment benefits, increasing the retirement age, cutting
minimum wages, reducing severance payments or
periods of notice for dismissals, for example, clearly
go against the short-term interests of workers and the
unemployed; they impoverish people who are already
low down in the distribution of incomes. “Smart” pol-
icy changes that assemble combinations of elements
may be able to compensate people who suffer losses
from the effects of some of the policy elements with
gains from others, and find more support.
3.3.1 Motives for intervention in labour markets:
broad principles
Efficient allocation and reallocation of employment
usually requires effort by workers, for whom changing
jobs is costly. In laissez-faire labour markets such
efforts need to be prompted by wage variability across
more or less productive workers and jobs. Since it is
difficult and important for individuals to be sheltered
from the excesses of such variability, labour market
institutions aim at reducing ex post inequality of out-
comes for ex ante similar individuals, and/or at redis-
tributing resources across different individuals. At the
same time, they may affect aggregate employment and
output negatively: higher wages reduce employment
demand; non-employment subsidies reduce labour
market participation and search effort; employment
protection legislation and institutional wage compres-
sion reduce the efficiency of labour (re)allocation. To
reconcile flexible reallocation and work incentives
with the objective of sheltering labour incomes from
risk, public training programs, in-work subsidies, and
other active labour market policies combine forms of
income support with measures meant to ensure that
labour is not idle (as it might be in a simple unem-
ployment benefit program) or employed in low-pro-
ductivity jobs (as employment protection tends to
imply). Such policies can combine “security” with
“efficiency”, but imply a third “fiscal” aspect of a pol-
icy trilemma: high levels of  employment and security
may be achieved at the same time only by committing
sizable resources to the funding of labour market
policies.
Some countries lean towards activation, others
towards welfare support; some have emphasised secu-
rity, others incentives and opportunities. The pros and
cons of the systems depend on their socio-economic
characteristics. A tighter family structure can, for
example, make youth non-employment more accept-
able as the price of job security and high wages for
older workers. Of course, there need not be clear
cause and effect relationships between the two fea-
tures of different countries. It may be that the poor
job-finding prospects are effectively what keep youths
attached to their families of origin. Complementari -
ties between these and other characteristics of differ-
ent labour markets and societies should nevertheless
be kept in mind when advocating the adoption of dif-
ferent institutional frameworks.
3.3.2 The role of collective bargaining and restrictions
on competition
While the benefits of competition are widely recog-
nised in goods and services markets, collective wage
bargaining is exempted from anti-trust rules even in
the United States, where Section 6 of  the 1914
Clayton acts exempts labour unions and agricultural
organizations because “the labour of a human being
is not a commodity or article of commerce”. Higher
and more uniform wages are obviously appreciated by
workers, even if  they come at the cost of lower
employment, production, and profits, because work-
ing households do not have access to a perfect finan-
cial market where labour income can be traded.
Restraints on wage competition can allow employers
to finance their apprentices’ general human capital
accumulation without fearing that a trained worker
will be head-hunted by higher wage offers (Acemoglu
and Pischke, 1999): this increases production effi-
ciently in cases where financial constraints would pre-
vent workers from funding their own training, or
indeed mobility towards more productive jobs
(Bertola, 2004). Unemployment benefits and employ-
ment protection can also be beneficial if, by providing
a safety net financed by society or by employers, they
encourage workers to take individual risks that
increase average production (Sinn, 1995). 
The balance between the costs and benefits of  labour
market policies depends on the environment in which
they operate. In recent decades (characterised by
globalization, information technology progress, and
macroeconomic stability), for instance, acquiring
general skills and the ability to adapt to new tech-
nologies and perform new jobs in flexible, evolving
labour markets were often viewed as advantages of
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the Anglo-Saxon ap proach to
labour market mechanisms. The
strong performance of  other sys-
tems during the crisis may lead
to a reassessment of  this view:
the jobs-for-life promise of  Ger -
manic systems of  vocational
education and tightly regulated
occupational and wage-setting
schemes seemed obsolete a short
while ago. How ever, a crisis that
revealed the shortcomings of
flexibility and financial markets
undoubtedly increased their
appeal. Practical implementa-
tion of  specific policies, however,
must also be aligned with the
socio-economic features of  the
countries involved: attempts by
the United Kingdom and France to introduce
apprenticeship type vocational training schemes
encouraged by the German example have met with
little success.
3.3.3 Inequality
Labour market rigidities not only reduce production
efficiency, they also stabilise and equalise labour
incomes. While international competitiveness requires
labour market flexibility, workers certainly dislike
insecurity. Bertola (2010a) finds that European
Monetary Union (EMU) countries experienced sub-
stantially faster deregulation of their product markets
and some deregulation of their labour markets. As a
result, employment grew and unemployment declined
everywhere, and more strongly where economic inte-
gration was tighter. In fact, changes to labour market
institutions now account for all of the increase in
inequality that the data also associate with EMU
(Bertola, 2010b). As rigid labour markets could not
cope with the internationalization of production,
their increasingly unpleasant unemployment implica-
tions were addressed not only by deregulation, but
also by the vigorous development of financial markets
in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Labour market reforms are almost always painful.
Regulations that keep primary workers’ labour
income high and stable, while typically making it dif-
ficult for youth to find employment, can lower house-
hold income inequality. However, Figure 3.6 shows
that employment has been higher in countries with
low inequality. This may reflect persistent socio-eco-
nomic differences between Mediterranean and
Scandinavian countries, for example. However,
inequality grew in Germany between 2005 and 2009,
as employment grew. In Italy higher inequality was
also associated with higher employment. In Denmark,
by contrast, inequality rose while employment fell.
The general tendency for inequality to rise is probably
due to the nature of changes in technology, but labour
market deregulation and the introduction of low-
wage employment opportunities, may have con-
tributed to it.
3.3.4 Institutions and reforms
Institutions and policies affect labour markets in
many different ways, and many detailed features of
them are important. Reducing them to a small num-
ber of summary indices is a hazardous task. This is
nevertheless attempted by the OECD in a bid to show
how institutions have changed over time and differ
between countries. Tables 3.2, 3.4, 3.6 and 3.7 report a
selection of the most important indicators in 1997
and 2005 to show how things changed in the years
leading up to the financial crisis.
3.3.4.1 Unemployment and other social security 
benefits
The OECD data in Table 3.2 summarise the benefits
system with measures of  the gross and net re -
placement rates: the ratio of  benefits to earnings
before tax, and after tax respectively, for an average
worker. There is a striking contrast between the low
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net replacement rates in the United States and Japan,
and those in many European countries. Three Nordic
countries have high net replacement rates, as may be
expected: 66 percent in Denmark, 61.4 percent in
Finland, and 75.9 percent in Norway in 2007. The
rate in Sweden, however, is relatively low, at 42.8 per-
cent, since Sweden was forced to scale back benefits
in the early 1990s after a major recession, caused by
a banking crisis, and a collapse in demand raised
unemployment to double-digit levels, making the
previously very generous system unsustainable.
Pressure on public finances forced a retreat from the
previously successful “Swedish model”. Other coun-
tries have similarly generous regimes, including
Austria (59.6 percent), Belgium (63.6 percent), and
Germany (63 percent). 
The German case illustrates the problem of obtaining
a full picture from summary figures. Germany’s land-
mark Hartz reforms, which are credited with having
transformed German labour markets, were introduced
between January 2003 and January 2005, but they do
not show in the OECD data. While they covered a wide
range of labour market issues, changing the benefits
regime was a key aspect of them. Importantly, they
combined the previously-existing unemployment assis-
tance and social assistance into a new “unemployment
benefit II”; introduced a system of tighter qualifica-
tions for receiving benefits and sanctions for not meet-
ing them; widened the range of
acceptable jobs that the unem-
ployed could be required to take;
lowered the marginal tax rate
effectively applied to earnings of
recipients in order to encourage
the take-up of work; and intro-
duced payments for community
work. These reforms reduced the
very high replacement rates that
had been a feature of German
social security for many years, and
reduced the duration of benefits. 
Labour market reforms always
face difficult trade-offs. The Hartz
reforms were prompted by the
competitiveness pressures induced
by the country’s reunification and
European economic and mone-
tary unification. While some mea-
sures were intended to increase
overall productivity (for example,
“workfare” rules made it possible
to activate some poverty-trapped
labour by allowing workers to retain a portion of their
benefits when taking up work), the brunt of the reform
induced wage moderation. Specifically, smaller benefit
entitlements, in the absence of a legal minimum wage,
strongly increased the supply of low-skill and de-
unionised labour, and brought down unemployment
by allowing workers to bid down the low end of wage
distribution. Hence, higher employment came at the
price of somewhat lower and far greater inequality as
far as wage incomes are concerned (Eichhorst, 2012;
Burda and Hunt, 2011; Dustmann et al., 2009).
While some countries have responded to the fall in the
demand for labour largely by cutting the numbers of
workers employed, others have spread out the cuts by
shortening working hours. When labour demand fell in
Germany in 2009 working hours were reduced, partly
by using the Kurzarbeit scheme in the social security
legislation, but mostly by employers using the flexibili-
ty in labour agreements to modify working hours with-
in quite broad parameters for periods of up to three
months and in some cases a year. In Italy firms have
made use of similar provisions that subsidise shortened
working hours through the social security system,
resulting in a smaller rise in unemployment. In the
United Kingdom short-time working has been accept-
ed by unions and workers as a means of preserving
jobs, without any particular scheme to provide incen-
tives via social security contributions. In Denmark,
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Table 3.2 
Unemployment benefit replacement rates 
 Gross replacement rates Net replacement rates 
 1995 2007 2001 2007 
Austria 32.5 31.6 60.4 59.6 
Belgium 38.7 40.0 62.4 63.6 
Czech Republic 5.9 6.3 22.0 29.4 
Denmark 64.9 47.7 68.0 66.0 
Finland 35.8 34.1 65.6 61.4 
France 37.4 39.0 60.5 56.8 
Germany 26.3 23.7 65.1 63.0 
Ireland 26.3 37.2 42.7 53.8 
Italy 19.3 31.7 5.6 7.5 
Japan 10.2 7.6 9.6 11.9 
Netherlands 52.3 33.9 60.0 38.9 
Norway 38.8 33.6 74.0 75.9 
Poland 11.5 10.2 36.3 40.3 
Portugal 35.4 43.4 42.7 48.1 
Slovakia 11.7 8.3 34.8 12.5 
Spain 39.0 35.9 39.5 39.2 
Sweden 26.9 32.4 44.3 42.8 
United Kingdom 17.8 12.1 53.6 58.0 
United States 11.9 13.6 5.6 5.6 
OECD average 28.0 26.4 44.5 43.5 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2012, Table 2.A1.4, 
http://www.oecd.org/els/employmentpoliciesanddata/EMo%202012_Chap
ter%202-Annexes%202.A1%20and%202.A2.pdf. 
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firms used their flexibility to cut jobs rather than hours
very quickly after 2008. In Spain and Portugal tight
restrictions on the hours and pay of  regularly
employed individuals have thrown the burden onto
temporary workers, who have become unemployed in
large numbers. However, in recent reforms (Bentolila et
al., 2011) Spain has learnt a few lessons from the suc-
cessful experience of  the Kurzarbeit scheme in
Germany. Reductions in hours will now be incentivised
by reducing firms’ social security contributions while
not reducing workers’ entitlements to benefits.
3.3.4.2 Active labour market policies
Active labour market policies (ALMPs) have become
more important over the last two decades in many
European countries. Following years in which govern-
ments typically paid out unemployment and other
benefits, but did little to influence the behaviour of
recipients, allowing a variety of social problems to
worsen and the costs of the benefits system to rise as
the numbers of recipients grew, governments in the
1990s started to intervene. They applied more rigor-
ous tests of availability for work, and attempted to
make an active search for work by recipients a condi-
tion for receiving benefits. The separation between the
public offices that paid benefits and those supporting
job searches was ended. Long-term unemployed per-
sons are now generally interviewed and given coun-
selling and training to help them apply for and get
work. Governments in some cases provide training or
retraining programmes, and in some cases guarantee
jobs for the long-term unemployed, if  only for a fixed
period. They may also subsidise firms to take on long-
term unemployed workers, or subsidise other
providers of training. In Britain such policies have
been described as “harassment of the work-shy”. The
aim of ALMPs is to allow generous benefits to coex-
ist with low overall structural unemployment and low
long-term unemployment. ALMPs are an important
ingredient in the bundle of policies that constitutes
flexicurity. 
While increased spending on ALMPs may improve
the functioning of labour markets and reduce struc-
tural unemployment, it does not contribute to lower
public deficits, and therefore is not currently an
attractive policy for the cash-strapped economies of
Europe’s periphery. There may nevertheless be strong
arguments for spending more on ALMPs and making
them work better in many of these countries as fiscal
conditions improve. The OECD figures in Table 3.3
show that Denmark spent 1.9 percent of GDP on
ALMPs in 2010, followed by Belgium (1.5 percent),
the Netherlands (1.2 percent), France (1.1 percent),
and Ireland (1.0 percent). Portugal and Sweden spent
around the OECD average at 0.7 percent of GDP,
Spain slightly more along with Germany at 0.9 per-
cent, while Italy comes low down at 0.5 percent, and
the United Kingdom and the United States spent the
least at 0.4 and 0.1 percent, respectively.
Among the problem economies of the periphery,
Spain has undertaken modest reforms recently
(Bentolila et al., 2011), restricting the groups of work-
ers eligible for subsidies on job creation and allowing
private placement agencies to operate for the first
time.
3.3.4.3 Employment protection legislation (EPL)
Excessively strong employment legislation has been
a major problem in a number of  countries. The
OECD data in Table 3.4 include indices of  the
strength of  the legislation for regular employees and
temporary workers. The indices summarise factors
like the size of  the severance payments that firms are
required to make, the periods of  notice that are
required before dismissals can be made, the range of
conditions under which dismissals can be made, and
so on. The distinction between regular and tempo-
rary workers has become very important in recent
years since the introduction of  temporary contracts
in some countries has led to huge growth in the
Table 3.3 
Spending on active labour market policies  
as a percentage of GDP, 2010 
Belgium 1.5 
Denmark  1.9 
France 1.1 
Germany 0.9 
Ireland 1.0 
Italy 0.5 
Netherlands 1.2 
OECD average 0.7 
Portugal 0.7 
Spain 0.9 
Sweden 0.7 
United Kingdoma) 0.4 
United States 0.1 
a) 2009. 
Source: OECD, Employment and Labour Markets: 
Key Tables, No. 9, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ 
employment/public-expenditure-on-active-labour-
market-policies_20752342-table9.  
 
numbers of  workers on these contracts. The United
States has very weak EPL; and the United Kingdom
is not far behind.
Portugal has very strong EPL for regular workers and
strong EPL for temporary workers, contributing to a
very rigid labour market. Established workers are very
secure in their jobs. External labour market pressure
exerts only a weak influence on wage developments.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in practice, employ-
ers pay substantially more than the legally required
severance pay to avoid long, uncertain, and costly
legal proceedings. Compared with the Netherlands,
where legal issues surrounding dismissals of workers
are typically resolved in a few weeks, cases in Portugal
can take years.
Spain is in a similar position to Portugal’s, with
strong EPL for both regular and temporary workers.
Nevertheless, firms can swiftly reduce their employ-
ment of  temporary workers as their contracts expire.
The introduction of  temporary contracts has created
a sharp divide between heavily protected workers in
permanent jobs and a growing number of  workers in
temporary jobs. Spain has a long history of  very
high and volatile unemployment. Bentolila et al.
(2011) describe the Spanish labour market as an
extreme case of  a dual labour
market with a highly pro-
nounced insider-outsider divide.
Job losses since the financial cri-
sis have mainly affected tempo-
rary workers, whose numbers
have fallen by 30 percent, while
the number of  regular workers
has barely decreased at all. 
Under the pressure of  public
debt and employment problems,
there have been recent labour
market reforms in Spain, but
they seem to have been relatively
ineffective. Reforms undertaken
in 2010 and 2011 were superfi-
cially wide ranging, affecting
severance pay, hours of  work,
active labour market policies,
and collective bargaining. The
grounds for fair dismissal were
broadened and made more
explicit, and included a persis-
tent loss in the firm’s revenues. A
new employment contract for
permanent employees was intro-
duced with less generous severance payments, sever-
ance payments for temporary workers were in -
creased, and the number of  successive temporary
contracts a worker could be employed on was
reduced (Bentolila et al., 2011). However, in Sep -
tember 2011 the maximum duration extension of  all
temporary contracts was extended to 4.5 years, until
September 2013. 
How likely are these changes to make a substantial
difference? Bentolila et al. (2011) argue that since
neither the government nor the social partners were
interested in reform, the kind of  reform undertaken
did not significantly reduce the fundamental insider-
outsider divide in the Spanish labour market.
Reforms were watered down to make them accept-
able to the unions and differential EPL was pre-
served. The position of  collective bargaining was
maintained. Some of  the reforms actually benefitted
insiders.
One of  the most costly aspects of  EPL in Spain,
Portugal, Italy, and elsewhere, from the viewpoint of
firms, and which greatly reduces firms’ ability and
willingness to adjust employment in the face of
shocks to demand, is the use of  the courts to adjudi-
cate on the actual or proposed severances of  work-
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Table 3.4 
Employment protection legislationa) 
 Regular workers Temporary workers 
 1995 2007 1995 2007 
Austria 2.9 2.4 1.5 1.5 
Belgium 1.7 1.7 4.6 2.6 
Czech Republic 3.3 3.1 0.5 0.9 
Denmark 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 
Finland 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.9 
France 2.3 2.5 3.6 3.6 
Germany 2.7 3.0 3.5 1.3 
Ireland 1.6 1.6 0.3 0.6 
Italy 1.8 1.8 5.4 1.9 
Japan 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.0 
Netherlands 3.1 2.9 2.4 1.2 
Norway 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.1 
Poland 2.1 2.1 0.8 1.8 
Portugal 4.3 4.2 3.4 2.8 
Slovakia  2.5 2.3 1.1 0.4 
Spain 3.0 2.6 3.3 3.5 
Sweden 2.9 2.9 2.1 1.6 
United Kingdom 0.9 1.1 0.3 0.4 
United States 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
OECD average 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.6 
a) Score range 0–6, where 0 represents the weakest employment pro-
tection legislation. 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2012, Table 2.A1.4, 
http://www.oecd.org/els/employmentpoliciesanddata/EMo%202012_Chap
ter%202-Annexes%202.A1%20and%202.A2.pdf. 
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ers. Court proceedings are generally very expensive,
of  very long and variable duration, and often result
in large penalties applied to firms. In Italy firms have
frequently been required to reinstate dismissed work-
ers and repay their wages for the period of  litigation.
Recourse to the courts is not a bad thing per se. In
the Netherlands the courts are used to adjudicate on
proposed dismissals of  workers, but proceedings typ-
ically take a few weeks, not years, and the outcomes
are relatively predictable and proportionate.
Problems really arise where the judicial system is
unable to process cases rapidly. There is a good argu-
ment for taking employment disputes out of  the
courts and establishing a separate system of  tri-
bunals and arbitration that can resolve these issues
speedily.
Denmark, as might be expected as the poster-boy for
flexicurity, has very limited employment protection.
Andersen (2011) notes that periods of notice for
workers dismissed are short (a matter of weeks in
most cases, up to six months at the most), and sever-
ance payments are low (up to three months’ pay, and
generally far less). 
3.3.4.4 Minimum wages
Most countries have minimum wages. Table 3.5 lists
them for 2011, measured as a fraction of median
hourly earnings in the country in question. The table
has no data for Germany, Italy, Denmark, Finland,
Norway or Sweden, where minimum wages are set by
collective bargaining on a sector by sector basis. The
highest figure in the table is France at 60.1 percent,
the lowest in Europe is Spain at 37.6 percent (leaving
aside the two months of additional pay). The United
Kingdom stands at 46.1 percent, the United States at
38.8 percent, and Japan at 37 percent.
Minimum wages raise the pay of  the least well-paid
workers, who are generally young unskilled individ-
uals and may also be disproportionately women and
part-time workers. The United Kingdom’s mini-
mum wage directly affects the pay of  about 4.4 per-
cent of  workers. Minimum wages may reduce
employment opportunities. However, the evidence is
overwhelmingly that negative employment effects
are small, if  present at all. This is understood as
being the result of  monopoly power in labour mar-
kets on the employers’ side, and efficiency wages.
When employers have market power in labour mar-
kets, i.e., when they have some flexibility as to how
much they pay their workers, they have an incentive
to pay lower wages and recruit fewer workers. A
well-chosen minimum wage rate can induce them
both to pay higher wages and to offer more jobs.
The efficiency wage argument is that when employ-
ers are forced to pay higher wages, they respond by
giving their workers better training, using them
more effectively, raising their productivity, or mak-
ing greater efforts to retain them longer. These fac-
tors are at work when the labour market is not a
textbook competitive perfectly-functioning market,
but one where there is imperfect competition and
information. Thus it appears that moderate mini-
mum wages can have a beneficial effect on the dis-
tribution of  earnings with no or very few offsetting
detrimental effects, and there is a strong argument
for countries having them.
However, there are discernible negative effects when
the minimum wage for prime-age workers (25–64) is
also applied to younger workers. In most countries the
minimum wage for younger workers is a fraction of
the prime-age rate. In the absence of a provision like
this, young workers can be squeezed out of jobs.
Sweden is an example where too little differentiation
by age increases youth unemployment. In Greece a
relatively high minimum wage with no allowance for
young workers has raised youth unemployment in the
past, but changes introduced in 2011 have begun to
remedy this. 
Table 3.5 
Minimum wage rates 
as a percentage of median wage rate 
Australiaa) 51.8 (47.7) 
Belgium 51.7 
Canada 45.0 
France 60.1 
Greece 42.9 
Ireland 52.9 
Japan 37.0 
Netherlandsb) 43.6 (47.1) 
New Zealand 59.1 
Portugalc) 48.0 (56.0) 
Spainc) 37.6 (43.8) 
United Kingdom 46.1 
United States 38.8 
a) Two estimates, one from LFS, other from 
Enterprise Survey. – b) Figure in parentheses in-
cludes 8% holiday supplement. – c) Figure in 
parentheses includes 2 months extra salary. 
Source: Report of UK Low Pay Commission, 2012, 
Table A3.2, data obtained from OECD min wage 
database and median earnings for full-time workers, 
mid 2012. 
3.3.4.5 The tax wedge
The tax wedge summarises the effects of employers’
and employees’ social security contributions, income
tax and other taxes on the percentage difference
between the amount received by workers and the gross
amount paid by firms. A high tax wedge reduces the
equilibrium employment rate and the structural
unemployment rate. The tax wedge in many European
countries has been high, and is often cited as a cause
of high structural unemployment. Table 3.6 gives
summary data for a number of OECD countries. Over
the twelve years before 2007, a number of countries
took steps to reduce the size of the tax wedge. Most
strikingly, Ireland reduced it from 26.8 in 1995 to
2.1 percent in 2007, having been able to cut tax rates
in a booming economy with buoyant public finances.
Both the United States and United Kingdom made
large reductions: the United States from 24.4 to
11.5 percent, the United Kingdom from 26.1 to
13.8 percent. Italy achieved a substantial reduction
from 44.9 to 32.8 percent, Germany a modest reduc-
tion from 37.3 to 32.4 percent, and Finland from
42.1 to 35.6 percent. However, in some European
countries the tax wedge increased in size, from 34.9 to
60.8 percent in the Netherlands. In most others the
size of  the wedge remained broadly unchanged.
Portugal, at 26.6 percent in 1997 and 23.6 percent in
2007, and Spain at 33.3 and 31.1 percent, do not stand
out as being particularly high relative to many other
European countries and are, indeed, close to the
OECD average. 
In the current recession it has been suggested that high
unemployment economies might reduce taxes on
employment (or social security contributions) and
shift taxation to indirect taxation like value-added tax
(VAT), which does not affect the size of the wedge.
This “fiscal devaluation” also promotes exports, as the
costs of producing exported goods are reduced by the
reduction in taxes on labour and not affected by the
increased VAT. For countries that need to regain com-
petitiveness in the euro area, this may be an attractive
strategy. Keen and de Mooij (2012) estimate that a
shift of around 1 percent of GDP from labour taxes to
VAT (achieved by a cut in labour taxes of around
2.7 percentage points and a roughly similar rise in the
VAT rates) can increase net exports by between 0.9 and
4 percent of GDP; a useful boost. This policy has been
proposed for Portugal and Greece, but was actually
implemented in France in 2012.
3.3.4.6 Trade unions and collective bargaining
The influence of collective bargaining is generally
thought to be in gradual decline, as old, highly
unionised industries in manufacturing and other pro-
duction industries decline, services become more
prevalent, technology and the nature of  work
changes, the gender balance in the workforce shifts,
and part-time work becomes more widespread.
Nevertheless collective bargaining remains important
in Europe. The OECD data in Table 3.7 show that
there has been considerable stability in unions and
bargaining arrangements. The coverage of collective
bargains has remained largely unchanged. The most
notable changes are the fall in Germany from 70 to
62.8 percent of the labour force, in Por tugal from
87 to 65 percent, and in Ireland from 60 to 44 percent.
The United States and United Kingdom stand out as
having low coverage of collective bargains, as well as
being the least corporatist countries, and having the
least coordinated bargaining arrangements, being
scored 1 (out of three) on corporatism and 1 (out of
5) on coordination, unchanged between 1997 and
2007. Some of the European countries have very cor-
poratist and coordinated bargaining (Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands
and Norway).2 Some countries are very corporatist,
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Table 3.6 
Tax wedges 
 1995 2007 
Austria 27.2 27.4 
Belgium 40.3 37.5 
Denmark 30.9 30.4 
Finland 42.1 35.6 
France 39.5 40.2 
Germany 37.3 32.4 
Ireland 26.8 2.1 
Italy 44.9 32.8 
Japan 13.1 23.0 
Netherlands 34.9 60.8 
Norway 24.4 28.5 
Portugal 26.6 23.6 
Spain 33.3 31.1 
Sweden 42.2 38.0 
United Kingdom 26.1 13.8 
United States 24.4 11.5 
OECD average 30.8 28.8 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2012,  
Table 2.A1.4, http://www.oecd.org/els/employment 
policiesanddata/EMo%202012_Chapter%202-
Annexes%202.A1%20and%202.A2.pdf. 
2 Very corporatist has been defined here as a country scoring a 3 on
the corporatism index, and very coordinated as scoring a 4 or 5 on
that index.
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but slightly less coordinated (Denmark and Finland),
while another group is only moderately corporatist
(France, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) and scores 2 on
the corporatism index, and between 2 and 4 on the
coordination index. 
How do collective bargaining arrangements affect the
workings of  labour markets? There is an argument
(Calmfors and Driffill, 1988) that highly decen-
tralised labour markets with weak unions produce
outcomes that do not differ greatly from a competi-
tive labour market, and for that reason are relatively
efficient. At the other end of  the scale, highly corpo-
ratist economies, with highly coordinated unions may
also produce good results because the unions,
although powerful, are large enough (“encompass-
ing”) to take account of  all the consequences of  their
actions. The problems arise in the intermediate situa-
tion, where corporatism and coordination are moder-
ate and unions nonetheless have a lot of  power. Here
unions are able to protect their own workers, but are
not large enough to take account of  the wider eco-
nomic and social consequences of  their actions. This
line of  thought goes back to
Mancur Olson (1982). In the
intermediate case, high unem-
ployment may emerge.
It is notable that Ireland, one of
the troubled periphery countries,
is among the most corporatist
and coordinated; indeed it is the
most corporatist and coordinat-
ed of  those listed in the
Table 3.7. It sits alongside
Germany and the Netherlands,
who are among the least trou-
bled countries of the EU core.
This may seem odd, but there are
similarities. Germany and the
Nether lands have both benefit-
ted from wage restraint and
greater competitiveness. Ireland
has also benefitted through the
1990s and 2000s from a series of
social pacts between unions,
employers and government,
which have also yielded wage
restraint and high employment.
Since 2008 after Ireland’s debt
problems began and unemploy-
ment shot up, cooperation
between the social partners has
allowed Ireland to adjust quickly, with deep cuts in
public sector pay and employment, private sector pay
cuts, and large tax increases. This cooperation has
mitigated the rise in unemployment. Indeed, at the
end of 2012 there were signs that unemployment has
stabilised and is beginning to fall. This has been
achieved with a remarkable degree of social harmony.
It stands in marked contrast to the slow pace of
adjustment and resistance to change in other troubled
periphery countries.
Germany’s cooperative industrial relations have been
the envy of British commentators since the 1960s,
when Germany’s productivity and competitiveness in
exports sustained strong current account surpluses
and growth. While wage determination in Germany
continued to be dominated for a long time by indus-
try-wide bargains between relatively powerful unions
and employer organizations, there has been growing
flexibility since the early 1990s, when early plans to
equalise wages between Western and Eastern parts of
Germany had to be tempered to accommodate the
economic problems of enterprises in the East. In 1993
Table 3.7  
Collective bargaining 
 Corporatisma) Coordinationb) Collective 
bargaining 
coveragec) 
 1995 2007 1995 2007 1995 2007 
Austria 3 3 4 4 96.1 99.0 
Belgium 3 3 5 4 96.0 96.0 
Czech Republic 1 1 2 2 65.3 44.0 
Denmark 3 3 3 3 84.0 80.0 
Finland 3 3 3 3 86.2 90.0 
France 2 2 2 2 91.0 90.0 
Germany 3 3 4 4 70.0 62.8 
Ireland 3 3 5 5 60.0 44.0 
Italy 3 3 4 4 82.0 80.0 
Japan 3 3 5 3 21.5 16.1 
Netherlands 3 3 4 4 86.2 83.2 
Norway 3 3 5 4 72.0 73.7 
Poland 1 1 1 1 42.0 38.0 
Portugal 2 2 3 3 87.0 65.0 
Slovakia  1 1 4 4 51.0 40.0 
Spain 2 2 3 4 87.6 85.3 
Sweden 2 2 3 3 94.0 91.0 
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 36.0 34.6 
United States 1 1 1 1 16.7 13.3 
OECD average 2 2 3 3 68.3 61.8 
a) Score range 1–3, where 1 represents countries with the lowest degree 
of corporatism. – b) Score range 1–5, where 1 represents countries with 
the least coordinated bargaining arrangements. – c) Measured in percent 
of the labour force. 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2012, Table 2.A1.4, 
http://www.oecd.org/els/employmentpoliciesanddata/EMo%202012_Chap
ter%202-Annexes%202.A1%20and%202.A2.pdf. 
 
a landmark settlement between the unions and
Volkswagen introduced deep cuts in working time and
pay in order to preserve employment. Competition
from Eastern Europe after 1989, with the prospect of
jobs being relocated to Poland and other states just to
the East of Germany, contributed to a shift in the bal-
ance of  power between social partners towards
employers. The influence of unions in Germany has
been in slow, but persistent decline. Whereas in 1996
union bargains covered 70 percent of the labour force
in Western Germany, by 2009 they covered only
55 percent; while for the East these figures are 57 and
40 percent respectively. The Hartz reforms also con-
tributed to the unions taking a less rigid approach.
Wages scarcely grew between 2001 and 2008 (Burda
and Hunt, 2011).
In contrast to Ireland and Germany, and indeed, to
other more corporatist and coordinated economies,
collective bargaining in Spain, Portugal and Greece
has contributed to high and volatile unemployment
and resistance to adjustment. Spain has had a system
of automatic extension of wage bargains to all firms
in the industry, of a particularly rigid form. Firms
have not been free to pay wages below those stipulat-
ed in collective bargains, or to employ workers for
fewer hours. This, combined with the strong protec-
tion of the employment of regular workers, has creat-
ed large scale unemployment among temporary work-
ers. Changes demanded by the troika of international
lenders have brought about reforms in this area
(Bentolila et al., 2011). Firms in distress are now
allowed to opt out of the wage set by the industry col-
lective bargain by reaching an agreement with their
workers, but only for a period of up to 3 years. Re -
forms enacted in June 2011 give firm-level agreements
precedence over industry-wide agreements, providing
the latter do not stipulate otherwise. 
Automatic extension of wage bargains has been the
rule in both Portugal and Greece, with similar results.3
It has sustained increasing (money) wage rates since
2008, despite growing unemployment. Combined with
EPL for regular employees, it has placed the burden of
job losses on temporary workers. 
3.3.4.7 Flexicurity
In the eyes of the OECD and the European Union,
flexicurity is a model of a successful bundling of labour
market institutions, which they are keen to promulgate.
Denmark and the Netherlands are currently its leading
examples. “Flexicurity refers to a combination of loose
employment protection legislation (EPL), generous
unemployment benefits and strong efforts on active
labour market policies (ALMPs).” (Koster et al, 2011). 
Reform of labour markets has often proved a slow and
controversial process because so many insiders stood
to lose from reforms that would have weakened their
grip on jobs and exposed them to greater competition
from outsiders (Saint-Paul, 2000; Thompson, 2009).
Flexicurity tries to buy off the potential losers from
reduced employment protection with the promise of
high aggregate employment, and therefore of good re-
employment prospects if  workers become unem-
ployed, continued generous benefits and vigorous
active labour market policies. This means training and
education for the unemployed to improve their re-
employment prospects, policies that tie generous bene-
fits to their availability for and active search for work,
and pro-active policies on the part of the authorities to
present unemployed persons with suitable vacancies
for which they must apply. Flexicurity aims to make
jobs more contestable, increase labour turnover, and to
allow firms to contract and expand more rapidly,
which should enable the economy to respond more
rapidly to shocks and changes in technology.
The Dutch have adopted a model similar to the
Danish, but one that is more reliant on combinations
of non-standard work, such as temporary agency
work and part-time work, with regular social security
rights (Koster et al., 2011).
It is interesting that while Denmark has achieved
good labour market outcomes, it does not stand out
in terms of  summary measures of  labour market ins -
titutions. However, as Andersen (2011) notes, Den -
mark spends by far the highest share of  GDP on
active labour market policies (1.9 percent). The un -
employed in Denmark are required to accept places
on education and training programmes and to follow
up job vacancies if  they wish to continue to receive
benefits.
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3 Portugal’s labour markets share some features of Spain’s. They are
described as highly inefficient, with poor institutions constraining
wage and productivity developments. Private sector real wages only
started to decline in 2011, supported by “widespread administrative
extension of collective agreements, long-lasting unemployment ben-
efits and pervasive labor market segmentation” (Pina and Abreu,
2012). Between 2007 and 2010 minimum wages increased by 5.3 per-
cent per year on average and there was another 2.1 percent increase
in 2011. Around 12 percent of all employees were on the minimum
wage in 2010. Portugal has, like Spain, a sharp divide between per-
manent and temporary jobs, with permanent jobs enjoying very
strong protection against dismissal, and temporary jobs very weak
protection. Bentolila et al. (2010) regard the segmentation of labour
markets into permanent and temporary jobs with differing amounts
of employment protection as a particularly serious problem, and
believe that ending this segmentation should be a policy priority.
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The recent rise in unemployment
in Denmark may cast doubt on
the strength of the case for flexi-
curity. Unemployment had fallen
to 3.4 percent in 2008, but has
risen to 8.0 percent in 2012 Q2,
while long-term unemployment
has risen from 0.5 in 2008 to
2.2 percent in 2012 Q1. Youth
unemployment rose from 5.3 per-
cent of the 15-24 year-old popula-
tion in 2007 to 9.8 percent in 2012
Q1 (see Figures 3.1–3.4). It is a
feature of a labour market in
which employment protection is
weak that unemployment should
rise sharply after a fall in demand
for goods. However, labour turn -
over remains relatively high and
there is a good flow out of unem-
ployment into work, limiting the
rise in long-term unemployment
and youth unemployment (An -
der sen, 2011). It appears that
some of the unemployment in -
crease in Denmark resulted from
the end of a boom in the con-
struction in dustry at the time of
the 2008 financial crisis, which
then in creased the impact of the
recession. 
The counterexample is the
United Kingdom, where despite
a steep fall in aggregate demand and GDP, and very
weak EPL, unemployment has risen remarkably little
since 2008. Of course, this has been helped by weak
unions, relatively low unemployment benefits, and
consequently flexible real wages. 
3.4 Youth unemployment
3.4.1 Education, employment, training, and inactivity
among young people
The data displayed in Section 3.2 indicate that young
workers have been hit more than adults by the recent
economic crisis (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011;
Scarpetta et al., 2010), and that the crisis is more seri-
ous in some countries than in others. Of course, the
alarming youth unemployment rates seen above are a
large percentage of relatively small labour forces: as a
fraction of the population in the same 15–24 age
range, the unemployed in early 2012 were 15.5 percent
in Greece, 20.0 percent in Spain, 11.0 percent in
Ireland, 13.6 percent in Portugal and 10.4 percent in
Italy. Since many youths are engaged in study or train-
ing schemes, and some of those that drop out of
schooling may not bother to engage in the search
activity that would classify them as unemployed,
NEET (not in employment, education, or training)
inactivity rates provide a better indication of youth
labour market problems.4
Figure 3.7 displays data, available only until 2010 for
the euro area countries discussed above. Since the
onset of the crisis, youth activity rates have deterio-
rated sharply in problem countries, in marked con-
trast with the stable or improving situation of
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4 For example, in the United Kingdom approximately one million
15–24 year-olds were unemployed in 2011, but over 1.4 million were
NEET, and both categories included some 400,000 more individuals
than at the 2001 cyclical low point (ACEVO, 2012).
Germany and its neighbours. To set the stage for our
analysis of how such differences may depend on insti-
tutions and policies, we focus in this section on the
remarkable divergence within Europe between
Germany and a number of nearby countries on the
one hand, and the “problem” economies on the other,
as regards these youth inactivity rates. 
Institutional features of the labour market play more
or less obvious roles in shaping youth employment
prospects. Legal or contractual minimum wages can
be set too high for the employment of young unskilled
workers to be profitable, contractual wage scales may
not allow suitable pay differences between young and
more experienced workers, and stringent employment
protection disproportionately increases the unem-
ployment rate of young workers (who will be seeking
their first job no matter how low the job finding rate
is) relative to that of older workers (who face similar-
ly difficult job-finding prospects, but are not as likely
to become unemployed when firing them is difficult).
For given labour market institutions, of course, the
overall cyclical conditions of the labour market (Bell
and Blanchflower, 2009) and the relative size of young
labour market entrant cohorts (Shimer, 2001) play the
larger role in determining both the overall and the
youth unemployment rates. Aside from demographic
dynamics, youth unemployment tends to be broadly
proportional to total unemployment along the cycle,
as well as across countries. Along the latter dimen-
sion, institutional features do appear to significantly
affect the level and cyclical sensitivity of youth unem-
ployment, which are relatively higher in more rigid
labour markets: labour market rigidity reduces both
unemployment inflows and outflows for mature
workers, with ambiguous implications for their unem-
ployment rates, but tends to leave young workers
unemployed in greater numbers, especially when hir-
ing rates are further reduced by recessions. 
When unemployment is the result of ongoing search
processes meant to match workers to suitable jobs
under imperfect information, there are good reasons
for youth unemployment to be higher than that of
older age groups. For youths, search has a larger
potential payoff and, inasmuch as they can rely on
family support rather than having to provide it, search
is less costly than in the case of older workers. The
involuntary unemployment that results from wage
and employment rigidities, conversely, can damage
the young workers on which it is concentrated more
seriously and permanently than older workers,
because any loss of employability has more important
implications for human capital when it occurs earlier
in life, and reduces earning over a longer remaining
career. To the extent that the latter mechanism is at
work, therefore, there is reason to worry about the
large and increasing inactivity rates of youths in the
European countries that were hit hardest in the crisis,
especially insofar as they reflect insufficient institu-
tional support for young people.5
The search-and-learn process underlying the relative-
ly high unemployment and frequent job transitions of
youth in the lightly regulated labour markets of
Anglo-Saxon countries may or may not be the most
effective way of matching people to the work that they
can do comparatively well, which is an essential ingre-
dient of any economic system’s productivity. Society
can support youth in that endeavour, and both labour
market institutions and educational systems differ
across countries in relevant ways. 
3.4.2 Education, vocational training and apprenticeships
Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Denmark have
maintained a highly successful dual education and
training system through apprenticeships. In all four
countries, over 40 percent of  young people who leave
school when it ceases to be compulsory take up
apprenticeships. These require around three years
training on the job with at least one day a week at a
vocational college (the Berufsschule), and lead to a
formal qualification which yields a “right to prac-
tice”, legally required to work in many occupations.
Employers can only offer young people jobs in a
recognised occupation under an approved training
contract. The Federal government, employers’ orga-
nizations, local chambers of  commerce, and trade
unions are all involved in and support the system.
The German system imparts not only job skills, but
many social skills, too. “Respect for authority, punc-
tuality, teamwork, and learning how to learn were all
fundamental to the employer’s decision as to
whether the apprentice was suitable to be taken on
for a given job.” In Germany, “The social partners –
employers, trade unions and politicians – combine
their resources to enable the transition from school
student to apprentice. They are also responsible for
approving the off-site VET curriculum, agreed
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5 Ha et al. (2010) suggest that higher youth unemployment may, in
fact, reflect age-biased changes in the structure of the welfare system:
in the United Kingdom, for example, youth unemployment had
already begun to increase in 2004, possibly as a result of the fact that
in the early 2000s the UK Employment Service shifted its focus away
from young people on Jobseeker’s Allowance, and towards Lone
Parents and Incapacity Benefits recipients.
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nationally and managed by the local chambers of
commerce, who also certify the skills achieved.”
(Steedman, 2001).
Britain is one of many countries where vocational
educational training (VET) is inadequate and disor-
ganised. The apprenticeship system does not work as
intended and Colleges of Further Education, which
provide vocational education, are the Cin derella of
the educational world. British apprenticeships before
the 1980s were five-year long “timeserving” prepara-
tions for young male workers’ entry into skilled man-
ual jobs, governed by custom and practice, and infor-
mal agreements between employers and unions. They
catered typically for only around 120,000 young peo-
ple per year, 80 percent of them male, and in the late
1980s numbers fell to 58,000. Since then there have
been repeated reorganizations with only modest suc-
cess. After being initially absorbed into the Youth
Training Scheme, which kept them alive despite its
variable quality, in 1986 they came under the frame-
work of  the Na tional Vocational Qualifications
(NVQs), and then the Modern Apprenticeship
scheme. While less successful than intended, the latter
had 279,700 apprenticeship starts in 2009/10. A per-
sistent problem is that employers have been margin-
alised in the design and operation of the scheme, and
the providers of training have incentives to make
schemes as short as possible. British employers have
remained suspicious of formal youth training schemes
and NVQ certificates, and prefer general educational
qualifications of a more academic kind like GCSEs
and A levels. British employers appear not to think
that VET contributes to productivity; they use educa-
tional achievements to sift potential employees, and
once employed, train them on the job. 
Hilary Steedman remains of the view that a good
apprenticeship scheme is important: “School- and
college-leavers in Britain desperately need the skills
and smooth transition to working life that apprentice-
ships provide. The economy desperately needs a more
highly-skilled workforce. More apprenticeships pro-
viding skills comparable to those in competitor coun-
tries can help achieve this.” However, despite the
United Kingdom’s ramshackle provision of appren-
ticeships and VET, youth unemployment, acquisition
of skills on the job, and the rate of return to the train-
ing that does occur are less disappointing than may be
feared. 
Ireland is in a similar position to the United Kingdom
from this perspective. Ireland had a traditional time-
serving apprenticeship system until 1991, when it was
replaced by a standards-based system.
Two countries with rather different systems are
Sweden and France. France provides full-time voca-
tional education in schools and colleges, rather than
on-the-job, and had 434,000 apprentices in 2008. In
the post-war period apprenticeship suffered from
political indifference, and sometimes hostility.
Recently there has been a revival, partly to fight
youth unemployment among the least qualified.
France, like the United Kingdom, looks to the
German system as a model. Sweden also has a
school-based education route for 16 to 19 year olds,
and has never had an apprenticeship system.
However, the Swedish model has clear failings. This
system does not make students “job ready” and leads
to high youth unemployment. Moreover, school-
based qualifications are not widely recognised in
industry. In building, for example, workers need to
do an additional apprenticeship by working in a firm
to obtain a qualification that employers recognise.
Thus Sweden introduced an apprenticeships system
in 2011, although it does not seem to be radically dif-
ferent enough from the existing model. “Leavers
from VET school, in particular early leavers, have
difficulty in finding a first job. Earnings differentials
are compressed and heavily regulated by collective
bargaining and wage structures do not normally
allow for young people to be paid a training
wage/lower wage on entering first employment.
Employment protection is also very strong, meaning
that employing a young person entails relatively high
costs and risks.” (Steedman, 2010). Both Sweden and
France appear to be moving towards the Germanic
system as a response to the perceived inadequacies of
their existing provision. 
These are a few examples, but vocational training and
apprenticeships in other European countries seem to
have similar problems. Portugal, Spain, Italy, and
Greece all have limited provision for training the less
academically able half  of the age cohort and smooth-
ing the transition from school to employment. 
Should the schooling system just equip youths to
engage in the labour market matching processes, or
should it steer them through the process of detecting
and acquiring skills suitable to specific jobs? As the
discussion above shows, different countries answer
this question in different ways. In Germany and its
neighbours (and in Japan), young people are assigned
to different tracks early in their school career. In these
countries vocational education prepares youths for
specific jobs and introduces them to the labour mar-
ket through administered apprenticeship contracts. In
Anglo Saxon countries, on the other hand, schooling
tends to be comprehensive, education is non-spe-
cialised until late in the school career, and flexible
wage and employment relationships allow for the
worker-financed accumulation of general on-the-job
learning, as well as for individual search-and-match-
ing processes of job allocation in competitive market
settings. 
Other countries display a mix of the two systems. In
some, the mix lies in-between the two extremes, with
some tracking, as well as some opportunities for in-
work training and sorting. In others, however, features
of the two systems are less appropriately mixed, as is
the case when ill-focused and uninformative schooling
is followed by would-be rigid work careers. This can
easily result in unemployment, and in the poor match-
ing of workers to jobs and of wage aspirations to pro-
ductivity. To fill the gap between school qualifications
and relatively rigid labour market relations, “non-
standard” and temporary contracts can be and have
been introduced that allow a degree of on-the-job
evaluation and learning. These are unsurprisingly
much more prevalent among young people than
among prime-age workers (in France, about 50 per-
cent of employed workers aged 15–24 are in tempo-
rary contracts, but only 10 percent of 25–54 year old
workers), and this figure varies considerably across
countries (ranging from 6.5 percent in Ireland to
66.3 percent in Spain).
In general, the choice between allocating youth to
vocational and academic tracks, or offering compre-
hensive education to all, depends on the extent to
which society believes individual talents are observ-
able early, and should be allowed to influence life out-
comes even when they reflect the luck of being born
to well-educated parents. 
The extent to which education and job search should
be publicly funded and organised depends on market
failures, especially the failure to provide accurate
information and adequate access to financial mar-
kets. Various approaches may be efficient, depending
on underlying characteristics, and no clear pattern
emerges from the data: the OECD’s Education at a
Glance finds no clear correlation between higher
VET participation levels and lower unemployment
rates among 15-29 year-olds, and only somewhat
weak evidence that participation in VET pro-
grammes is associated with lowering youth inactivity
levels.
It is clear that the pros and cons of  early specialisa-
tion depend on labour market characteristics that
differ over time, as well as across countries. The data
in Figure 3.7 show both cross-country differences in
the situation of  young people, which are to be inter-
preted in the light of  educational system characteris-
tics and development levels. Germany and its neigh-
bours already had low rates of  youth inactivity prior
to the crisis, even at a time when their overall unem-
ployment rate was relatively high; and changes dur-
ing the crisis period, reflecting the severity of  cyclical
developments and choices to remain in education. In
crisis-hit countries, youths stay in school longer: this
is explained by the lack of  employment options,
which were previously so plentiful as to give them
incentives to go into work at very early ages in coun-
tries like Ireland; but more youths also fall into the
not employed, not in education or training (NEET)
category, which is, of  course, very worrisome, as per-
sistent loss of  employability threatens an economy’s
pros pects of  recovery. In countries like Spain,
France, and Italy non-standard employment has
been an alternative to both searching for a job while
unemployed and apprenticeships. When schools are
not equipped to provide the labour market with suit-
able information, temporary contracts may provide
learning opportunities, much like apprenticeships.
However, they may also confine workers to the lower
segment of  a dual labour market and, as the figure
shows, leave them exposed to the brunt of  labour
demand shocks.
3.5 Labour market institutions and sensitivity to shocks
Differences in policies and institutions can give rise
to large cross-country differences in the overall
impact of  economic downturns on unemployment,
labour income and earnings inequality. The OECD
Em ployment Outlook 2012 uses evidence from firm-
level data to assess these effects in the context of  the
effects of  the recent downturn, and finds that strict
employment protection provisions for workers on
permanent contracts reduce the importance of  em -
ployment adjustment relative to working time and
wages, while more temporary work is associated with
more employment adjustment relative to working
time and wages. Coordinated wage-bargaining insti-
tutions can contribute to good structural perfor-
mance and labour market resilience. Coordination is
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important for achieving low structural unemploy-
ment rates, and mitigating the effects of  shocks by
facilitating adjustments to wages or working time.
Institutional settings that favour the use of  tempo-
rary employment contracts, such as stringent
employment protection for regular workers are asso-
ciated with both weaker structural outcomes and less
labour market resilience.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the OECD concludes that
policies and institutions that are conducive to good
structural labour market outcomes also tend to be
good for labour market resilience, where “good”
structural outcomes are low unemployment rates
(rather than, for example, low income inequality), and
the policies and institutions conducive to them are
those advocated by the OECD’s revised Job Study
strategy. However, that tendency
is not as strong as one might
hope.
The large dispersion of unem-
ployment rates across countries
in the aftermath of  the crisis
shock reflects not only differ-
ences in institutional structures,
but also the different intensities
of that shock. In practice, the
countries with the highest unem-
ployment increases and final lev-
els in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are also
those experiencing the worst
banking and sovereign debt prob-
lems. Employment tended to be
more fragile, and unemployment
more concentrated in youth and other secondary seg-
ments of the labour market, in the same countries that
turned out to be ill-prepared to withstand negative
financial shocks. To a large extent, un employment
developments in fact mirror the different severity of
the crisis in the various countries.
It turns out that the countries that have suffered the
largest post-crisis increases in unemployment were
those that had enjoyed the largest pre-crisis increas-
es in employment (Figure 3.8). Some countries
appear to have been much more volatile than oth-
ers. Labour markets like that of  Spain, which had
enjoyed the largest deregulation-driven employ-
ment gains, unsurprisingly suffered a major break-
down. Just as exceptional financial returns were
brought about by inconsiderate and unregulated
leverage, it is legitimate to won-
der whether the strong employ-
ment performances of  recent
years were just an illusion con-
jured up by labour market de -
regulation. Denmark fits this
pattern, to some extent, while
Ger many and its neighbours
stand apart from it. 
Figure 3.9 shows a positive rela-
tionship between the increase in
unemployment after the crisis
and the growth of unit labour
costs before it (which did not pre-
vent employment growth because
GDP growth was also relatively
strong).
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3.5.1 Germany
Thus the outstanding performance of the German
economy, which has staged a remarkable turnaround
since the 1980s (Möller, 2012) when the country was
the embodiment of eurosclerosis (Giersch, 1985), is
partly explained by the character of the macroeco-
nomic shocks that originated in the global economy
and had asymmetric implications within Europe. 
While flexibility and financial development became
liabilities for other economies, the manufacturing-
intensive export-oriented German economic system
proved able to withstand this particular crisis well. It
is possible that Germany performed strongly in the
crisis, and poorly before it, not due to its reforms,
but because of  the financial and services character of
the crisis, in the context of  which (unreformed) tem-
porary layoff  programs and a strong manufacturing
export orientation made it possible for the country
to limit employment losses and to recover quickly as
emerging countries restarted importing. Never -
theless, German unemployment has continued to fall
since 2008, partly due to the successful restraint of
money wage growth by employers and unions, and
partly due to the successful system of  apprentice-
ships and VET. As well as the overall low unemploy-
ment rate, youth unemployment has also remained
low.
3.5.2 Italy
Passive short-work and temporary layoff  measures
(Kurzarbeit and Cassa integrazione guadagni in
deroga) have subsidised per manent employment
relationships not only in Germany, but also in Italy.
Firm-side financial problems have more inefficient
implications if  they lead to permanent severance of
“solvent”, but illiquid employment relationships. In
other countries, the crisis triggered massive expendi-
ture on income and job-search support to perma-
nently displaced workers. To understand which of
these policy responses was the most appropriate, one
needs to assess whether the shock was just a mani-
festation of  financial difficulties and temporary
aggregate demand shortages, or instead called for
permanent restructuring and reallocation in specific
countries. Italy’s technocratic government has out-
lined a sweeping set of  reforms. These reforms aim at
reducing labour market duality, introducing flexibil-
ity in regular contracts at the same time as non-stan-
dard contracts are phased out, and funds previously
used to finance German-style on-the-job temporary
layoffs are channelled towards universal unemploy-
ment insurance.6 Much as flexibility could improve
labour market efficiency in a less troubled situation,
limiting temporary employment opportunities and
making it easier to dismiss workers for economic rea-
sons is likely to be destabilising in a crisis situation,
where the only jobs that might be created would be
temporary, and fear of  dismissals may encourage
employed workers to perhaps work harder, but cer-
tainly to spend less.
3.5.3 Spain and Portugal
Other countries have sought a way out of  high
unemployment by allowing employers to offer tem-
porary contracts to new workers, while retaining
strong protection for existing permanent jobs. As
the experiences of  Spain and Portugal show, this
strategy has proved less successful. It has created a
bifurcated labour market, with marked differences
between insiders and outsiders. In countries where
the institutional school-to-work process is not suffi-
ciently developed, temporary employment may sub-
stitute apprenticeships as a chance for young work-
ers to learn “on-the-job” and for employers to train
a young labour force. However, in countries that
introduced labour market flexibility on the margins,
deregulating temporary employment without
chang ing employment protection legislation for
standard regular workers, the employment impact
of  the crisis was strong and biased against young
workers. 
3.5.4 Greece
In contrast to the German experience of  a fortunate
constellation of  economic shocks favourable to its
industrial structure and labour market institutions,
Greece has suffered a large fall in demand, which has
instead exposed the weaknesses of  its industrial
structure and institutions. Labour force participa-
tion is low, and employment (as a fraction of  the
population) is low; while unemployment, noticeably
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6 Italy introduced a degree of flexibility at the margins of the labour
market with its introduction of non-standard contracts in 1997, fol-
lowed up by a 2000 law relaxing regulation of part-time employment,
and by 2001 deregulation of fixed-term contracts. These changes
made it possible to create “atypical” dependent jobs alongside the
formally self-employed Collaborazione coordinata e continuativa
employment relationships. Wage moderation prevailed in Italy
between the early 1990s and euro area accession. During this period
the pre-set planned inflation rate was ex post lower than actual infla-
tion throughout Italy’s disinflation, so that real wages did not keep
up with productivity (and employment grew, along the labour
demand curve). 
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long-term, youth, and structural unemployment, is
high.7 While public spending falls and taxes rise,
other austerity measures and the global recession
account for much of  the problem, a substantial part
of  it is structural. Productivity in Greece has caught
up with the euro area average since 1995, but nomi-
nal wages have grown faster, and unit labour costs
have risen.8 This has contributed to the decline in
private sector employment in tradable goods and the
rise in public sector employment. Wage bargaining
arrangements, employment protection measures, the
benefits system, pensions, access to professions, and
education and training have all contributed to these
trends.
Greece’s neo-corporatist system of extended collective
agreements, in operation since the 1930s, provides the
main floor under wages (Anagnostopoulos and
Siebert, 2012). The two main union federations are
still funded by the state. An annual National General
Collective Agreement (NGCA), supplemented by var-
ious sectorial agreements, sets a national minimum
wage for private sector employees. 
While union membership is low (24 percent of
employees in 2008), coverage of bargains is high, bar-
gaining at the industry and sector level predominates,
and there has been a system of extension of bargains
to all firms in the sector. Local or firm-level variations
were (until 2010) only allowed to raise wages above
the industry-wide bargain. Moreover, firm-level
agreements were only allowed for the small fraction of
firms with over 50 employees, and were actually used
by only a fifth of the latter. A system of arbitration to
which trade unions have privileged access has
strengthened their position.9
In so far as change has occurred, it has done so under
pressure from the European Union and the troika of
international lenders. Changes in laws made in
December 2010 have enabled greater flexibility. Firms
and their workers are allowed to agree to lower wages
than stipulated by the sectorial agreements, although
the wages agreed in a national labour collective agree-
ment still set a floor. The procedures for mediation
and arbitration have been rebalanced to give both
employers and workers a voice. 
Until 2010, a relatively high minimum wage discour-
aged the employment of  young workers (below 25).
Changes in legislation in 2010 effectively allowed a
lower wage for them (84 percent of  the basic wage
agreed at the national level), and one-year appren-
ticeships for youths aged between 15 and 18 years
with wages at 70 percent of  the minimum wage were
introduced. More changes made in 2011 have
allowed anyone between 18 and 25 to be employed on
fixed-term contracts for up to 24 months at a wage
that is 20 percent below the applicable collective
agreement, whether national or sectorial. The OECD
regards this as a step in the right direction, i.e.
towards cutting youth unemployment, whose effects
on hardship can be partly cushioned by Greece’s
extended family networks. However, they argue that
it needs to be linked to the provision of  more train-
ing to improve skills. 
At the same time, employment protection legislation
was relaxed in 2010. Firms now need to give only six
months’ notice of dismissal for white collar workers
with 28 or more years of service, as opposed to
24 months previously, and can pay in instalments.
Collective dismissals are defined less restrictively; pro-
bationary periods are allowed to be longer, and work-
ers can be employed on temporary contracts for
longer (36 months as opposed to 24). 
3.5.5 The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom was hit by a large fall in aggre-
gate demand in 2008. GDP fell substantially, and was
still several percentage points below its peak even at
the end of 2012. Unemployment has risen very little,
from around 5.5 in 2008 to 8 percent at the end of
2012. Employment actually rose during this period.
Commentators have puzzled at the implied fall in pro-
ductivity. There are several factors at work here. One
is the depreciation of the pound against the euro in
2008 and 2009, which created inflation and has
allowed real wages to fall, while nominal wages con-
tinued to rise very slowly. Weak unions were unable to
negotiate significant wage increases. Increasingly
7 Overall employment was roughly 60 percent of the 15–64 age group
in 2008, versus around 65 percent for the OECD and the euro area.
For young workers aged 15–24 it was roughly 20 percent, compared
with roughly 40 percent in the euro area, for women it was around
60 percent and for older workers aged 55–64 it was around 40 per-
cent. The OECD put structural unemployment, measured by its esti-
mate of the NAIRU, at 10 percent in 2010. Actual unemployment
was over 12 percent of the labour force in 2010 (OECD Economic
Surveys: Greece 2011) and had reached approximately 25 percent by
the end of 2012. 
8 Unit labour costs grew at around 7 percent per annum between
1995 and 1999, versus around 1 percent in the euro area on average;
and grew at 4 percent, versus 2 percent in the euro area from 2000 to
2008. They subsequently fell to 1.5 percent per annum in 2009–10,
compared with 0.5 percent in the euro area. However, this leaves a
substantial fall in competitiveness over the whole period from 1995.
9 “Frequent recourse to arbitration, despite low union density, im -
plies that a small number of insiders can influence wages for much
larger groups, making negotiations less responsive to market needs.”
(OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 2011, p. 115).
meagre unemployment and other social security ben-
efits encouraged pay deals that allowed reductions in
working hours to preserve jobs. 
The Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), which was intro-
duced in October 1996 as a reform of the UK system
of unemployment compensation, increased the rate
at which claimants left unemployment, but not
because they found jobs; and the JSA did not do
much to improve their long-term career prospects
either (e.g. Petrongolo, 2009). Since 1996, the UK
government has further reduced welfare support to
the unemployed (with the notable exception of  the
various New Deals introduced by the New Labour
Gov ernment). The interplay between reformed
labour market institutions and the severity of  the cri-
sis may explain why there have been signs of  conflict
and social unrest in the United Kingdom and several
other European countries, with some similarity to
social and economic developments in European
countries between the wars. 
While the United Kingdom adopted a laissez-faire
approach in its employment reactions to the crisis,
notably refraining from raising modest unemploy-
ment benefits (indeed, they have been further cut
back), Sweden has adopted a proactive approach
aimed at restoring full employment through incentives
for employers and the reduction of payroll taxes for
those who hire, while trying to cushion the social
effects of unemployment by relaxing the qualifying
period for unemployment insurance. 
3.6 Conclusions
3.6.1 General considerations
Over the course of time several different countries
have jostled for pole position in the “good labour
market” stakes (Bertola et al., 2002, discuss reversals
of fortunes from the 1970s to the 1990s). Denmark’s
institutions and reforms looked very good before the
current crisis, but its unemployment rate increased by
a disturbingly large amount during the crisis. The
Hartz reforms introduced in Germany’s labour mar-
ket created a lightly regulated, low-wage segment very
similar to that enabled by Spain’s and Italy’s earlier
reforms. This suggests that success might be partly
due to good luck, as well as to good policies. Reforms
should not be undertaken lightly and should not sim-
ply imitate past successes, which are no guarantee of
future successes. They need to proceed cautiously,
taking account of local circumstances.
Structural labour market problems must be addressed
by reforms that reconcile the security, efficiency, and
fiscal aspects of labour market policies. To be fruitful,
reforms need to understand what policies and institu-
tions do in different contexts.
The crisis calls for two types of policy reactions.
Firstly, it requires policies that foster structural
adjustments to persistent and potentially permanent
shocks, such as those that call for shrinkage of
finance, retail distribution, and construction in coun-
tries that need to develop a manufacturing export
base. Lower wages are needed in some countries and
are easier to achieve than higher labour productivity. 
Secondly, policy reactions should focus on the impact
of aggregate demand shortages and private and public
financial confidence problems. Immediately prior to
the crisis, increasing oil prices and a weakening euro
were reasons to worry about second-round inflation-
ary pressures from collective wage bargaining, and it
was comforting to find evidence that deregulation, de-
unionization, and international and product market
competition helped increase employment flexibility
and keep wage reactions in check, as suggested by the
empirical results of Bertola et al. (2012). In other
words, labour market flexibility can be destabilizing in
a crisis, and not positive. As with fiscal policy, medi-
cines that are beneficial from a longer-run perspective
can be detrimental if  hastily administered in the midst
of a low-confidence, high-uncertainty situation. Care
has to be taken as regards the impact and short-run
effects of labour market reforms; and it is important
that these reforms should be credibly durable. Active
labour market policies and unemployment benefit
reductions are much more attractive and politically
acceptable at times of plentiful tax revenues and
expanding labour demand than during a recession.
From every viewpoint country-level coordination and
political cohesion proved much more important dur-
ing the crisis than in the years prior to it, when shocks
were mostly at the regional or sector level. 
Tripartite wage agreements and public sector wage cuts
could make important contributions to success in the
face of country-specific issues in problem countries, as
they did for many of those same countries on the path
to EMU. However, the crisis has created severe politi-
co-economic tensions both within crisis-hit countries
and at the European level. Policy coordination at the
European Union level would obviously be desirable,
because while labour mobility across jobs and occupa-
tions is beneficial, cross-country labour mobility may
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contribute to crisis dynamics: if Greek workers migrate
to Germany, they may relieve the Greek social security
system of the need to pay their unemployment benefits,
but certainly deprive it (and Greek pensioners) of their
contributions. Unfor tunate ly, European coordination
of labour market policies is even more obviously polit-
ically difficult in the current situation. While small
Baltic countries may be able to reform and implement
massive internal devaluations, within larger countries
reform efforts may worsen already critical political sit-
uations, because labour market policies are politically
divisive and economically difficult. Throughout histo-
ry, income distribution and risk sharing issues have
always been addressed by collective schemes with a mix
of administration, authority, and social pressure. Such
schemes always were, and still are, at work for individ-
uals in families, and for families in local communities.
They were implemented at the national level in the con-
text of the commercial and industrial revolutions that
made Europe rich. Currently, the political cohesion
needed to support them is weak within nations, not
only in crisis-stricken countries such as Spain (where
Catalonia would like to be freed of its obligations), but
also in the United Kingdom (where cutting social ben-
efits is widening the divide between rich and poor, caus-
ing urban minorities to feel oppressed, and strengthen-
ing the cause of Scottish separatism), and even in
Germany as the political appeal of supporting Eastern
federal states fades. It is even weaker at the European
level, where it would be most useful if, as is likely, har-
monised labour market regulation needs to accompany
market integration.
3.6.2 Some specific suggestions
Notwithstanding the cautionary notes and general
principles set out above, some aspects of policy in
some countries stand out as strong candidates for
(further) attention:
• The two tier labour markets that have emerged in
Spain, Portugal, Greece, and to some degree Italy,
have thrown the burden of job cuts onto a particu-
lar segment of the labour market, those individuals
on temporary contracts. Meanwhile, the heavily
protected workers in regular jobs feel little pressure
from the existence of many unemployed persons to
moderate wage claims or change working practices
to increase productivity. Changes are taking place,
but more needs to be done to reduce, if  not elimi-
nate, the distinction. The amount of job protection
enjoyed by workers should depend on their length
of service in the job, and should be set at a level
that balances the interests of current and future
workers and employers.
• When severance cases are tested in the courts, with
long delays and great uncertainty as to the outcome,
the administration of EPL is highly inefficient.
There is a good case for removing employment dis-
putes from the courts and instituting tribunals and
arbitration procedures to deal with them more
quickly, cheaply, and with greater certainty.
• The automatic and legally enforced extension of
wage bargains to all firms in an industry or sector
in a number of countries has contributed to wages
not responding to labour market conditions,
inflexibility and high unemployment. It can give a
small group of workers excessive influence over
pay and employment in an industry. Legal provi-
sions that support this practice need to be careful-
ly reconsidered.
• Many European countries need to develop better
arrangements for vocational education and train-
ing. Apart from Germany, Austria, and Switzer -
land, provision for roughly half  of the age cohort
that does not go to universities has been neglected,
contributing to higher than necessary youth unem-
ployment. 
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US PRECEDENTS FOR EUROPE
4.1 Introduction
The discussion of  European integration – both in the
past and in the future – has largely been driven by
analyses of  how precedents on the other side of  the
Atlantic have worked. At the highest political level,
such reflection concerns the constitution, with the
US precedent encouraging European leaders to con-
template (rather unproductively to date) the possibil-
ity of  drafting a European constitution. At the time
of  US independence in 1776, the thirteen former
colonies were widely thought of  as independent and
sovereign entities; and Americans did not want the
United States simply to be another conventional
state like France or Britain. The US constitution was
not drawn up until 1787, and was really only com-
pleted in 1791 with the Bill of  Rights. Modern
European attempts to follow the eighteenth century
US constitutional path were suspended after the pro-
posed constitutional treaty was rejected in referenda
in France and the Netherlands in the summer of
2005. That was not, however, the end of  the discus-
sion. In the wake of  the financial crisis, some –
including Chancellor Merkel – suggested that, in the
long run, a new constitutional settlement is the only
acceptable way of  defining the claims and obliga-
tions of  member states. This is a convincing argu-
ment. If  the path laid out in this section – whereby
monetary union is followed by the development of
some measure of  fiscal federalism – were to be taken,
a constitutional solution laying out clearly the extent
and limits of  European member states' commitment
would be an essential condition.
The aftermath of  the recent financial crisis has
prompted another sort of European reflection on how
a workable federal fiscal system arose in the United
States. Again, this system was not introduced until
1790, some fourteen years after the Declaration of
Independence. Fiscal federalism actually took much
longer to work its nation-building magic. It was not
until the middle of the nineteenth century that “the
United States is” became the accepted grammatical
form (rather than “the United States are”). The feder-
al state did not expand beyond a rather modest peace-
time share of 3 percent of GDP until the middle of
the twentieth century. Strikingly, that ratio of 3 per-
cent was the size of the EU budget envisaged by
European Commission President Jacques Delors at
the time of the Maastricht Treaty, at a moment when
the actual size of the budget was the 1 percent that it
remains today.
Those who (like Jacques Delors) would like to see
Europe moving in a federal direction see the long (and
often tumultuous) development of the United States
as a precedent. But is this development a helpful
example or a grim warning? Each episode in the cre-
ation of a modern federal US state offers analogies to
the painful and politically contentious road to
European integration.
This chapter investigates two of the most widely
debated aspects of US fiscal and financial integration:
(1) the responsibility of the federation for state-level
debts and for the creditworthiness of states; and (2)
the working of a federal central bank. Today’s fiscal
federalism in the United States is relatively robust, but
the road from 1790 was rocky; and the first two
decades of the Federal Reserve as rife with monetary
mistakes as the first fifteen years of the European
Central Bank. 
4.2 Assumption of state debts
The search for a solution to Europe’s post-2008
debt crisis has awakened European interest in
American precedents for federal finance. As a
result, Alexander Hamilton has become the hero of
contemporary Europe. Hamilton’s 1790 negotiation
of  a federal assumption of  the high levels of  state
debt in the aftermath of  the War of  Independence
looks like a tempting model for European states
groaning under unbearable debt burdens. It was
cited as a helpful precedent in Thomas Sargent’s
Nobel Prize acceptance speech (2011) and, for
example, in the annual report of  the German
Council of  Economic Advisors (2011). The back-
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ground to the assumption was a no-blame principle.
The thirteen states had not been responsible for the
poor fiscal performance, which was deemed a con-
sequence of  the external circumstances of  the War
of  Independence. After all, much of  the debt result-
ed from financing the war against Britain, and it
was more or less a matter of  chance in which state
that war was waged and consumed financial re -
sources. 
Hamilton’s eventually successful proposal for the
assumption of  state debt accumulated due to the
War of  Independence was certainly a decisive initial
step in the creation of  a real union – and it accom-
panied the constitutionalisation of  the American
experiment. This assumption, however, did not pro-
duce a responsible system of  state finance, and dur-
ing the half  century that followed there were numer-
ous state-level defaults and a debate about new debt
assumptions and/or new ways of  blocking state
indebtedness. The irresponsibility of  individual
states also gravely damaged the reputation of  the
federal government and made external borrowing
prohibitively expensive.
Hamilton argued – against James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson – that the war debt accumulated by
the states in the War of Independence should be
assumed by the federation. There were two sides to his
case, one practical, the other philosophical. Initially
the most appealing argument was that a federal
takeover of war-related state debt was an exercise in
providing greater security, and thus reducing interest
rates from the 6 percent at which the states funded
their debt to 4 percent. This was the practical side.
Hamilton emphasised the importance of a commit-
ment to sound finance as a prerequisite to public
economy. “When the credit of a country is in any
degree questionable, it never fails to give an extrava-
gant premium upon all the loans it has occasion to
make.” Reduced borrowing costs and a lower drain on
resources arising from the need to service debt would
allow the state governments to “furnish new
resources,” to uphold public order and to protect the
security of the Union against foreign attacks. There
would be concrete benefits, accruing “to every mem-
ber of the community.” Land values would increase
from their post-war lows. 
The historical case of the United States looks like an
attractive precedent for today's Europe, where propo-
nents need to sell a solution as holding out gains for
both debtors and creditors.
As for the philosophical side, Hamilton also insisted
on a stronger reason for following good principles
than merely the pursuit of expediency. There existed,
he stated, “an intimate connection between public
virtue and public happiness.” That virtue consisted of
honouring commitments. Extended to a political
body, it would build solidarity. Those principles made
the fiscal union what he called “the powerful cement
of our Union” (Hamilton, 1790). The promise to hon-
our obligations had already been clearly set out dur-
ing the War of Independence as a foundation of a new
American identity: in Congress’s address to the states
of April 18, 1781, it had stated that: “A bankrupt,
faithless Republic would be a novelty in the political
world, and would appear, among reputable nations,
like a common prostitute among chaste and reputable
matrons.”
The state debt of around 25 million US dollars at this
time was smaller than the federal debt, also incurred
almost entirely as a result of the war, which consisted
of 11.7 million US dollars of foreign-owned federal
debt (on which at that time default was unthinkable)
and 40.4 million US dollars of domestically-owned
debt. To put these figures into context, a modern esti-
mate of GDP in 1790 is 158 million US dollars (see
Mitchell, 1983).
The condition for success in the American case was
that the Union raised its own revenue, initially mostly
through new excises and federally administered cus-
toms houses. The logic of a need for specific revenue
also applies in modern Europe, where the sources of
funding for bank rescues or for a recapitalization fund
should be clearly spelled out. This consideration has
produced an initiative to impose a small levy or tax on
financial transactions. In the longer term, and after
the foundation of a common state with a common
army, parliament and government, the analogy with
Hamilton’s system would require a more extensively
reformed fiscal system that might include a common
administration of customs or of value added tax (with
the additional benefit in both cases of eliminating a
great deal of cross-border fraud).
Would an expansion of European federal fiscal capac-
ity represent a massive transfer of power from mem-
ber states to EU authorities? It is significant that the
1790 assumption of state debt occurred in the context
of an understanding that federal powers should be
few and limited. In Federalist paper 46, James
Madison had made it clear that central authority
should be carefully circumscribed, and had concluded
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that: “The powers proposed to be lodged in the feder-
al government are as little formidable to those
reserved to the individual states, as they are indis-
pensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the
Union.” (Madison, 1788).
There were two problems with the Hamilton propos-
als, both of  which gave rise to immediate and violent
political controversy. Firstly, state debt had been
extensively traded on a secondary market at a deep
discount. Relatively few of the original purchasers,
who had acted out of  patriotism, still held the debt;
instead, the debt had been bought up by speculators
– financial intermediaries – who hoped that some-
thing like the Hamilton scheme might be realized. A
settlement that imposed no haircut and treated the
debt at nominal value would, in effect, reward specu-
lation. James Madison disliked the idea of  what
would effectively constitute a subsidy for Northern
financiers. However, Hamilton argued that any dis-
crimination between creditors based on the moment
when they had bought debt would represent a breach
of contract.
Secondly, some states had already made great efforts
to pay off  their wartime debt and would not benefit
from the federal bailout. Virginia and Maryland in
particular had largely paid off  their debts, and the
Virginian representatives in Congress consequently
pressed for a precise calculation of the level of state
debt outstanding (Mitchell, 1962, p. 70). Madison, in
particular, pressed for a compensation for states that
had already discharged their debt. Politically, a
straight forward debt assumption was unworkable.
Initially, assumption was rejected by Congress, with
potentially catastrophic consequences. Thomas
Jefferson, who was opposed to the Hamilton propos-
al, wrote to his fellow Virginian James Monroe about
the possibility of  failure as Congress was split.
“Unless they can be reconciled by some compromise,
there will be no funding bill agreed to, our credit will
burst and vanish, and the states separate” (Mitchell,
1962, p. 81). 
Eventually the Union was bought, at a price, and
there was a compromise. Since the financial arrange-
ment favoured the Northern states, the South and its
landed elite needed symbolic, as well as practical com-
pensation. There were financial clauses that limited
the liability of the Southern states. The exposure to
the common liability of Virginia, the most politically
powerful state in the Union, was limited with a ceil-
ing. Only this inducement moved Madison to drop his
opposition and agree to assumption. However, there
was also a symbolic and political concession. The his-
toric compromise also led to the capital being moved
to the new site of Washington, on the border of Vir -
ginia and Maryland, rather than staying in Phila -
delphia. Some states, such as Georgia, opted out of
the assumption.
4.3 Problems of state debt
The US experiment in federalized finance was not
immediately successful from the point of view of dri-
ving economic growth in the young republic. Two
important parts of Hamilton’s financial architecture
were not realized at all, or only imperfectly. He pro-
posed a model of joint stock banking on a national
scale, which ran into immediate opposition, and
which, curiously, was much more influential in
Canada than in the United States. Secondly, the pro-
posal for a national central bank, based on the model
of the Bank of England, was eventually blocked by
political opposition. The charter of the First Bank of
the United States was allowed to lapse in 1811; then,
one generation later, the charter of the Second Bank
of the United States was successfully opposed by
Andrew Jackson after 1832.
The fiscal side did not bring long-lasting relief  either.
Yields on US government debt fell immediately,
showing the new confidence produced by the debt
arrangement. By the beginning of  1792, they had
fallen to 4.6 percent; but the cost of  borrowing sub-
sequently rose sharply again (see Figure 4.1). Neither
did the Hamiltonian scheme of federal finance guar-
antee a peaceful commonwealth in the longer term.
The immediate consequence of  the new excise was a
revolt in Pennsylvania (the Whiskey Rebellion of
1794 and four years later the Fries Rebellion). In the
longer run states were divided over the shape of  tar-
iffs, which Southern states saw as disadvantageous to
them since they relied on cotton exports and the
import of  British manufactures. In fact, the fiscal
union turned out to be dynamite, rather than cement,
because the tariff  dispute turned into a constitution-
al struggle by the 1830s in which Southern states
claimed that the Constitution was merely a treaty
between states and that the Southern states could
ignore federal laws that they deemed to be unconsti-
tutional. The fiscal mechanism designed to allow ser-
vicing of  a common liability raises inherently explo-
sive distributional issues.
The distributional consequences between states of a
fiscal mechanism would also be a potentially divisive
mechanism in contemporary Europe. The most popu-
lar suggestions currently under discussion are a gen-
eral financial transactions tax, which would fall heav-
ily on major financial centres (and for this reason is
resolutely blocked by the United Kingdom); or a
European payroll tax, which would raise problems of
different implementation and coverage in the various
European states. 
The fiscal union was also dangerous because it
allowed states to recommence their borrowing. As
with the dispute over the tariff, this problem became
very apparent in the 1830s. As international capital
markets developed in the first decades of  the nine-
teenth century, American states used their new-
found reputation to borrow on a large scale, and
ruined their creditor status fairly quickly as a result.
At first, the North American states looked to
British banks and investors as more appealing
debtors than the newly independent South
American republics, which merely wanted to borrow
in order to buy weapons. Agents of  the American
states swarmed over Europe in order to sell their
debt. A key part of  the argument for the foreign
investors was that the American state borrowing
was sanctioned and approved by the US govern-
ment. A characteristic statement was that of  the
London Morning Chronicle in 1839 and 1840 that:
“Persons desirous of  investing money in any of  the
principal American securities will find on inquiry
that we have never over-rated the honour and good
faith which have always been shown by the United
States government.” Even “the
newest and smallest states” were
satisfactory for Washington
(McGrane, 1933, p. 677).
In addition, the difficulties of the
states became acute due to bank-
ing issues. In the longstanding
conflict about the Hamiltonian
concept, President Andrew Jack -
son launched a Bank War, in the
course of which he vetoed the
renewal of  the charter of  the
Second Bank of  the United
States, but also encouraged the
establishment of  other banks.
The result was successful in
achieving Jackson’s immediate
objective, in that it decentralized
credit. However, the new banks subsequently immedi-
ately started to expand their lending, above all to the
states and the political elites that had facilitated their
establishment. The upshot was an orgy of bank cred-
it to individual states, often structured in a complex
way so that debt securities could be repackaged and
sold on foreign markets.
When in 1841 the first state, Mississippi, reneged on
its debt, disingenuously claiming that its law allowing
state bond issuance had been unconstitutional, the
major British bank involved in the issuance of
American state debt in London, Barings, counselled
against a panic response: “Is it wise for this single
instance of dishonesty in a remote and unimportant
state to endeavour to brand the whole of the United
States as wanting in good faith? We think not.”
(McGrane, 1933, p. 683). But the foreign creditors
also tried to push the US government into a new fed-
eral assumption of state debts, and the case was
actively pushed by the anti-Jacksonian party, the so-
called Whigs (while Jacksonian Democrats saw the
campaign as a conspiracy to get the American tax-
payer to bail-out individual states, but above all the
foreign creditors).
The practice of  default spread in 1841–42, with
Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Maryland, In -
diana, Illinois, Arkansas and Louisiana all announc-
ing their unwillingness or inability to pay. At this
time, a whole palate of  responses was contemplated,
ranging from the expulsion of  defaulters from the
Union to the repetition of  the Hamiltonian assump-
tion. The situation was so precarious because of  its
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international consequences: not just exclusion from
the European capital markets that were needed to
finance American development, but also a real secu-
rity threat. The federal government could not even
sell bonds yielding 6 percent, while – as the US
Treasury bitterly complained, “Nations with not a
tithe of  our resources, and with large public debts,
have been able to effect loans at 3 percent per annum”
(Bolles, 1885, p. 580). But the consequences of
default also included the risk of  international con-
flict, as Britain was widely thought to be willing to
use naval and military power to enforce credit claims.
In response to the danger of  military conflict with the
principle creditor country, Congressman John
Quincy Adams even introduced a proposal to make
the repudiation of  any debt to foreigners “a violation
of the Constitution of  the United States” and which
stipulated that any state involved in a war as a conse-
quence of  repudiation should cease to be a state of
the Union (Scott, 1893, p. 248–9).
Inevitably, the Hamiltonian option was floated again.
In 1843, a congressional committee recommended a
new assumption, on the grounds that the debts
incurred had been mostly to fund infrastructure,
which was, “calculated to strengthen the bonds of
Union, multiply the avenues of commerce, and aug-
ment the defences from foreign aggression” (Scott,
1893, p. 251). But this proposal was rejected, primari-
ly on moral hazard grounds: if  states were freed of
present debt, they would only be likely to get into debt
very quickly again. The measure also would have
imposed a clear and heavy cost on the non-indebted
states. The outcome of the 1840s debate was laissez-
faire: no federal intervention to punish defaulters, but
no bailout either.
The question of how the Union should respond to a
state default inevitably hinged on the degree of
responsibility of the defaulters. Subsequently, it was
sometimes claimed that the US crisis had come about
because of tightening credit conditions in Europe,
and especially due to interest rate hikes by the Bank of
England (Temin, 1969). Econometric analysis, howev-
er, shows that the surge in state yields in 1841–42
occurred first on the domestic US markets, and only
with a lag (due to the slow communications technolo-
gy at the time) on European exchanges (Kim and
Wallis, 2005).
There are strong parallels between the development of
American states in the 1830s and that of modern
Europe. The American states that borrowed most
heavily and then ran into problems were the less devel-
oped states that saw borrowing as a way of financing
development infrastructure, especially in transport.
The borrowing states were also keen to encourage the
development of domestic financial institutions in
order to stimulate growth and development. When
problems appeared, there could be a debate as to
whether they were due to external circumstances (a
crisis in the world’s financial centre, the United
Kingdom then, the United States now), or to a flawed
development strategy, or to governance problems and
corruption in both state governments and banks.
These issues were extensively debated in the 1840s,
and a contrast was drawn with the position of state
finances in the aftermath of the War of Independence.
In the case of the state defaults of the early 1840s, as
in that of  contemporary Greece, the problems
stemmed primarily from misguided policies, and can-
not be blamed on external circumstance, war or glob-
al crisis.
One generation after the era of defaults, in the 1860s,
the country was torn apart by the Civil War as a result
of what was largely a dispute about states’ rights and
about the character of financial burdens. In a bid to
end the immoral practice of  slavery, Abraham
Lincoln originally proposed that the slave-owners
should be compensated by the public purse. But such
a buy-out would have been unacceptably expensive for
the non-slave states. So in the end, the Virginians (and
the rest of the South) were expropriated by the Union
– at least that is the way they interpreted events. The
Civil War arose out of longstanding tensions between
the North and the South, and was largely driven by
Southern hostility to the revenue stream chosen to
service the federal debt (the Hamiltonian tariff, which
protected Northern manufacturers and penalized
Southern exporters), as well as by the deeply prob-
lematic issue of whether and how slave-owners might
be compensated for abolition.
A second wave of state defaults occurred in the 1870s
in the South (and in Minnesota), in the aftermath of
the Civil War and of Reconstruction. Some Southern
policy-makers – and the broader public – took as their
example the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which repudiated debts that had been
contracted in the interest of rebellion. Southerners
disliked the new debt incurred in the process of
Reconstruction – and all the more so since it was
owed to Northern creditors. In addition, interest pay-
ments had risen during the war and accrued interest
increased overall debt levels, while tax revenues had
collapsed. For the most severely affected of the states,
Arkansas, bonds were trading at 7 percent of their
nominal value by the end of  the 1870s (see
Figure 4.2). Unlike the defaults of the early 1840s, the
problems of a specific group of Southern states no
longer affected the cost of borrowing of other states
or of the United States.
The eventual solution lay in the adoption of debt
restraint or balanced budget laws. At the end of the
nineteenth century, many states set a very low ceiling
on permissible state debt, and other states limited
indebtedness to a (small) share of total taxation. Only
the Northern states (New Hampshire, Vermont,
Massachusetts, Connecticut and Delaware), which
had never really experienced the debt problem,
allowed their legislatures to contract unlimited debt.
By the early twenty-first century, such legislation lim-
its state indebtedness in all but one of the 50 states.
4.4 Federal central banking
How centralized should the operation of  a central
bank be? The early central banks – in Sweden,
England, and France – were unitary institutions that
corresponded precisely to unified and centrally
directed states, with a powerful capital that was also
the main financial centre. The models for federal
central banking came rather later, with Germany
(1875), Switzerland (1907) and the United States
(1914). Such a federal central bank required complex
rules to ensure that there was no direction by the fed-
eral government, and that policy operations reflect-
ed the diverse conditions of  a
federation.
The central banking side of the
US federal model, the Federal
Reserve System, has often been
held up as a model for the Eu -
ropean System of Central Banks.
Indeed the Federal Reserve had
an impact on the development of
European central banking in two
ways: firstly, indirectly, in its
influence on German central
bank design. Allied suggestions
on how to reform German cen-
tral banking and free it from its
previous dependence on the cen-
tral German state (the Reich)
drew on the US model and
shaped banking law during the allied occupation. The
Deutsche Bundes bank evolved out of a federal Bank
deutscher Länder. It retained that federal organiza-
tion, in which a board (Direktorium) met with region-
al heads of the Landes zent ralbanken in the policy-
making Bundes bank Council (Zentralbankrat).
Thanks to the Bun des bank’s successful policy, espe-
cially in providing for a greater degree of price stabil-
ity than any European central bank except for the
Swiss National Bank, the Bundesbank’s design, in
turn, heavily influenced the debate on the governance
and policy-orientation of  the future European
Central Bank (ECB). 
The US model also directly impacted the ECB's
design. When it came to designing European institu-
tions, European federalists also consistently looked
directly and explicitly to the American model. In the
1960s, the Vice-President of the European Com -
mission, Robert Marjolin, who had pushed for the
institutionalization of a Committee of ECB Gov -
ernors saw that body as the “embryo of a Community
Federal Reserve Board.” In 1970, German Economics
Minister Karl Schiller drew up a four stage plan for
increasing economic and monetary coordination,
which he believed would lead to a “sort of Federal
Reserve System.” The 1970 Werner Plan envisaged
two parallel Community “organs” as indispensable
for European stability: a centre of decision-making
for economic policy and a Community system for the
central banks. When in 1972, in accordance with the
Werner recommendations, a European Monetary
Cooperation Fund was established, its designers
talked ecstatically about it becoming a new Federal
EEAG Report 2013 100
Chapter 4
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879
Source: Scott (1893).
State bond prices
% of nominal value
New York
Pennsylvania
Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Alabama
Louisiana
Texas
Arkansas
Tennessee
Kentucky
Figure 4.2
EEAG Report 2013101
Chapter 4
Reserve, even although the new body had only very
limited routine tasks in practice. In the early 1990s,
the Federal Reserve System, and its relationship to
federal political authority in the executive and the leg-
islature, was conceived of as an explicit model for
European emulation. The European Commission, in
particular, liked to refer to the future ECB as a
“Eurofed” in the early 1990s (James, 2012).
Both the European Commission and the existing
national central bankers saw an attraction in the US
institutional model. The board or council of the cen-
tral bank had a permanent core, as well as some way
of securing an alternation of National Central Bank
(NCB) representatives analogous to that of  the
Federal Reserve districts, whose presidents all attend,
but do not all vote in the Open Market Committee
(there is a rotating voting system, for all except the
president of the New York Bank). Since at the time of
drawing up the ECB draft statute and negotiating the
Maastricht Treaty it was unclear how many countries
would initially participate in the monetary union (and
that number might have been relatively small), no
solution involving a rotation of committee members
was adopted. By the time the euro area had increased
to a membership of 17, the large number of NCB rep-
resentatives had become a problem for the effective
operation of the ECB Council.
Interest in learning from the Federal Reserve and its
policy stance remains intense. By 2012, with the new
ECB government bond purchasing program, many
commentators suggested that the ECB had, at last,
become more like the Fed. For some, this meant
praise of institutional flexibility; for others, it meant
that central banking principles had been replaced by
politically driven expediency.
4.5 The Federal Reserve System
As in the case of fiscal federalism, the American
precedent is filled with a legacy of policy mistakes and
of bitter controversies. The question of the relation-
ship of a central federal bank to local banking sys-
tems – and to the patronage systems built up by local
elites – has always been a highly contentious issue in
American politics. The feeling that local interests
would be sacrificed to a Massachusetts and New York
banking elite was a strong driver of opposition to
Alexander Hamilton’s plans of 1790. It was also at the
core of Andrew Jackson’s campaign against Nicholas
Biddle and the Second Bank of the United States in
the 1830s; and his attempt to establish an alternative
banking system, answerable to and controlled by local
elites (the so-called “pet banks”).
Initially, as a response to the US financial panic of
1907, the National Monetary Commission looked at
the models of the leading institutions of the time,
namely the Bank of England, the Banque de France,
and the Reichsbank, and recommended a federally
dominated state central bank (in the form of the
Aldrich bill). That proposal was rejected by the
Democrats. The alternative scheme – which was even-
tually adopted – was engineered to give a great deal of
power and autonomy to the Reserve Banks in the
individual Reserve Districts, whose boards banks
were largely chosen by the regional banks. Until 1933,
the power of the Washington Board was very limited,
and it met and interacted relatively rarely with the
Com mittee of Governors representing the individual
Reserve Banks. After 1933, the Open Market Com -
mittee acted as the key policy-making organ of a
more centralised system.
The Federal Reserve System relied on a complicated
governance system that was designed to preserve
checks and balances, and to ensure that the system
could be neither dominated by the powerful East
Coast financial community nor by the federal govern-
ment in Washington. The regional Federal Reserve
Banks corresponded to what were felt to be logical
economic areas, which did not necessarily overlap
with state boundaries. A separate Reserve Bank for
each state would have created an over-complicated
system, with a large and unwieldy central committee
(originally termed the Federal Reserve Advisory
Council). The majority on the boards of the Reserve
Banks were selected by the local nationally chartered
banks, which composed the US financial system and
which were required to subscribe to the capital of the
Reserve Bank. This principle continues to the present
day. Three directors were chosen by the banks of the
district to reflect the financial community, and anoth-
er three to represent the general community (“com-
merce, agriculture or some industrial pursuit”); with a
final group of three being selected by the Washington
Board. The seven member Board in Washington was
the political counterpart, and five members were
appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. In the original Federal Reserve
Act, the Treasury Secretary and the Comptroller of
the Currency were also members of the Board. The
twelve regional banks represented coherent regional
economies. The Reserve Banks were required to pay a
6 percent dividend on the capital subscribed by the
banks, but profits above this level (and potential loss-
es) went to the federal government, which in this sense
became the ultimate backstop of the system. To high-
light the surprising character of this feature, a mental
experiment might be helpful. A modern European
equivalent to the Federal Reserve would be to create
private sector-based regional central banks, for
instance with Alpine, Baltic, North Sea, Atlantic,
Danubian, and Mediterranean banks. 
The original (1914) Federal Reserve System in many
ways more closely resembles the interaction of nation-
al central banks in the international system of the
gold standard. The system as a whole was not like that
of a bank with its own balance sheet. The twelve
Reserve Banks controlled their own operations, and
had their own discount policy. Any transactions with
other Reserve Banks had to be settled in the same way
as those with foreign central banks were. Section 17 of
the 1913 Act deterred the individual Reserve Banks
from issuing each other’s notes by imposing a fine,
and notes from one bank were to be returned to the
issuing bank: “Whenever Federal Reserve notes
issued through one Federal Reserve Bank shall be
received by another Federal Reserve Bank they shall
be promptly returned for credit or redemption to the
Federal Reserve Bank through which they were origi-
nally issued. No Federal Reserve Bank shall pay out
notes issued through another under penalty of a tax
of 10 per centum upon the face value of notes so paid
out (…). The Federal Reserve agent shall hold such
gold, gold certificates or lawful money available exclu-
sively for exchange for the outstanding Federal
Reserve notes when offered by the Reserve Bank of
which he is a director. Upon the request of the
Secretary of the Treasury the Federal Reserve Board
shall require the Federal Reserve agent to transmit so
much of said gold to the Treasury of the United
States as may be required for the exclusive purpose of
the redemption of such notes.” The mechanism was
known as the Gold Settlement Account.
The individual banks were also required to hold gold
in order to allow for the clearing of debit balances.
The loss of gold would affect their reserve ratio,
meaning that they would presumably also need to
reduce credit to banks, and would thus shrink the
regional money stock. In this regard, the system
seemed to reproduce the pre-1914 characteristics of
the National Banking Era (following the 1863
Banking Act), which in practice made for regional
contractions as banks contracted loans when their
reserves fell (these were maintained by law at very
high levels, as 15 or 25 percent of deposits). A similar
mechanism operated for one episode in the history of
the Fed, in the severe deflation at the end of the First
World War in 1920/21. The agricultural districts were
affected more strongly than the industrial districts,
and payments to farmers were slow and at low prices.
The consequence was a balance of payments deficit.
As the reserves fell, the district Reserve Banks were
under pressure, but they borrowed from other Reserve
Banks with large surpluses so as to minimize the
impact. There was thus substantial interdistrict bank
borrowing, but the outcome was still that credit
restrictions were believed to have hit the agricultural
areas and made for a faster recovery from the defla-
tion in the manufacturing districts (Goldenweiser,
1925, p. 36). By the time of the Great Depression,
however, when a similar effect might have been
expected to operate, the district shortfalls as a result
of regional balance of payments deficits were made
good, not by interdistrict accommodation, but by fed-
eral fiscal transfers made through the Federal Reserve
System (Burgess, 1936, p. 123–4). The Federal Reserve
System in practice during the Great Depression also
moved away from its previous practice of limiting
loans to credit secured by commercial bills (the so-
called real bills or Burgess-Riefler doctrine) to operat-
ing much more with government securities as collater-
al, and subsequently to the direct purchase of govern-
ment securities. The expansion of the federal budget
avoided the need for big financing operations by the
central bank through the interdistrict settlement
account, and the alteration in the credit practice of
the system in practice removed monetary policy from
being driven by regional imbalances. Large interdis-
trict surpluses and deficits only appeared again after
2008, in the aftermath of the failure of the private
interbank market. Then, as in Europe, the Federal
Reserve System substituted for a failure of private sec-
tor bank intermediation.
Immediately after the Federal Reserve Act took
effect, the outbreak of  the European War made the
question of  international gold movements highly sen-
sitive, and the most important financial figure in
dealing with international issues, the New York
Governor Benjamin Strong, pressed for a centraliza-
tion of  reserves, and New York in practice became
the dominant holder of  gold assets in the US system.
The Board was pleased with the easing of  interest
rates in the United States after 1915 and claimed that
it was the result of  the new institutional regime
(Meltzer, 2003, p. 79–80). 
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Like national central banks in
the international gold standard
order, the various American
Reserve Banks had their own dis-
count policies and applied differ-
ent rates – especially at moments
of strain. Globally, despite the
theoretical possibility of capital
being sent over vast distances to
other parts of the world, much
capital remained local. Creditors
and banks often preferred to do
business with known borrowers,
and where local jurisdictions
could settle disputes. In particu-
lar, a critical part of the interna-
tional gold standard was that
individual national central banks
set their own interest rates, with
the aim of influencing the direction of capital move-
ments. This became the central feature of the gold-
standard world: a country that was losing gold
reserves would tighten interest rates in order to attract
money. Central bank discount rates (the policy rate)
in France and Great Britain, major capital exporters,
were constantly lower than in Germany, which had no
major current account surplus, even although there
was never any market expectation of a parity alter-
ation. France and Britain in practice placed a floor
under rates, and their choices affected other countries
because of the possibility of arbitrage. Italy, where
there were expectations of parity changes in the 1870s
and 1880s, needed much higher rates.
We can see the same differentiation of interest rates in
the early history of the Federal Reserve System.
Individual Reserve Banks set their own discount rates.
Under Section 14(b) of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act,
their rates were “subject to review and determination
of the Federal Reserve Board.” The Board also (sec-
tion 13) had the “the right to determine or define the
character of the paper thus eligible for discount.” The
individual Reserve Banks had different collateral
requirements and accepted differing kinds of securi-
ties. In smooth or normal times, the rates tended to
converge; but in times of shocks, they could move
apart (see Figure 4.3). In the summer of 1929, at the
height of the credit boom, New York tightened, while
the other banks left rates unchanged; in 1932, New
York went much faster and further in lowering rates
than other banks. This created scope for major policy
conflicts. In 1919, the Attorney General ruled that the
Board could change rates for a Bank; and in 1929,
there was an acute conflict when the Board voted 4:3
to impose a reduction on the Chicago Bank
(Chandler, 1958, p. 44; Meltzer, 2003, p. 221–3).
By the late 1930s, the rate differences were disappear-
ing, but they only vanished completely during the
Second World War, for the simple reason that operat-
ing with federal bills (a single instrument) in open
market operations, rather than with a multiplicity of
differently valued private securities, became the pri-
mary tool of US monetary policy. When it came to
monetary policy instruments, the makers of the ECB
took the practice of the post-war Federal Reserve,
and assumed that the debt instruments of different
member states could fill the monetary policy role of a
single financial instrument (federal government secu-
rities) in the case of the Federal Reserve’s open mar-
ket policy.
The gold-standard rules look very different from the
modern practice of monetary union, which relies on a
single uniform interest rate. That one-size-fits-all
approach meant that in the 2000s interest rates in
Southern European countries were too low, and in
Northern Europe they were too high. Identical nomi-
nal rates with divergent real rates produced unsus-
tainable credit booms in the South. By contrast, a
gold-standard rule would have produced higher rates
for the Southern European borrowers, which would
have attracted funds to where capital might be pro-
ductively used, and at the same time acted as a deter-
rent against purely speculative capital flows. A mod-
ern equivalent to the gold standard/early Federal
Reserve approach would require differing (higher) lev-
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els of collateral requirement for central banks operat-
ing in countries with a housing and credit boom (pre-
2007 Spain or Ireland) than in countries with no cred-
it boom (pre-2007 Germany), see Brunnermeier
(2012).
The early history of  the Federal Reserve is rarely
seen as a productive source of  lessons for central
bank policy because it is overshadowed by dramatic
policy mistakes that did not follow automatically
from its design, but were probably intensified
because of  the governance structure and the con-
flicts of  the different powerful Reserve Banks (espe-
cially New York, as the international financial centre
and Chicago as the hub of  the domestic trading sys-
tem). In 1920/21, and more disastrously in 1930–33,
the Federal Reserve System engineered a pernicious
deflation (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). Reform
suggestions consequently focused on coordinating
policy more centrally.
4.6 Reform of the Federal Reserve System
It was only in the 1930s, with the new Bank Law of
1933, that the Federal Reserve System really started to
act as a modern central bank. That legislation was the
result of the Great Depression, a profound disruption
of economic life in which it was generally felt that
both American banking and American central bank-
ing had failed.
The mechanism of  settlement changed in the 1930s,
and was renamed from the Gold Settlement Account
to the Interdistrict Settlement Account (ISA). The
change in nomenclature was
necessary in that the dollar value
of  gold or gold certificates was
arbitrarily set after 1933 by the
US Treasury. In April 1975, with
much larger international trans-
actions occurring through New
York, the Federal Reserve Open
Market Committee agreed to
institute an annual settlement
(in April) of  the ISA balances of
the Federal Reserve Banks in
terms of  reallocating the owner-
ship shares in the open market
portfolio, including interest,
acquired by the system in the
process of  money creation.
From the 1970s to 2008, the bal-
ances were of  small size and limited importance,
because inter-district transfers occurred primarily
through the interbank market. After 2008, with the
seize-up of  the interbank market, the ISA became
very significant. 
Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 compare the ISA balances in
the US with the Target balances in the euro area,
which have a very similar definition and which were
discussed extensively in last year's report (EEAG,
2012, Chapter 2). Basically, these are net payment
orders through the common reserve system that
require one District Fed or one National Central
Bank to credit payment orders on behalf  of  other
such institutions, and that hence lead to the building
up of  local debt and asset positions. Figures 4.4 and
4.5 show the balances in absolute terms, and figure
4.6 shows the sum of  the respective gross claims rel-
ative to the GDP of  the US or the euro area, respec-
tively.
As in the case of  the ECB, the Fed's settlement mech-
anism did not appear to be problematic or contro-
versial until the 2008 financial crisis. After 2008,
large and persistent imbalances appeared, however,
with the large liabilities of  the San Francisco and
Richmond banks, and the large asset balances of
New York. The highest levels of  deficits for San
Francisco were 67 billion US dollars (February 3,
2010) and 66 billion US dollars (December 28, 2011);
and the maxima for the New York surpluses were 270
billion US dollars on November 12, 2008, in the
aftermath of  the Lehman collapse, and 368 billion
US dollars on January 12, 2012. These are relatively
small figures compared with the overall expansion of
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the Federal Reserve System’s balance sheet, but they
are not insignificant. They are comparable to
European Target imbalances in that they arise from
very large movements of  funds out of  some commer-
cial banks that operate across the whole of  the
United States, but have their headquarters (and thus
their financial location) in a particular place within
one of  the twelve Federal Reserve districts. The most
plausible explanation involves the head office loca-
tion of  large banks in the San Francisco district
(Wells Fargo) and in the Richmond district (Bank of
America), with the Federal Reserve Bank keeping
claims against these banks, rather than selling them
in the settlement process. Since the ISA imbalances
reflect fundamentally changing market perceptions
of  US private financial institu-
tions, rather than current
account imbalances between the
various regions of  the United
States, and as local District Feds
being private institutions are not
vulnerable to local political pres-
sure aiming at state finance with
the printing press (Garber,
2010), they do not display the
permanence that has character-
ized their European equivalents,
where banks in deficit countries
are paralyzed because of  the ties
between banks and sovereigns
(with banks holding the paper of
the sovereigns that bail them
out).
The most pronounced difference between the United
States and the European system (highlighted in Sinn
and Wollmershäuser, 2011, and Sinn, 2012a) is, how-
ever, that only the United States has a settlement sys-
tem that requires the debtor District Feds to securitize
their ISA debt, i.e. to redeem their liabilities with
interest bearing, marketable assets. In the euro area,
by contrast, the debt is simply kept in the books and
carried forward year by year with interest being
added. Figure 4.6 shows that during the crisis, around
the month of settlement (April), the US balances nor-
mally go down significantly. An exception was 2011.
In that year, settlement was postponed by a year to
give the deficit District Feds more time to react. In
April 2010 and 2012 settlement actually took place in
the United States and reduced
the balances. In April 2009, by
contrast, the balances came down
in the months before April and
rose in the months thereafter.
Presumab ly, the District Feds in
deficit had tried to avoid the
transfer of interest bearing assets
upon settlement by reducing their
local credit supply and hence
attracting private capital inflows
from other regions, which
reduced the ISA balances. They
did this despite the fact that the
system is underwritten by the US
government, perhaps because
only the revenue after cost is
transferred to the government,
while cost includes local ameni-
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ties, above all the widely differing local salaries.1 At
present (November 2012), the gross sum of the US
ISA balances is 0.8 percent of GDP, while the euro
area’s gross sum of Target balances has risen to
11 percent of GDP. 
In addition to generating useful incentives to keep the
interdistrict imbalances small, the settlement does
protect local central banks more effectively against
the break-up of the system. In Europe, the creditor
central banks would probably lose their claims against
the debtor central banks should the euro break up, as
these are claims against a system that no longer exists.
This makes the national governments that own the
central banks vulnerable to political pressure to par-
ticipate in further bail-out activities like government
bond purchases and the establishment of intergovern-
mental rescue programs, which both reduce the Target
imbalances. Had the euro area adopted a system of
securitizing the Target claims with marketable interest
bearing assets that would retain their value even after
a break-up of the system, the incentive to participate
in bail-out activities contrary to the Maastricht Treaty
(no-bail-out clause, article 125 Union Treaty, and ban
on state finance with the printing press, article 123
Union Treaty) would have been lower.2
4.7 Conclusions
The US example is often cited to make the sensible
point that, in the long run, any monetary union also
requires some sort of a fiscal union. That demand
appeared frequently in the political rhetoric of the
early 1990s, when the German government in particu-
lar insisted that economic and monetary union need-
ed to be accompanied by political union. The inter-
connections of state debt and (private) banking sector
liabilities produce intense conflicts about who – which
political authority – is the ultimately debtor. Without
a political mechanism for allocating fiscal responsibil-
ity, it is hard to imagine long-term stability.
Sometimes a move to political union is suggested sim-
ply as a pragmatic solution to the borrowing incapac-
ity of some states. In an extreme example, early in the
First World War, the Russian Imperial government
believed that it would be able to borrow if  it declared
a union with its political allies France and Great
Britain. The proposal was absurd, and merely high-
lighted the absurd incompatibilities of very different
political systems. The political union can only succeed
on the basis of a constitutionalisation, as in the
American example, which, in turn, depends on the
recognition and acceptance of common identity, as
well as of some shared interests.
There is certainly an interest-based case to be made
for greater integration. When the European
Monetary Union was created, no adequate provision
on a European basis existed for banking supervision
and regulation, which like fiscal policy, was left to
rather diverse national authorities. An explosion of
banking activity occurred simultaneously with the
transition to monetary union and may well have
been stimulated by the new single money. A “bank-
ing glut” led to a new challenge to monetary policy-
making. Neither of  these problems, fiscal and bank-
ing, was uniquely European, but the complexity of
interaction between different levels of  authority and
different interests produced a coordination problem
that was uniquely difficult to deal with in the
European context.
In this context, it is not surprising that Europeans
turn to examples of how political institutions have
evolved elsewhere that solve the problem of federal-
ism (as well as looking to the history of European fed-
eral systems, such as that of the German state system
since 1806). But it is a mistake to think that the
United States holds out a very simple or easy to apply
model. American history shows how difficult and
obstacle-filled the path to federalism can be.
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